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EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
SANCTIONS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
By W. Gregory Vossi & Hugues Bouthinon-Dumasii 
Prior to the application of the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), one result of the low maximum corporate fines for 
violations under the preceding data protection legislation was, 
arguably, a lack of compliance by U.S. Tech Giants and other 
companies. At least on paper, this changed under the GDPR. This study 
approaches the issue of GDPR sanctions, not through the lens of a 
catastrophe waiting to happen, but instead though a development first 
of the theoretical grounds for sanctions, prior to a view of the practical 
side of them. In doing so, it is somewhat unique and adds to the GDPR 
literature. Furthermore, it engages the legal strategy and compliance 
literature to bring its results home to inform companies as to the risks 
involved and to provide strategic recommendations both for companies 
and for regulators. 
 Among the several sub-goals of sanctions, this study 
determines that the most relevant for an analysis of GDPR sanctions—
which are administrative, regulatory and financial sanctions, in large 
part—is the deterrence function, beyond the symbolic functions. This 
demands effective and substantial administrative fines. While these are 
not the only sanctions available under the GDPR—this study also sets 
out a range of possible sanctions, such as judicial compensation and 
orders to halt data processing—they are perhaps the most 
characteristic of data protection enforcement. However, through what 
is referred to as the one-stop-shop mechanism, the Irish DPA is the 
lead authority for most of the U.S. Tech Giants, and it has failed to act 
against them up to now, resulting in a potential lack of deterrence. This 
study argues that, on the one hand, companies should embrace 
compliance, and on the other hand, truly dissuasive administrative 
fines must be issued by supervisory authorities when they are justified, 
in order for the sanctions to have their necessary deterrence effect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR),1 which has applied since May 25, 2018,2 has extraterritorial 
effect,3 much as its predecessor legislation—the EU Data Protection 
Directive4—did, but more so. However, such extraterritorial effect is—
this study argues—not of much use without effective incentive for 
compliance and means of enforcement. In November 2015,  a little 
more than one month before political agreement was reached on EU 
data protection law reform,5 and more than five months before its 
adoption in the form of the GDPR,6 then-French State Secretary for 
Digital Matters Axelle Lemaire estimated that the power to sanction of 
the French data protection authority–the CNIL (Commission Nationale 
de l’Informatique et des Libertés [National Commission for Computing 
and Liberties])–was “peanuts” compared to the economic reality of 
Internet giants, especially U.S. companies that dominate the market.7 
 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 1, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
2 Id. art. 99(2). 
3 For a brief discussion of this extraterritorial effect, see infra Section A of the 
Introduction. 
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data personal data and on the free Movement of such data, 1995 O.J. 
(L 281) 31, 31 [hereinafter EU DP Directive]. 
5 Political agreement was reached on EU data protection reform on 
December 15, 2015.  See European Commission Press Release IP/15/6321, 
Agreement on Commission's EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital 
Single Market (Dec. 15, 2015).     
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6321. Note that 
the term “data protection,” is used within the European Union. 
6 Various dates have been used for the adoption date of the GDPR. Certain 
authors use the date it was approved by the Council of the European Union.  
Some use the date that the GDPR was approved by the European Parliament; 
others, the date of its publication in the Official Journal of European Union, 
or twenty days thereafter, when it entered into force. The GDPR was actually 
signed and dated on April 27, 2016. GDPR, supra note 1 (“Done at Brussels, 
27 April 2016”). 
7 Fabienne Schmitt, Le pouvoir de sanction de la CNIL, « c’est cacahouète » 
[The CNIL’s Sanctioning Power: “It’s Peanuts”], LESECHOS.FR (Nov. 3, 
2015), https://www.lesechos.fr/03/11/2015/LesEchos/22058-101-ECH_le-
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At the time the maximum administrative sanction that the CNIL was 
able to impose was €150,000,8 or the then-equivalent of approximately 
$165,000.9 This was a sum that then-EU Justice Commissioner Viviane 
Reding described as “pocket money,” when in 2014 the CNIL issued a 
fine against Google in that amount.10  
However, since May 25, 2018, the date the GDPR first 
applied,11 EU Member State data protection supervisory authorities 
such as the CNIL can issue administrative sanctions for the most severe 
data protection violations by companies in the amount of the greater of 
€20 million or 4% of worldwide annual turnover for the prior year.12  
At least on paper, it’s not peanuts anymore!  Much attention has been 
paid to this increase in potential EU sanctions for data protection 




a%20CNIL,%20«%20c’est%20cacahouète%20».   
8 See Hazel Grant & Hannah Crowther, How Effective Are Fines in Enforcing 
Privacy?, in ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES 287, 301 (David Wright & Paul De Hert, eds., 
2016). 
9 Currency Converter, OANDA, 
https://www.oanda.com/lang/fr/currency/converter/ (calculated using 
historical currency exchange figures for Nov. 3, 2015).  
10 See European Commission Press Release, Speech: The EU Data Protection 
Reform: Helping Businesses Thrive in the Digital Economy (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-37_en.htm (“Taking 
Google's 2012 performance figures, the fine in France represents 0.0003% of 
its global turnover. Pocket money.”). One journalist referred to a 2017 CNIL 
fine against Facebook in the same amount as a “slap on the wrist.” See also 
Mark Scott, Facebook Gets Slap on the Wrist from 2 European Privacy 
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rlzS4O.  
11 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 99(2). 
12 Id. art. 83(5). 
13 See, e.g., ONNO JANSSEN ET AL., THE PRICE OF DATA SECURITY: A GUIDE 
TO THE INSURABILITY OF GDPR FINES ACROSS EUROPE 3 (3rd ed., 2020) 
(“The scale of these fines has understandably generated concern in 
boardrooms. GDPR has replaced a regime under which fines for a data 
breach were limited and enforcement actions infrequent. The regulatory 
environment across European Member States is undoubtedly shifting and 
regulators now have greater powers of enforcement, and significant GDPR 
fines are expected to be imposed where organisations are subject to 
investigations.”), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2020/05/third-edition-
of-guide-on-the-insurability-of-gdpr-fines-across-europe/. See also Omer 
Tene, With Hefty GDPR Fines, a New Industry Emerges, IAPP (July 12, 
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today’s economy—described variously as the new gold or the new oil14 
—and due to the extraterritorial reach of the GDPR.  This study looks 
at these sanctions and other remedies under the GDPR both from 
theoretical and practical perspectives. The essential research question 
posited by this study is, does the reality of supervisory authority action 
support the theoretical goals for GDPR sanctions, and what strategic 
recommendations for both firms and supervisory authorities result? 
This introduction continues with an initial brief explanation of 
the GDPR (Section A), followed by a discussion of the U.S. Tech 
Giants (Section B)—companies whose business model may be strongly 
impacted by the GDPR due to their use of personal data,15 and ending 
with an introduction on data protection sanctions (Section C). 
A. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
The GDPR is the European Union’s omnibus data protection 
legislation,16 taking the form of an EU regulation, which means that it 
 
2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/with-hefty-gdpr-fines-a-new-industry-
emerges/ (discussing the new privacy tech industry, the author comments 
about the effect of GDPR fines: “With mega fines come heightened 
responsibilities for companies, directors and officers.”).  
14 See, e.g., W. Gregory Voss, Internet, New Technologies, and Value: Taking 
Share of Economic Surveillance, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 469, 471 
(2017). 
15 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of 
Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L & 
TECH. 1, [1]–[5] (2018); see also David Meyer, Europe’s Privacy Laws are 
Tough. Meet the Woman Who Could Make Them Costly for Facebook and 
Google, FORTUNE (Oct. 28, 2019, 3:30), https://fortune.com/2019/10/28/gdpr-
europe-helen-dixon-ireland-privacy-laws-facebook-google/ (“If the U.S. 
firms lose in major cases, Dixon could order them to pay fines as high as 4% 
of global annual revenue; a negative ruling could also expose them to even 
more expensive civil suits. More importantly, they may face new limits on 
how they acquire, share, and use personal data—the lifeblood of today’s ad-
driven tech economy.”). 
16 Omnibus (or comprehensive) data protection legislation contrasts with the 
U.S. sectoral/self-regulatory model. See W. Gregory Voss, Internal 
Compliance Mechanisms for Firms in the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation, 50 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 783, 789 (2018). Note that the 
GDPR also applies in the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement 
countries of Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein. In this sense, see also Decision 
of the EEA Joint Committee No 154/2018 of 6 July 2018 amending Annex XI 
(Electronic communication, audiovisual services and information society) and 
Protocol 37 (containing the list provided for in Article 101) to the EEA 
Agreement [2018/1022], 2018 O.J. (L 183) 23. Nonetheless, this study will 
continue to refer to the European Union in its discussion of the GDPR. 
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is directly applicable throughout the European Union.17 The GDPR has 
a dual objective—to protect “fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal 
data”18 and to guarantee the “free movement of personal data” within 
the European Union.19 The GDPR recognizes that, thanks to new 
technologies, private companies (such as the U.S. Tech Giants), are 
able “to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale in order 
to pursue their activities.”20 As a result, there is a need to make 
operators more responsible and to have strong enforcement by the 
regulatory authorities, with a view to creating trust in the digital 
economy.21 The GDPR stipulates that in order for personal data—a 
very broad concept in the European Union drafted to include a range 
of information that can be tied to an identified or identifiable natural 
 
17 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, art. 288, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 171–72 [hereinafter TFEU]. See also 
Irina Alexe, The Sanctioning Regime Provided by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
on the Protection of Personal Data, 2017 INT’L LAW REVIEW 60, 61 (2018). 
18 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 1(2). This right to personal data protection is 
enshrined in the TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 17, art. 16. It is also contained 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 397. 
Article 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
provides “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her.” For a discussion of the modification of the legal status of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to make it legally 
binding, and for the incorporation of the right to personal data protection into 
the TFEU, see GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL 
DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU  231–234 (2014). 
19 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 1(3). This is part of what Lynskey refers to as part 
of the “economic underpinning” of the legislation. See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 8 (2015). Lynskey also 
discusses the legislative goal of market harmonization. Id. at 66-67 (“The 
increased emphasis on the effectiveness of fundamental rights in the 
Commission’s proposal for a Regulation did not detract attention from its 
emphasis on market harmonization … the substantive provisions of the 
Commission’s initial proposal also evidenced its ambition to create a uniform 
regulatory environment for data processing in the EU.”). 
20 GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 6. 
21 Id. Recital 7. 
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person (data subject)22—to be processed (another broad term),23 there 
must be a legal basis for such processing, such as consent, when the 
GDPR applies.24 Moreover, a large range of rights must be furnished 
to data subjects,25 and data information principles (similar to fair 
information principles) apply,26 including the requirement that 
measures must be taken to ensure the security of the personal data.27 
The GDPR operates when its provisions regarding material and 
territorial scope are met,28 among which, new extraterritorial coverage 
 
22 “Personal data” are defined as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is 
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to 
an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.” 
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(1). For a discussion of the broadness of this term 
and its meaning, see W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data 
and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 
AM. BUS. L.J. 287, 313–24 (2019). For an earlier development of this issue, 
prior to the finalization of the GDPR, see Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. 
Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European 
Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877, 877 (2014). 
23 “Processing” is defined as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by 
automated means, such as collection, recording, organization, structuring, 
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.” GDPR, supra note 1, art. 
4(2). 
24 Consent is one of six legal bases for the processing of personal data. The 
others are where the processing is necessary for: the performance of a contract 
to which the data subject is a party, compliance of a legal obligation of the 
controller, the protection of the data subject’s (or another individual’s) vital 
interests, the performance of a public interest task or one under public 
authority, or the controller’s legitimate interest. However, this last basis may 
be overridden by the data subject’s fundamental rights. Id. art. 6(1). 
25 These include information requirements with respect to the processing. Id. 
arts. 13–14. A right of access to his or her data is provided, as well. Id. art. 15. 
A right to rectification applies, too. Id. art. 16. Furthermore, there is a new 
right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”). GDPR, supra note 1, art. 17. A right 
to obtain restrictions of processing is furnished in certain circumstances. Id. 
art. 18. In addition to other rights, there is a new right to data portability. Id. 
art. 20. For other rights (right to object and right not to be subjected to 
automated individual decision-making), see id. arts. 21–22. 
26 Id. art. 5. 
27 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(f). 
28 Id. arts. 2–3. 
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where data of data subjects in the European Union are being processed 
in connection with the offer of goods or services (whether for pay or in 
exchange for the personal data, without payment) or where the 
behavior of data subjects in the European Union is being monitored, 
when such behavior occurs within the European Union.29 In such cases, 
the companies collecting and processing the data do not need to have 
an establishment in the European Union in order to be required to 
comply with the GDPR, but they may be required to appoint a 
representative in the European Union.30  
B. The U.S. Tech Giants 
As measured almost three and one-half years after Axelle 
Lemaire spoke, and ten months after the GDPR became applicable, five 
of the six largest U.S. firms by market value were in the sector of 
information technology and Internet (including e-commerce and social 
media): (in order) Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet (Google), and 
Facebook.31  One journalist has referred to these companies, which 
each amass tens of billions of dollars in revenue annually, as the 
“Frightful Five,” and has remarked upon the domination of these firms, 
and their recent loss of goodwill both among the public and U.S. 
regulatory and legal infrastructure, as such firms have moved from 
“disrupters” to “incumbents.”32  These same firms have been referred 
to by Europeans as the “GAFAM” (for Google, Apple, Facebook, 
Amazon, and Microsoft),33 and such firms have similarly lost goodwill, 
especially since the revelation of the N.S.A. PRISM mass surveillance 
 
29 The new provision reads:  
2. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data 
of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not 
established in the Union where the processing activities are related 
to:  
(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a 
payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the 
Union; or  
(b) the monitoring of their behavior as far as their behavior takes 
place within the Union. Id. art. 3(2). 
30 Id. art. 27. 
31 The ranking is as of March 29, 2019. The other firm making up the six 
largest market valuations was Berkshire Hathaway, at fourth place, ahead of 
Amazon. See Fortune 500, FORTUNE 2019, 
https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/search/. 
32 Farhad Manjoo, Tech Giants Seem Invincible. That Worries Lawmakers., 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jD5mCK.  
33 For a discussion of this, see Voss, supra note 14, at 474 n.28. 
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program34 involving the participation of all but one of them.35 Another 
term used has been “Big Tech.”36 For ease of reference and to retain 
the tie to their nation of origin, this study retains the use of the term 
“the U.S. Tech Giants,”37 keeping in mind that this grouping is 
established merely as a shorthand way of discussing the largest U.S. 
technology companies, and that there are many distinctions between 
the companies that make up such grouping.38 Much of what is said 
about the U.S. Tech Giants also applies to other U.S. companies mainly 
active on the Internet, such as Netflix, Airbnb, Tesla, and Uber, which 
have also been referred to as the "NATU."39 
Certain of the U.S. Tech Giants have been the subject of 
prosecution or investigation in Europe for tax and competition law 
violations, areas of law often categorized as falling within the ambit of 
international economic law (IEL).40 At the EU level, for instance, the 
 
34 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), https://nyti.ms/2nJdWCF.  
35 See GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE 107–09 (2014). The lone 
exception was Amazon.  
36 For use of the term “big tech,” see, e.g., Sherrod Brown, Privacy Isn’t a 
Right You Can Click Away, WIRED (June 29, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/privacy-isnt-a-right-you-can-click-away/. See 
also Adam Satariano & Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Big Tech’s Toughest 
Opponent Says She’s Just Getting Started, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/2QA8ZtF (discussing EU competition law enforcement efforts 
against companies such as Apple, Uber, Amazon, Facebook and Google). 
37 For prior use of this term, see, e.g., Ellen Huet & Alex Webb,  
US Tech Giants Face Splintered Digital Future in EU, SFGATE (June 28, 
2016; updated, June 28, 2016 4:42 PM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/US-tech-giants-face-splintered-
digital-future-in-8330585.php). 
38 See e.g., Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 332–38 (contrasting the legal 
strategy pathways of Facebook and Google, on the one hand, and Amazon, 
Microsoft and Apple, on the other hand). 
39 See Pierre Haski, Après les Gafa, les nouveaux maîtres du monde sont les 
Natu [After the Gafa, the New Masters of the World are the Natu], L’OBS 
AVEC  RUE 89 (Jan. 26, 2017, 12:56 PM), 
https://www.nouvelobs.com/rue89/20150802.RUE3739/apres-les-gafa-les-
nouveaux-maitres-du-monde-sont-les-natu.html. 
40 “Tax activity” and “corporate activity” that is the subject of bilateral or other 
international treaties, is considered to be part of international economic law 
(IEL).  See JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING 
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (2006). See also Steve 
Charnovitz, What Is International Economic Law?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 5–
6 (2011) (including competition/antitrust and double taxation in the definition 
of international economic law, as legal norms “legislated (or alluded to) in the 
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European Commission concluded that Luxembourg tax rulings in favor 
of Amazon constituted illegal state aid in an amount of $295 million 
(€250 million) and must be recovered from Amazon by Luxembourg,41 
and likewise that two Irish tax rulings in favor of Apple constitute 
illegal state aid in an amount of up to €13 billion, which must be 
recovered from the company by Ireland.42  However, the decision in 
the Irish tax rulings case was eventually annulled by the General Court 
of the European Union,43 although such annulment is being appealed 
by the Commission,44 and various EU member state efforts to recover 
taxes from certain U.S. Tech Giants have resulted in settlements.45  
 
law of the World Trade Organization (WTO).” Charnovitz even includes legal 
norms regarding “the internet” as part of “international legal norms that are 
not part of the WTO,” which fit within the definition of international economic 
law). 
41 See European Commission Press Release IP/17/3701, State Aid: 
Commission finds Luxembourg gave illegal tax benefits to Amazon worth 
around €250 million (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3701. See also 
Robert-Jan Bartunek, EU Orders Amazon to Repay $295 Million in 
Luxembourg Back Taxes, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2017, 2:37 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-amazon-taxavoidance/eu-orders-
amazon-to-repay-295-million-in-luxembourg-back-taxes-idUSKCN1C913S.   
42 Commission Decision 2017/1283, on State Aid SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 
2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP) implemented by Ireland to Apple, 2017 O.J. (L 187) 
1, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017D1283&from=EN. In 2017, the 
European Commission referred Ireland to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union for failure to recover such amounts. See also Press Release, 
European Commission, State Aid: Commission refers Ireland to Court for 
failure to recover illegal tax benefits recover illegal tax benefits from Apple 
worth up to €13 Billion (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_3702. 
43 European Union Press Release 90/20, General Court of the European Union, 
The General Court of the European Union annuls the decision taken by the 
Commission regarding the Irish tax rulings in favour of Apple (July 15, 2020), 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-
07/cp200090en.pdf.  
44 Foo Yun Chee, EU's Vestager Appeals Court Veto of $15 Billion Apple 
Tax Order, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2020 11:52 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-taxation-idUSKCN26G1DB.  
45 See, e.g., Daniel Boffey & Jill Treanor, Google £130m UK Back-Tax Deal 
Lambasted as ‘Derisory’ by Expert, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2016, 17:05),  
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/23/google-uk-back-tax-
deal-lambasted-as-derisory (discussing £130 million settlement between 
Google and the UK); See also Reuters Staff, Amazon to Pay 100 Million Euros 
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France adopted a “GAFA” (or digital services) tax, aimed at ensuring 
that the U.S. Tech Giants pay a fair share of their French revenue to the 
French tax authorities,46 and other European countries are considering 
similar measures.47  
Furthermore, EU competition law sanctions have involved 
significant sums of money—in a 2013 report, prior to the application 
of the GDPR, EU competition law fines were shown to have an impact 
on U.S. international transactions accounts, while EU data protection 
fines were absent from the analysis.48 EU competition law cases have 
resulted in fines of €561 million against Microsoft for not complying 
with anti-tying commitments in an antitrust case involving Internet 
 
to Settle Italy Tax Dispute, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:03 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-italy-tax/amazon-to-pay-100-
million-euros-to-settle-italy-tax-dispute-idUSKBN1E91KM (reporting 
agreement between the Italian tax authority and Amazon to collect €100 
million ($118 million) in back taxes for the period 2011–2015); See also Mark 
Scott, Google Agrees to Pay Italy $334 Million in Back Taxes, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2pL2Z3Z (detailing agreement between Italian 
authorities and Google to recover €306 million ($334 million) in back taxes 
for 2002–2015 and mentioning a similar 2015 agreement between Apple and 
Italy for €314 million in back taxes); Microsoft has also agreed to enter into 
an agreement with the French Ministry in charge of taxation for €350 million 
for corporate income tax for the period 2010–2012. See David Bensoussan, 
Microsoft passe un accord avec le fisc français [Microsoft Makes an 
Agreement with the French Tax Authorities], CHALLENGES (June 5, 2019, 
18:58), https://www.challenges.fr/economie/microsoft-passe-un-accord-
avec-le-fisc-francais_657176.  
46 See Liz Alderman, France Moves to Tax Tech Giants, Stoking Fight with 
White House, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2Lh1iXo. France 
has delayed collecting such tax—also referred to as a digital services tax—in 
order to allow time to negotiate a deal on the resulting dispute with the United 
States through the OECD. France had planned to collect such tax starting at 
the end of 2020. See also Mark Sweney, UK and Europe Renew Calls for 
Global Digital Tax as US Quits Talks, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 18, 2020, 9:40), 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/jun/18/uk-europe-global-digital-
tax-us-quits-talks-tech.  
47 See Lilian V. Faulhaber, Beware. Other Nations Will Follow France With 
Their Own Digital Tax., N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/2XKGsBC.   
48 See Christopher L. Bach, Fines and Penalties in the U.S. International 
Transactions Accounts, BEA 57 (July 2013), 
https://apps.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2013/07%20July/0713_fines_penalties_internati
onal_accounts.pdf.  
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Explorer and Windows OS software,49 periodic penalties of €899 
million against Microsoft in an antitrust case involving a refusal to 
provide interoperability information to vendors of work group server 
operating system products.50  The European Commission has also fined 
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as a search engine by 
giving illegal advantage to its own comparison shopping service,51 and 
more recently €4.34 billion (or $5.1 billion52) for illegal actions related 
to the Android mobile operating system, which were aimed at 
strengthening Google’s dominant position in internet search,53 and 
€1.49 billion for abuse of its dominant position in online search 
advertisements through restrictive AdSense for Search contractual 
clauses requiring publishers using AdSense for Search to effectively 
reserve the most profitable spaces in their search results for Google 
advertisements, thereby disfavoring search engine competitors such as 
 
49 See European Commission Press Release IP/13/196, Commission fines 
Microsoft for non-compliance with browser choice commitments (Mar. 6, 
2013), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_196. 
50 Commission Decision of February 27, 2008, fixing the definitive amount of 
the periodic penalty payment imposed on Microsoft Corporation by Decision 
C (2005) 4420 final, 2009 O.J. (C 166). This fine was upheld but reduced to 
€860 million by the General Court. See James Kanter, In European Court, a 
Small Victory for Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012), 
https://nyti.ms/MAx1tU. 
51 Commission Decision of June 27, 2017, relating to proceedings under 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 
Article 54 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (AT.39740 - 
Google Search (Shopping)) C (2017) 76, 213, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_1499
6_3.pdf.  
52 See Debra Cassens Weiss, EU Punishes Google with Record $5.1B 
Antitrust Fine for Deals Requiring Preinstalled Apps, Services, ABA 
JOURNAL (July 18, 2018, 8:48 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/eu_punishes_google_with_record_5
.1b_antitrust_fine_for_deals_requiring_prei.  
53 See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust: 
Commission fines Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices regarding Android 
mobile devices to strengthen dominance of Google's search engine (July 18, 
2018), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581. 
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Microsoft and Yahoo.54 In addition, the European Commission 
obtained commitments from Amazon in a case relating to e-books.55 
C. Introduction to Data Protection Sanctions 
Moreover, and more pertinent to our study, certain of the 
practices of the U.S. Tech Giants have also been subject to sanction by 
various EU Member State data protection authorities (DPAs),56 called 
“supervisory authorities” in the GDPR,57 and by other regulatory 
authorities even if they are not specifically in charge of data protection, 
such as competition authorities,58 or financial authorities59 such as the 
 
54 See European Commission Press Release IP/19/1770, Antitrust: 
Commission fines Google €1.49 billion for abusive practices in online 
advertising (Mar. 20, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770.  
55 See Summary of Commission Decision of May 4, 2017, relating to a 
proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.40153 — E-Book 
MFNS and related matters), 2017 O.J. (C 264) 7, available at https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017XC0811(02)
&from=EN. 
56 See, e.g., Houser & Voss, supra note 15, at 20–35.  
57 “Supervisory authority” is defined in the GDPR as “an independent public 
authority which is established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51.” 
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(21). Pursuant to Article 51, it is charged with 
“monitoring the application of [the GDPR], in order to protect the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to processing and to 
facilitate the free flow of personal data within the [European] Union.” Id. art. 
51(1). Note that this study will use the term “supervisory authority,” or, 
alternatively, “DPA,” to indicate this form of regulatory authority. 
58 See Commission Decision of May 17, 2017, Case M.8228 — 
Facebook/WhatsApp, notified under document C(2017) 3192; see also 
Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding: Facebook’s Collection and 
Use of Data From Third-Party Sources is Abusive, BUNDESKARTELLAMT  
(Dec. 19, 2017), quoted in PAUL FRIEDRICH NEMITZ, FINES UNDER THE GDPR 
4–5 (2017) .  
59 See, e.g., Financial Services Authority (U.K.), Final Notice to HSBC 
Actuaries and Consultants Limited, July 17, 2009 (regarding fines totaling 
over £ 3 million against companies of the HSBC), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/hsbc_actuaris0709.pdf; see 
also Financial Services Authority (U.K.), Final Notice to HSBC Life (UK) 
Limited (July 17, 2009), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-
notices/hsbc_inuk0907.pdf;  see also Financial Services Authority (U.K.), 
Final Notice to HSBC Insurance Brokers Limited (July 17, 2009), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/hsbc_ins0709.pdf. For an 
additional example, see also Financial Services Authority (U.K.), Final Notice 
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UK Financial Services Authority.60 Paul Nemitz refers to data 
protection and competition law both falling within “special economic 
administrative law,”61 and the GDPR looks to competition law for the 
definition of “undertaking,” used to determine the level of sanctions 
applicable in data protection enforcement actions.62 However, many of 
the enforcement actions against the U.S. Tech Giants have been under 
the EU DP Directive,63 the legislation that preceded and was repealed 
by the GDPR, and resulted in relatively small sanctions when 
compared to those in tax and competition law cases, and certainly when 
compared to the annual revenue of the U.S. Tech Giants. As an 
example, these could only go up to a maximum of €150,000 (for a first 
offense) in France; €900,000 in Spain, and £500,000 in the United 
Kingdom.64  
One definition of “sanction” is “[a] provision that gives force 
to a legal imperative by either rewarding obedience or punishing 
disobedience.”65 Likewise, “sanctioning” has been defined as “the 
formal reaction to a violation of the law by the authorities” and it may 
be punitive or restorative.66 Effective sanctions are seen as necessary 
for obtaining compliance with legal rules,67 especially when people do 
not spontaneously comply with the rules because they consider them 
fair and deserving of respect for that reason alone. The imposing of 
sanctions is one tool of enforcement, as we have seen, and enforcement 
in turn is meant to put into application legal standards meant to 
 
to Zurich Insurance Plc, UK branch, Aug. 19, 2010 (regarding a fine of 
££2,275 million pounds against Zurich Insurance). On the latter fine, see also 
Nemitz, supra note 58, at 14.  
60 Nemitz, supra note 58, at 14–15.  
61 Id. at 3. 
62 GDPR, supra note 1, recital (150) (referring to TFEU arts. 101 and 102, the 
provisions regarding, respectively, illegal cartels and abuse of a dominant 
position). 
63 EU DP Directive, supra note 4. 
64 See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 301. 
65 Sanction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
66 Miroslava Scholten et al., The Proliferation of EU Enforcement Authorities: 
A New Development in Law Enforcement in the EU, in LAW ENFORCEMENT 
BY EU AUTHORITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 5 (Miroslava Scholten & Michiel Luchtman, eds., 2017). 
67 See Sebastian J. Golla, Is Data Protection Law Growing Teeth? The Current 
Lack of Sanctions in Data Protection Law and Administrative Fines Under the 
GDPR, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 70, 70 (2017), (citing 
THOMAS RAISER, GRUNDLAGEN DER RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 253 (Mohr Siebeck 
6th ed. 2013)). 
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influence behavior.68 Indeed, effectiveness of sanctions may be 
evaluated by first identifying the desired outcome, such as 
discouraging non-compliance, encouraging good practice, or raising 
awareness of privacy rights, for example,69 and comparing this to the 
result achieved. However, it is more difficult to measure compliance 
with privacy laws than to measure enforcement.70 Sanctions may take 
many forms beyond the basic carrot and the stick announced in the 
definition of the term. For example, there are criminal sanctions,71 
administrative sanctions,72 and civil sanctions.73 In addition, as various 
factors may need to be taken into account in the application of 
sanctions, their level may not be fixed once and for all but determined 
 
68 See David Wright & Paul De Hert, Introduction to Enforcing Privacy, in 
ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES 1, 2 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2016) (defining 
enforcement as “to translate a set of legal standards designed to influence 
human and institutional behavior into social reality” (citation omitted)).  
69 See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 290. 
70 See Graham Greenleaf, Responsive Regulation of Data Privacy: Theory and 
Asian Examples, in ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES 233, 234 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 
2016) (commenting that enforcement may be measured by published national 
statistics and case studies, whereas few studies of compliance exist). 
71 A criminal sanction may be defined as “[a] sanction attached to a criminal 
conviction, such as a fine or restitution.” Criminal Sanction, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
72 In the United States, administrative sanctions have been upheld by courts 
“on the basis of the remedial or regulatory ingredients of the sanctions” 
(citations omitted), rather than the penal element of sanctions. See Lillian R. 
Altree, Administrative Sanctions: Regulations and Adjudication, 16 STAN. L. 
REV. 630, 632–33 (1964). In the European Union, administrative sanctions 
have taken several forms: “such as the loss of a deposit, the administrative 
fine, the surcharge, the exclusion from subsidies and blacklisting.” See also 
Adrienne de Moor-van Vugt, Administrative Sanctions in EU Law, 5 REV. 
EUR. ADMIN. L. 5 (2012). This study is more focused on administrative fines, 
although other forms of sanctions are discussed as well. 
73 Grant and Crowther refer to a “civil penalty ordered by a court,” in addition 
to administrative or criminal penalties. See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, 
at 288. 
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on a case-by-case basis instead.74 Furthermore, there are sanctions 
specific to various areas of law.75 
The sanctions involved in the specific field of European Union 
data protection law are at the heart of this study, which is organized as 
follows:  after this Introduction, Part I deals with the theory of sanctions 
and their goals as applied to EU data protection law. Part II of the study 
focuses on the nature of sanctions provided by the EU data protection 
law, starting with the EU DP Directive and continuing with the GDPR.  
Part III of the study analyzes the strategic risks involved in firms’ lack 
of understanding of, and non-compliance with, the GDPR, and the risks 
of supervisory authorities’ non-enforcement of the GDPR; Part IV 
provides recommendations both to firms and to the authorities in this 
regard. In Part V, conclusory remarks are made. 
I. GOALS OF SANCTIONS 
Before detailing the objectives of the sanctions that the DPAs 
of the European Member States may impose to enforce the GDPR, it is 
necessary to specify the nature of these sanctions: they are financial, 
administrative and regulatory. 76 First, the sanctions in question are 
financial sanctions, such as fines, as they consist of the relevant DPA 
obliging the sanctioned entities to pay a sum of money if they do not 
comply with the obligations provided by the GDPR.77 The sums to be 
paid following a determination of a data protection violation by a 
regulatory authority must be paid into the budget of the nation where 
the sanction is imposed.78 
 
74 See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 (f) (2018). See also 
id. ch. 8 (for chapter entitled, Sentencing of Organizations: Introductory 
Commentary, which states that “[ . . . ] The two factors that mitigate the 
ultimate punishment of an organization are: (i) the existence of an effective 
compliance and ethics program; and (ii) self-reporting, co-operation, or 
acceptance of responsibility.”).  
75 For example, there may be compensation for harm for negligence or strict 
liability in torts law, as well as punitive damages; in contracts law there are 
expectation damages, but also potentially specific performance; in criminal 
law, punishment; under regulation, penalty sanctions, and so on. Robert 
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1538–51 (1984). 
76 Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, The Implementation of Administrative Fines 
Under the General Data Protection Regulation from the German Perspective, 
2 INT'L J. FOR THE DATA PROTECTION OFFICER, PRIVACY OFFICER & PRIVACY 
COUNS. 11, 14 (2018).  
77 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83. 
78 For example, for the United Kingdom, see GDPR Penalties and Fines: 
Who Gets the Money from GDPR Fines?, IT GOVERNANCE, 
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Secondly, these sanctions are administrative79 because they are 
not imposed by courts as such but by administrative bodies.80 More 
specifically, they are regulatory sanctions because the power to 
sanction given to DPAs is part of their regulatory powers.81 Even if 
these sanctions are not criminal penalties, they are nevertheless 
criminal matters within the meaning of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), guaranteeing a right to a fair 
trial.82 Indeed, Article 83(8) provides, in a similar manner, that “[t]he 
exercise by the supervisory authority of its powers under this Article 
shall be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance 
 
https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/dpa-and-gdpr-penalties (“All fines collected 
by the ICO go to HM Treasury’s Consolidated Fund to be spent on health 
and social care, education, policing and justice, and the like.”) (last visited 
on Oct. 24, 2020); for France, see Julien Lausson, Où va l’argent quand les 
géants de la tech paient des amendes? [Where Does the Money Go When 
Tech Giants Pay Fines?], NUMERAMA (Nov. 3, 2019), 
https://www.numerama.com/politique/565914-ou-va-largent-quand-les-
geants-du-net-paient-des-amendes.html (“ces montants, lorsqu’ils 
proviennent de décisions de la CNIL, sont versés au budget français" [these 
amounts, when they come from CNIL decisions, are paid to the French 
budget.]).  
79Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Application 
and Setting of Administrative Fines for the Purposes of the Regulation 
2016/679, WP 253 (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=611237 
[hereinafter WP 253].  
80 Article 83(9) allows for the penalties for violations of the GDPR to be 
“initiated by the competent supervisory authority and imposed by competent 
national courts”. See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(9). This provision is 
exceptional. Denmark and Estonia use this possibility, because they do not use 
administrative fines. See also Wolff, supra note 76, at 13; See also, GDPR, 
supra note 1, Recital 151. 
81 See GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 129. DPAs’ powers are more extended 
than under the directive. See Philip Schütz, The Set Up of Data Protection 
Authorities as a New Regulatory Approach in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: 
IN GOOD HEALTH? 1, 14 (S. Gutwirth, R. Leenes, P. de Hert & Y Poullet, eds., 
2012) (“the Directive provides DPAs with investigative powers, effective 
powers of intervention and the power to engage in legal proceedings.”). 
82 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. This 
Convention applies in the EU Member States and in the other nations of the 
Council of Europe. See also Engel and others vs. The Netherlands, 1976 Eur. 
Ct. Hr. 1, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/tur#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
57479%22]}. See also Oztürk vs. Germany, 1984 Eur. Ct. Hr. 1, 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/tur#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57552%22]}. 
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with Union and Member State law, including effective judicial remedy 
and due process.”83 
By their nature, the regulatory sanctions provided for in the 
GDPR are different from strictly criminal sanctions. Thus, criminal 
courts may use penalties of a different nature, such as fines, whereas 
DPAs may not order prison sentences at all.84 Besides, malicious 
intention is not required for administrative sanctions.85 Regulatory 
sanctions imposed on regulated entities are also distinct from the 
sanctions that may be imposed on the managers of regulated companies 
in person.86 Regulatory sanctions are distinct from civil sanctions, 
particularly in the context of private enforcement, which allows victims 
to obtain damages to compensate for the harm they have suffered.87 
The primary purpose of regulatory sanctions is not the reparation, but 
rather the punishment of offenders.88 The financial sanctions that DPAs 
may impose are also different from injunctions and other 
administrative or coercive measures such as the withdrawal of an 
administrative authorization or an obligation to implement a 
compliance program.89 It is important to bear in mind that financial 
penalties imposed by DPAs on regulated companies may be in addition 
to or as an alternative to these other types of sanctions.90  
 
83 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(8). 
84 See Mitchel A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and 
Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 89–90 (1984). See also Cyrus Chu & 
Neville Jiang, Are Fines More Efficient Than Imprisonment?, 51 J. PUB. ECON. 
391, 391–92 (1993).  
85 Intention is only a circumstance that must be taken into account when 
sentencing. See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2)(b).  
86 See OECD, Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals, 9(3) OECD J.: 
COMPETITION L& POL’Y 7, 10 (2007), https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/cartels-sanctions-against-individuals_clp-v9-art10-
en (“As corporate sanctions rarely are sufficiently high to be an optimal 
deterrent against cartels, there is a place for sanctions against natural persons 
that can complement corporate sanctions and provide an enhancement to 
deterrence.”). 
87 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82 and Recitals 146–47.  
88 WP 253, supra note 79, at 6 (“The assessment of what is effective, 
proportional and dissuasive in each case will have to also reflect the objective 
pursued by the corrective measure chosen, that is either to reestablish 
compliance with the rules, or to punish”).  
89 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
29, 31 (2002).  
90 See GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2) (“Administrative fines shall, depending 
on the circumstances of each individual case, be imposed in addition to, or 
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The raison d’être for regulatory sanctions is specific, and it 
explains that there are regulatory sanctions in addition to other 
categories of sanctions that are typically criminal, civil, or 
administrative.91 Regulatory sanctions can contribute to pursuing the 
same goals as other types of sanctions.92 However, ultimately, 
regulatory sanctions aim to ensure the effectiveness of the whole legal 
framework that the supervisory authorities are responsible for 
enforcing.93  
The functions of sanctions that are traditionally identified as 
criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions appear as sub-goals to 
ultimately achieve the key objective of compliance with the rules that 
European data protection legislation intends to promote and 
guarantee.94  
In order to present the different goals that regulatory sanctions 
of DPAs can achieve, this study proposes to draw inspiration from the 
theories of sanctions and sentencing.95 However, in order to streamline 
 
instead of, measures referred to in points (a) to (h) and (j) of Article 58(2).”). 
Article 58(2) sets out the corrective powers of DPAs. Id. art. 58(2). On the 
various GDPR sanctions, see also infra Part II.  
91 See WP 253, supra note 79, at 4 (“Administrative fines are a central element 
in the new enforcement regime introduced by the Regulation, being a powerful 
part of the enforcement toolbox of the supervisory authorities together with 
the other measures provided by article 58.”).  
92 See Ioannis Lianos et al., An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System 
for Infringements of Competition Law: A Comparative Analysis, 27 CLES, 
Research Paper No. 3/2014, 2014, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2542991 (“From 
a legal standpoint, sanctions could pursue a number of other goals such as 
retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation etc. Usually laws, and competition 
law is no exception, do not clearly specify what the goal of law enforcement 
is supposed to be. These goals are not necessarily in conflict with the goal of 
deterrence pursued by the economic approach.”). 
93 See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 2 (“Whether Article 83 GDPR can fulfil 
its function in practice will depend crucially on its implementation by the Data 
Protection Authorities: It will be essential that the supervisory authorities are 
adequately resourced in terms of infrastructure, personnel and finances in 
order to be able to fulfil their role, also vis-à-vis internationally and globally 
active companies, thus enabling the GDPR to be implemented and applied 
effectively”). See also Richard Macrory, Reforming Regulatory Sanctions – 
Designing a Systematic Approach, in THE REGULATORY STATE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 229, 230 (Dawn Olivier et al., eds., 2010).  
94 See GDPR, supra note 1, Recitals 11 & 129.  
95 See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404–05 (1958). See also Julian V. Roberts & Andrew 
Von Hirsch, Legislating the Purpose and Principles of Sentencing, in MAKING 
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the presentation of these different functions and to highlight the 
specific issues attached to these sanctions, this study proposes an 
original analytical framework. This framework is based on a double 
distinction with regard to the functions of sanctions. First, we 
distinguish between the symbolic and material functions of sanctions,96 
and secondly, we distinguish between the retrospective (backward-
oriented) and prospective (forward-oriented) natures of sanctions.97 
A sanction always has content. It consists, for example, of 
depriving a person of his or her liberty, forcing him or her to pay a 
certain amount of money or to perform a certain action. This content 
can be said to be material. The materiality of the sanction is obvious 
when the sanction is a fine. As such, the sanction aims at changing 
something in the state of the world (by a transfer of wealth, by a 
remedial measure, etc.).98 But the sanction also has a meaning 
independently of its content, by the very fact that it is a sanction: this 
is the symbolic aspect of the sanction.99 The sanction is, in fact, a 
 
SENSE OF SENTENCING 48, 51 (J. V. Roberts & D.P. Cole, eds., 1999); See 
generally, MICHAEL TONRY, WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON 
PUNISHMENT (2011); See also ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, Making Sentencing Policy 
More Rational and More Effective, 25 ISR. L. REV. 607, 608 (1991); See also 
PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINING SENTENCING. THE PROMISE AND THE 
REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 3 (1991) (“the four traditional purposes of 
the criminal sanction: rehabilitation, incapacitation, deterrence, and 
retribution”).  
96 This study notes that this distinction does not cover the distinction between 
monetary and non-monetary sanctions. A sanction such as imprisonment is 
not monetary, but it is not purely symbolic! A monetary sanction can be 
essentially symbolic; if the amount is very small, especially in view of the 
financial capacity of the person sanctioned.  
97 See Mustapha Mekki, Considérations sociologiques sur le droit des 
sanctions [Sociological Considerations on the Law of Sanctions], in LES 
SANCTIONS EN DROIT CONTEMPORAIN. LA SANCTION, ENTRE TECHNIQUE ET 
POLITIQUE [SANCTIONS UNDER CONTEMPORARY LAW: PUNISHMENT- 
BETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND POLITICS] 31, 33–34 (C. Chainais & D. Fenouillet, 
eds., 2012).  
98 Cécile Chénais & Dominique Fenouillet, Le droit contemporain des 
sanctions, entre technique et politique [Contemporary Law of Sanctions, 
Between Technique and Politics], in LES SANCTIONS EN DROIT 
CONTEMPORAIN. LA SANCTION, ENTRE TECHNIQUE ET POLITIQUE [SANCTIONS 
UNDER CONTEMPORARY LAW: PUNISHMENT- BETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND 
POLITICS] XI, LXXIX, n°88 (C. Chainais & D. Fenouillet, eds., 2012).  
99 The symbolic dimension of social and economic interactions was 
emphasized by Marcel Mauss in his essay on the gift. There is, of course, an 
economic value that is transferred in the gift and counter-gift transactions he 
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message addressed to the person sanctioned and, beyond the offender, 
to other persons who might be affected by the rule.100 This message 
does not aim to change the state of the world, at least not immediately, 
but it does aim to change some representations of the world. The 
symbolic effect is not necessarily linked to the importance of the 
content of the sanction. Thus, a sanction whose content is very light 
may nevertheless have a meaning: the fact of being condemned 
sometimes is more important than the magnitude of the condemnation. 
However, the importance of the sanction can sometimes also be a 
message that has a meaning (denunciation function). Even if a sanction 
is ultimately not applied (for example, because it cannot be applied, if 
the sum to be paid exceeds the financial capacity of the person 
sanctioned), the fact that the sanction is heavy is a message from the 
sanctioning judge or authority to citizens.101  
On the other hand, sanctions may seek to produce effects in 
relation to a past situation or in relation to a future situation.102 There 
are thus backward-oriented sanctions and forward-oriented 
sanctions.103 For example, a sanction may aim to react to a past act. 
Since an act is deemed to be wrong because it is contrary to the law, 104 
it infringes legally protected interests, or it constitutes a social disorder, 
the role of the legal procedure and, ultimately of the sanction, is to 
counteract this act, erase its consequences and punish the perpetrator 
of the act. The ideal is to be able to restore the status quo disturbed by 
the non-compliant act. Sanctioning does not always achieve this ideal 
because events are often irreversible, at least partially irreversible. But 
 
describes, but the social significance of this act makes the economic and 
material aspect of the transfer a very secondary one. MARCEL MAUSS, ESSAI 
SUR LE DON: FORME ET RAISON DE L'ÉCHANGE DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS 
ARCHAÏQUES, translated in MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND 
FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES, 42-84 (W.D.Halls, trans., 
1990), https://libcom.org/files/Mauss%20-%20The%20Gift.pdf.   The concept 
of symbolic sanction can be used by scholars when the effectiveness of the 
sanctions is doubtful, as it is the case in the field of international economic 
sanctions. See Taehee Wang, Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of 
Economic Sanctions in the United States, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 787, 788 (2011). 
100 Antony R. Duff, Punishment, Retribution and Communication, in 
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 126, 126–27 
(Andrew von Hirsh, Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts, eds., 2009).  
101 JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 100 (1970). 
102 John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante 
Function of Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165–66 (2001). 
103 Id.  
104 Mekki, supra note 97, at 33.  
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an important function of sanctions is to make the response to an offense 
as relevant and effective as possible. Restoring the status quo in line 
with the law is one way of ensuring the effectiveness of the norm 
through an adequate response. Conversely, the purpose of a sanction 
may be to prevent the future occurrence of an act contrary to law. In 
this case, the relevant sanction is not the one imposed on the perpetrator 
of a concrete behavior, but the one that abstractly threatens those who 
would break the law. A sanction applied to a particular person for a 
past offense may also produce effects in the future for that person (the 
aim is to prevent him or her from repeating the offense) or for others 
because the sanction imposed is designed to be exemplary.105 The 
sanction has a preventive function if it prevents or hinders the future 
performance of an offense or if it effectively persuades persons that it 
is better not to commit an offense in view of the sanction incurred in 
that case.106  
The two criteria can be combined, and the different functions 
of sanctions can therefore be put into the following matrix.  











This study will examine these different sub-goals to show 
whether, how, and under what specific conditions the sanctions 
imposed, or likely to be imposed, by DPAs can contribute to make the 
GDPR effective. In particular, this study will consider whether the 
sanctions must be effective in order to play their role, whether they 
must be heavy in order to be effective, and whether they must be 
consistently applied by DPAs in order for the GDPR to be properly 
 
105 Anthony Bottoms and Andrew Von Hirsch make a distinction between 
“special deterrence” (“reformation” in Bentham’s wording) and “general 
deterrence” (example), for instance. See Anthony Bottoms & Andrew Von 
Hirsch, The Crime Preventive Impact of Penal Sanctions, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 96, 97 (P. Cane and H. M. 
Kritzner, eds., 2010). See also PATRICK MORVAN, CRIMINOLOGIE 
[CRIMINOLOGY] 309 (2019).  
106 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (1990, Princeton 
University Press ed., 2006) (“An instrumental perspective regards compliance 
as a form of behavior occurring in response to external factors. It leads to a 
focus on the extent and nature of the resources that authorities have for shaping 
public behavior [by contrast to a normative perspective studied by the 
author].”). 
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enforced. First, this study will investigate the retribution and 
rehabilitation functions of sanctions (Section A). Then, the 
confiscation and reparation functions are detailed (Section B), after 
which this study delves into the expressive and normative goals of 
sanctions (Section C). Finally, the deterrence and incapacitation 
functions of sanctions are analyzed (Section D), before conclusory 
remarks on the theory of sanctions (Section E). 
A. Retribution and Rehabilitation 
This Part of the study investigates the retribution function 
(Section 1), prior to studying the rehabilitation function (Section 2). 
1. Retribution  
The most obvious function of punitive sanctions is that of 
retribution.107 The sanction responds prima facie to a request for a 
symbolic reaction. An evil has been done; in return, an evil must be 
applied to the one who committed the initial evil.108 Punishment is a 
response to the transgression. A sanction, regardless of its content, is 
therefore first of all an official acknowledgement that an evil has been 
committed.109 
The retributive compensation may take the form of an 
obligation to pay a certain amount of money (fine) or to lose control of 
property (confiscation).110 But the sanction can also be immaterial.111 
Infamous sanctions or making the sanction public is an accessory or 
principal penalty in criminal law, and even more in a regulatory 
approach through “publicity order” for instance.112 Such sanctions are 
 
107 Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 24 (2003–2004). 
108 Immanuel Kant, The Penal Law and the Law of Pardon, in THE 
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 331 (1999), quoted in Tonry, supra 
note 95, at 31.  
109 Micheal S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY  110 (A. von Hirsch et al., 
eds, 1987).  
110 See Jean-Paul Céré & Ludivine Grégoire, Peine (Nature et prononcé), in 
REPERTOIRE DE DROIT PENAL ET DE PROCEDURE PENALE (2020).  
111 See Golla, supra note 67, at 70 (“Even though immaterial damages such as 
loss of reputation due to a mention in an activity report or a high-damage claim 
can be more painful for an enterprise in certain cases, technically 
administrative fines and criminal penalties are to be regarded as the most 
severe sanctions for data protection violations.”).  
112 Richard Macrory, New Approaches to Regulatory Sanctions, 20 ENVTL. L. 
& MGMT. 210, 212 (2008).  
2021] EU GDPR SANCTIONS  25 
also provided for in data protection law.113 The regulator may make 
public with varying degrees of force the GDPR violation and the 
infringement of data subject rights.114 A regulator may thus choose to 
display information prominently on its website, communicate to the 
media and the public through press releases, or even generate 
discussion about a sanction through press interviews.115 When the 
entity that is sanctioned is a media, it may be condemned to inform its 
users of the sanction that has been imposed on him.116 The more a 
company depends on its reputation, the more redoubtable these kinds 
of sanctions will be for it.117 Many companies collecting personal data 
are strongly impacted by attacks on their image in the users’ eyes. 
Companies whose clients are other companies may be less sensitive to 
this. Scandals concerning the illegal exploitation of personal data or the 
lack of security of sensitive data show the vulnerability of companies 
 
113 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58 (a) and (b). 
114 The sanction pronounced by the French CNIL against Google is an 
illustration of a deliberate decision by the regulatory authority to "make 
public." See Deliberation No. SAN-2019-001 of the Restricted Committee of 
the CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019) pronouncing a financial sanction against financial 
sanction against Google LLC. at 28, 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/san-2019-001.pdf (“The 
Restricted Committee of the CNIL, after having deliberated, decides . . . to 
make its decision public on the CNIL website and on the Légifrance website, 
which will be anonymized upon expiry of a period of two years from its 
publication.”).  
115 See Golla, supra note 67, at 71 (“Even though immaterial damages such as 
loss of reputation due to a mention in an activity report or a high-damage 
claim can be more painful for an enterprise in certain cases, technically 
administrative fines and criminal penalties are to be regarded as the most 
severe sanctions for data protection violations.”).  
116 Thierry Kirat, Frédéric Marty, Hugues Bouthinon-Dumas & Amir Rezaee, 
Quand dire c’est réguler [When to Say is to Regulate], 25 ÉCONOMIE ET 
INSTITUTIONS 3 (2017).  
117 In a prior enforcement action regarding Google’s privacy policy, this was 
arguably the case. In that instance, the CNIL also pronounced a sanction that 
included a publicity element, which required publication of a notice on 
Google’s home page. See W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy 
Law Developments, 70 BUS. LAW. 253, 255 (2014/2015) (“a decision … 
requiring the publication of a communique regarding the fine and data 
breaches, as well as linking the decision, for a period of forty-eight 
consecutive hours, on its French home page. The publication sanction was 
perhaps the most prejudicial (at least from an image standpoint) to Google”) 
(citation omitted). 
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in this respect.118 In view of the retributive function of the sanction, 
companies can expect to be sanctioned whenever they violate the 
regulation, and the regulatory authorities know it, and they must fear 
being sanctioned all the more severely when the breaches are serious. 
The application of sanctions according to the logic of the giving and 
receiving principle, basically founded on the law of retaliation, is 
reinforced by the principle of proportionality included in the European 
law about sanctions.119 The requirement laid down in the GDPR, in 
particular in its Article 83(1), that penalties must be “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive,” 120 is interpreted most of the time from 
a quantitative perspective (that is the material aspect of the penalty): 
there must be a relationship between the fault and/or the harm to the 
interests of others, on the one hand, and the magnitude of the penalty, 
on the other.121 But the requirement of proportionality may also suggest 
a symbolic interpretation: an offense must give rise to a sanction in 
reaction, just as a donation calls for a counter-gift.122  
2. Rehabilitation 
The retributive function is linked to the symbolic part of the 
rehabilitative function or psychological effect of the sanction.123 The 
sanction is not only a message about the wrong act; it also implies 
consequences for the way in which the offender and possibly the 
victims of the offense (if there are any) are viewed.124 In ordinary 
criminal law, particularly in the context of the punishment of offenses 
against persons, the rehabilitative function of the victims is 
 
118 Yasmine Agelidis, Protecting the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: “Exposure” 
Data Breaches and Suggestions for Coping with Them, 31 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1057, 1069 (2016).  
119 Morris J. Fish, An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of 
Punishment, 28(1) OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 58 (2008).  
120 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(1) (“Each supervisory authority shall ensure 
that the imposition of administrative fines pursuant to this Article in respect 
of infringements of this Regulation referred to in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 shall 
in each individual case be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” The cited 
paragraphs refer to the levels of administrative fines for various 
infringements.). 
121 See WP 253, supra note 79, at 6. 
122 Mauss, supra note 99, at 50. 
123 Mekki, supra note 97, at 48–49.  
124 ANTOINE GARAPON, BIEN JUGER: ESSAI SUR LE RITUEL JUDICIAIRE [GOOD 
JUDGMENT: ESSAY ON THE JUDICIAL RITUAL] 63–65 (1997). See also MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR [DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF 
THE PRISON] 14 (1977). 
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important.125 For example, it seems important that the victim of a rape 
who might paradoxically feel a sense of guilt should be regarded as a 
victim thanks to the punishment.126 Such a consideration may play a 
certain role in the field of data protection. It may be important that users 
who have had their sensitive data misappropriated as a result of a 
breach of data security obligations on the part of the data controller are 
told that this harm is not the result of their own negligence but the effect 
of a breach of the regulation which for this reason deserves a sanction. 
The Ashley Madison case,127 in which a dating platform for extramarital 
relationships did not ensure the security of this obviously very sensitive 
data128 for the data subjects, illustrates this problem.  
The rehabilitative function also concerns the offender.129 Being 
punished is seen in classical sentencing theory as a necessary step for 
the offender to transform himself or herself to become someone 
different from the one who may have committed the offense.130 In 
theory, the rehabilitation of the offender, that can be included in the 
restorative justice approach, including for white-collar crime,131 does 
 
125 See Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, 
Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 431, 449 (2007).  
126 Tyler G. Okimoto & Michael Wenzel, Punishment as Restoration of Group 
and Offender Values Following a Transgression: Value Consensus Through 
Symbolic Labelling and Offender Reform, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 346, 348 
(2008).  
127 On the Ashley Madison case, where hackers obtained sensitive data on 
users of the site, see Dino Grandoni, Ashley Madison, A Dating Website, Says 
Hackers May Have Data on Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2015), 
https://nyti.ms/1Jc7acr.  
128 The GDPR category of sensitive data or “special categories of personal 
data,” specifically includes “data concerning a natural person’s sex life.” 
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 9(1). 
129 See Céré & Grégoire, supra note 110, at nos. 8–9.  
130 MARC ANCEL, LA DEFENSE SOCIALE NOUVELLE, UN MOUVEMENT DE 
POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE HUMANISTE [THE NEW SOCIAL DEFENSE, A HUMANIST 
CRIMINAL POLICY MOVEMENT] (1954); PIERRE LALANDE, PUNIR OU 
REHABILITER LES CONTREVENANTS ? DU NOTHING WORKS AU WHAT WORKS 
(MONTEE, DECLIN ET RETOUR DE L’IDEAL DE REHABILITATION) [PUNISH OR 
REHABILITATE OFFENDERS? FROM NOTHING WORKS TO WHAT WORKS (RISE, 
DECLINE AND RETURN OF THE REHABILITATION IDEAL)] 30–77, Ministère de 
la sécurité publique du Canada (2006).  
131 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 125 (1989) 
(“Seventeen cases were studied (on the basis of interviews with executives 
and other sources) in which corporations had been through adverse publicity 
crises. The financial impacts of adverse publicity (on sales, earnings, stock 
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not necessarily require a heavy sanction.132 In the field of criminal or 
regulatory law that applies to companies, this function of punishment 
plays a very limited role.133 The transformation of the company that 
violates the GDPR requires more than a symbolic monetary sanction, 
as we shall see with regard to the incapacitation function.134  
With regard to the retributive and rehabilitative role that 
sanctions under the GDPR can play, it can be concluded that, if 
breaches of the law can be identified, it is important that they do not 
remain unpunished and therefore, that sanctions are effectively and 
even systematically applied (at least if other regulatory responses 
remained insufficient). As this function is symbolic, it is not necessary 
for sanctions to be severe (but sanctions may need to be severe for other 
reasons).135 In addition, in order for the functions of retribution and 
rehabilitation to be fulfilled, it is important that the sanctions are 
properly enforced by all DPAs. If there is a jurisdiction in Europe 
where the DPA is reluctant to react to violations or reacts very slowly 
compared to other DPAs, this may send the problematic message that 
violations go unpunished in that territory. This may logically lead to 
companies that tend to be non-compliant to preferentially locate in the 
territory of that authority, through what may be described as a form of 
forum-shopping. This is the problem that a jurisdiction such as Ireland 
could raise, if it appears that it does not apply sanctions, even symbolic 
ones, to companies that deserve to be punished.136 As we shall see, 
while from a strictly symbolic point of view, light sanctions are more 
useful than no sanctions at all, there are other reasons to consider that 
 
prices, etc.) were generally found to be slight; however, nonfinancial impacts 
on the loss of repute which executives perceived their company and 
themselves to have suffered in the community were found to be important to 
them”.). Id. at 124.  
132 See GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 148.  
133 It is the case as far as fines can be viewed as a “cost of doing business.” 
See Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of 
Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 516 (1979–1980).  
134 See infra Section D.2. 
135 Recent developments in criminal policy show that public authorities want 
a systematic “criminal response” when offenses are proven, even if there is no 
need to apply sanctions in the strict sense. In the French context, see Laura 
Aubert, Systématisme pénal et alternatives aux poursuites en France: une 
politique pénale en trompe-l'œil [Criminal System and Alternatives to 
Prosecution in France: A Criminal Policy in Trompe l'oeil], 74(1) DROIT ET 
SOCIETE 17–33 (2010). 
136 Joshua Blume, A Contextual Extraterritoriality Analysis of the DPIA and 
DPO Provisions in the GDPR, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1425, 1455 (2018).  
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light sanctions against powerful actors prevent other functions of 
sanctions from being fulfilled.137  
B. Confiscation and Reparation  
The penalty imposed on the perpetrator of an offense does not 
merely serve to declare that an offense has been committed. It can also 
be used to repair the situation, or the relationship, disrupted by the 
offense. Reparation can be applied to three categories of actors and 
refers more specifically to three sub-goals, that this study sets out as 
confiscation (Section 1), reparation (Section 2), and a financing 
function (Section 3).  
1. Confiscation 
First, for the offender, reparation consists in removing the 
positive consequences that the offense may have generated on his or 
her economic situation. The sanction must then result in the deprivation 
of the benefit of the offense.138 The financial penalty is convenient to 
play this role of confiscation of an illegitimate profit.139 This implies, 
for example, that the sanction should be at least as high as the unlawful 
profit. This approach is common in other branches of economic 
criminal law such as competition law or market abuse law. Sentencing 
rules generally take into account the illegitimate profit. For example, 
the amount of the benefits derived from the offense is the minimum 
amount of the fine or the fine is a multiple of the illicit profit.140 This 
 
137 See infra Sections B.1 (on the confiscation function), B.3 (on the financing 
function), C.1 (on the expressive function), and above all D.1 and D.2 (on the 
deterrence and incapacitation functions). All of these functions require heavy 
penalties imposed on large corporations (such as the U.S. Tech Giants, when 
they violate data protection law), virtually or effectively. 
138 Claude Ducouloux-Favard, L’amende dans son rapport avec le profit [The 
Fine in Relation to Profit], in LA CRIMINALITE D’ARGENT: QUELLE 
REPRESSION? [FINANCIAL CRIME: WHAT REPRESSION?]  183, 184 (C. 
Ducouloux-Favard & Ch. Lopez, eds., 2004) (explaining that legislation 
setting out scales of fines for illegal profit are one of two types: either the 
legislator allows fines to exceed the scale’s maximum when the illegal profit 
itself exceeds that maximum; or it requires that the fine be at least equal to the 
profit derived from the crime).  
139 Macrory, supra note 112, at 211.  
140 See, e.g., Lianos et al., supra note 92, at 9 (“According to economic theory, 
fines should be at least equal to the expected illegally earned profits divided 
by the probability to be caught, hence they should relate to expected profits 
originating from the violation and not to the profits actually gained that may 
be higher or lower than those expected at decision-making time, should the 
fines be paid after the period of infringement”).  
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approach can be applied in the data area. In today's economy, data have 
a high economic value and are the main source of wealth for tech 
giants.141 The additional data that could be collected and processed by 
companies in violation of the GDPR could bring them additional profit, 
which in this case would be illegal.142 The GDPR refers to "financial 
benefits" that must be taken into account in determining the amount of 
the penalty that the DPA could apply to a non-compliant company.143  
2. Reparation 
The sanction may theoretically be intended, among other 
things, to compensate for the harm suffered by particular victims. It is 
clear that this function is not fulfilled by financial sanctions imposed 
by DPAs because the amounts to be paid by the sanctioned entity are 
not paid to the victims. It is the civil action that provides adequate 
compensation to the victims.144 Indeed, this is the main purpose of the 
civil liability mechanism.145 The concern to provide victims with 
compensation for their losses is not at all absent from the GDPR, but it 
is referred to in Article 82146 and not in Article 83, which is devoted to 
administrative penalties.147 Regulatory sanctions do not contribute 
 
141 See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 1–7 (“They ensure that efforts of 
compliance are undertaken in addition to pure profitability investments and a 
fortiori that the economic advantage that controllers or processors derive from 
infringements of GDPR, if any, do not remain with them . . .[.[t]he amount of 
the fine must be significantly higher than any profit derived from the violation 
of the GDPR”). 
142 Katharine Kemp, Here’s How Tech Giants Profit from Invading Our 
Privacy, and How We Can Start Taking it Back, The Conversation (Aug. 11, 
2019 4:03 PM EDT), https://theconversation.com/heres-how-tech-giants-
profit-from-invading-our-privacy-and-how-we-can-start-taking-it-back-
120078.  
143 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2)(k). 
144 Id. art. 79(1) (“each data subject shall have the right to an effective judicial 
remedy where he or she considers that his or her rights under this Regulation 
have been infringed as a result of the processing of his or her personal data in 
non-compliance with this Regulation.”). 
145 See Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, Les sanctions en droit de la responsabilité 
civile [Sanctions in Civil Liability], in LES SANCTIONS EN DROIT 
CONTEMPORAIN. LA SANCTION, ENTRE TECHNIQUE ET POLITIQUE [SANCTIONS 
UNDER CONTEMPORARY LAW: PUNISHMENT- BETWEEN TECHNIQUE AND 
POLITICS] 257, 259 (C. Chainais & D. Fenouillet, eds., 2012).  
146 Id. art. 82(1) (“Any person who has suffered material or non-material 
damage as a result of an infringement of this Regulation shall have the right 
to receive compensation from the controller or processor for the damage 
suffered.”). 
147 Id. art. 83. 
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directly to this, even if the importance in duration and number of 
persons affected by the infringements are part of the criteria for 
determining the administrative penalty.148 The sanction imposed by the 
regulator may simply facilitate private enforcement in parallel with the 
procedure before the regulatory authority, by facilitating the proof of 
the fault of the sanctioned entity.149 In this respect, regulatory financial 
sanctions, if they are imposed, whatever the magnitude of the fine, 
facilitate private enforcement more than negotiated procedures that 
generally preclude admission of guilt.150  
3. Financing Function 
Thirdly, sanction can be conceived as a means of repairing the 
damage caused to the economy or society in general, irrespective of the 
particular harm.151 Insofar as the amount of the fines is paid to 
collective budgets or to the regulatory authority, sanctions help to 
replenish public financial resources that can be used for projects of 
general interest (education of citizens, guarantee fund, etc.).152 The 
sums collected by way of administrative sanctions, if paid into the 
general budget of the Member States, are not specifically earmarked 
 
148 Id. art. 83(2)(a). It may be noted that the damage suffered by the victims is 
included as part of the first criterion in the list of elements to be taken into 
account.  
149 See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 3 (“Private enforcement and actions for 
damages, even where special legislation for that purpose exists, play a smaller 
role, with the later often being efficient only as a follow on of public 
enforcement findings of illegality”).   
150 The sanction decision pronounced by a regulatory authority facilitates the 
demonstration of a fault entitling the victim to compensation when the 
sanctioned violation is the cause of a particular prejudice. This has been 
underlined in particular by the European Court of Justice in the field of 
competition law (Mar. 9, 1978, Simmenthal, 106/77, Rec. 629, para. 16, and 
of June 19, 1990, Factortame and others, Case C-213/89, Rec. I-2433, para. 
19). See Robert Saint-Esteben, La reparation d’un préjudice économique 
resultant d’infractions au droit de la concurrence, Conference held at the 
French Cour de Cassation, n°9, 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf_2007/26-04-2007/26-04-
2007_st_esteben.pdf.  
151 See Saint-Esteben, supra note 150, at no. 4.   
152 See, e.g., the answer of the French Financial Markets Regulator (AMF) to 
the question “To whom are the pecuniary penalties imposed by the 
Enforcement Committee paid?” Sanctions & transactions: FAQ: La 
sanction, AMF, https://www.amf-france.org/fr/sanctions-transactions/faq/la-
sanction#ancre-62499 (last visited on Oct. 27, 2020).   
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for personal data protection policy, but it is a political choice that can 
be made by EU Member States.153 
Incidentally, sanctions can thus fulfil a funding function. 
Sanctions have an objective funding function when the cumulative 
amount of sanctions represents a significant financial flow for the State, 
EU or regulator's budget. This sanction function is often ignored by the 
theorists because it would be inadequate if the financing of public 
expenditure or even the functioning of a regulatory authority depended 
on sanctions, as this would mean that the normal functioning of 
institutions is based on the anticipation of deviant behavior on the part 
of regulated people.154 One can note that a good sanction, and therefore 
good regulation, meant that sanctions did not have to be applied 
because regulated operators comply with the law. When sanctions were 
low and few in number, fines were not a significant source of funding 
for public institutions. But once the penalties incurred are very severe 
and the penalty-imposing authorities no longer hesitate to fine 
offending companies hard, penalties become a significant source of 
auxiliary funding.155 In the field of competition law, for example, it has 
been observed that the cumulative amount of sanctions imposed by the 
European Commission has increased by a factor of twenty in 25 
 
153 One way of choosing to earmark the sums collected for personal data 
protection policy is to allocate the fines not to the general state budget but to 
the budget of the regulatory authorities (if they have budgetary autonomy). 
See Julien Lausson, Où va l’argent quand les géants de la tech paient des 
amendes? [Where Does the Money Go When Tech Giants Pay Fines?], 
NUMERAMA (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.numerama.com/politique/565914-
ou-va-largent-quand-les-geants-du-net-paient-des-amendes.html. 
154 See, e.g., Matt Ford, The Problem With Funding Government Through 
Fines, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-problem-with-
funding-government-through-fines/389387/.  
155 According to the Commission, “Fines imposed on companies found in 
breach of EU/EEA antitrust rules are paid into the general EU budget. This 
money is not earmarked for particular expenses, but Member States' 
contributions to the EU budget for the following year are reduced 
accordingly. The fines therefore help to finance the EU and reduce the 
burden for taxpayers.” See European Commission Press Release IP/20/1774, 
Antitrust: Commission fines car parts suppliers of € 18 million in cartel 
settlement (Sept. 29, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1774.  
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years.156 Some antitrust sanctions exceed €1 billion.157 As multi-
billion-dollar fines could be imposed on large digital companies, 
sanctions in personal data protection law could become an interesting 
source of financing for States that are facing significant budgetary 
difficulties. This budgetary consideration tends to convince regulators 
not to hesitate to impose severe sanctions.158 Thus, DPAs that would 
be quick to sanction in order to be the priority beneficiaries of the 
amount of the sanctions create the risk of opportunistic use of the power 
to sanction, motivated by funding considerations.159 The case of the 
sanction pronounced by the French regulator, (CNIL) against Google, 
and confirmed by the judge competent to exercise judicial review, the 
French Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), may be examined in the light 
of this remark.160 However, this creates a perverse incentive because 
the amount of the sanctions may be set for reasons other than those 
 
156 According to the European Union, “The EU's sources of income include 
contributions from member countries, import duties on products from 
outside the EU and fines imposed when businesses fail to comply with EU 
rules.” How the EU is Funded, EUROPEAN UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-budget/revenue-income_en 
(last visited on Oct. 27, 2020). See also Matthew Keep, A Guide to EU 
Budget, UK House of Commons Briefing paper n°05455, at 3, 
file://hecate/myfiles/bouthinondumas/Downloads/SN06455.pdf. 
157 See, e.g., Business Insider España, The 7 Biggest Fines the EU Have Ever 
Imposed Against Giant Companies, BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2018, 8:11 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.fr/us/the-7-biggest-fines-the-eu-has-ever-
imposed-against-giant-corporations-2018-7. 
158 Unless the attraction or retention of foreign companies on the territory of a 
Member State is seen as a more important political priority objective than the 
replenishment of the State's coffers. The case of the Commission's sanction 
against Apple for the taxes that the company should have paid, according to 
the Commission (before being contradicted by the Court of First Instance), 
shows that Ireland did not seek to take opportunistic advantage of a decision 
that potentially brought it more than €13 billion, but made common cause with 
Apple to maintain its status as a welcoming territory for US tech giants. See 
Eugene Stuart, Whether or Not to Bite the Apple: Some Implications of the August 
2016 Commission Decision on Irish Tax Benefits for Apple, 16(2) EUR. STATE AID 
L. Q. 209, 229 (2017).  
159 David Cowan, Total GDPR Fines Climb to €114m as Companies Struggle 
to Comply with Regime, THE GLOBAL LEGAL POST (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.globallegalpost.com/corporate-counsel/total-gdpr-fines-climb-
to-114m-as-companies-struggle-to-comply-with-regime-67962582/.  
160 For a discussion of this case, see infra Part II. 
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relating to the effective application of the regulation.161 For this reason, 
it seems desirable that the policy for the application of sanctions be 
harmonized between the DPAs, in particular to ensure that the remedial 
function of sanctions is not misused. The adequate remedy to prevent 
the risk of a race towards administrative sanctions to finance the 
various EU Member States would be to substitute a sanction procedure 
conducted by the European Commission or the EDPB rather than by 
the national DPAs, or to allocate the amount of the sanctions imposed 
by the regulatory authorities to the EU budget, as is the case with fines 
for major anti-competitive practices.162 
C. Expressive and Normative Goals 
Sanctions play an important role in shaping the mental 
representations of individuals and companies, especially expectations 
of what might happen to them if they behave this way or that way.163 
The main effects of sanctions for the future are prevention and 
deterrence. But there is also a future-oriented symbolic effect of 
sanctions.164 It corresponds to the expressive or denunciatory function 
(Section 1), as well as the normative function of sanctions (Section 2).  
 
161 It was observed that the large fines that some large companies had to pay 
represented a quite major contribution to the European budget. See, e.g., 
William Watts, Google’s $2.7 Billion Goes into EU’s Budget — And That’s 
More Than Most Member Nations Put it, MarketWatch (June 28, 2017, 2:43 
AM ET), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-googles-27-billion-fine-
stacks-up-against-each-eu-countrys-annual-budget-contribution-2017-06-27. 
162 Fines paid to the European budget lead to a reduction in Member States' 
contributions in proportion to their participation in the EU budget. See 
Antitrust: Commission Fines NBCUniversal €14.3 Million for Restricting 
Sales of Film Merchandise Products, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_157 (“Fines 
imposed on companies found in breach of EU antitrust rules are paid into the 
general EU budget. This money is not earmarked for particular expenses, but 
Member States' contributions to the EU budget for the following year are 
reduced accordingly.”).  
163 Olivier Chassaing, La portée normative des interdictions pénales [The 
Normative Scope of Criminal Prohibitions], 93(1) RUE DESCARTES 28, AT NO. 
16 (2018) (“La première fonction sociale de la loi pénale est de poser des 
modèles de conduites et d’adresser des interdictions pour les citoyens; elle ne 
sert à qualifier les situations punissables et à sanctionner les infracteurs que 
dans un second temps” [The first social function of criminal law is to lay down 
models of conduct and to issue prohibitions for citizens; it only serves to 
qualify punishable situations and to punish offenders in a second stage]).  
164 See Mekki, supra note 97.  
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1. Expressive Function 
The mere fact that there is a sanction for transgression and that 
this sanction is a punishment, is a means of sending the message that 
the rules underlying this sanction are mandatory.165 It promotes the 
awareness that these obligations and prohibitions must be complied 
with because it is law and more specifically hard law.166 Citizens who 
spontaneously respect the legal order (or because they fear the 
stigmatizing effect of a criminal conviction for instance)167 will thus be 
encouraged to comply with these rules because they know, namely via 
the sanctions, that the rules must be applied. This purely symbolic 
function of sanctions is, however, unlikely to significantly influence 
rational economic actors who tend to weigh costs and benefits related 
to compliance and non-compliance, according to the classical 
assumptions of Economic Analysis of the Law.168 Besides, the level of 
sanctions incurred indicates the importance of these rules and the rights 
protected.169  
 
165 The rule is mandatory because it is sanctioned. To take up Henri Motulsky's 
concepts see HENRI MOTULSKY, PRINCIPES D’UNE RÉALISATION MÉTHODIQUE 
DU DROIT PRIVÉ [Principles of a Methodical Realization of Private Law] 18–
19 (2002) (the rule is composed of two parts: the presupposition or hypothesis 
and the effect, i.e. the consequence implied by the hypothesis. If a sanction is 
incurred in the event of the performance of a certain conduct, this means that 
this conduct is legally prohibited and that it is obligatory not to perform this 
act. Similarly, if a sanction is provided for in the event of a breach of an 
obligation, this means that the obligation is legally binding!). See Bruno 
Oppetit, Henri Motulsky et la philosophie du droit, 38 ARCHIVES DE 
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 251, 254 (1993) (Commenting that the rule of law has 
a necessarily coercive character and that it implies an at least virtual sanction 
and, by its social nature, an external sanction).  
166 In environmental law, for instance, the existence of criminal sanctions or 
quasi-criminal sanctions is a privileged means of demonstrating the mandatory 
nature of the rules imposed in particular by European directives. See MICHAEL 
G. FAURE & GÜNTHER HEINE, FINAL REPORT: CRIMINAL PENALTIES IN EU 
MEMBER STATES’ ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 333 (2002), 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/pdf/criminal_penalties1.pdf.   
167 Steven Shavell, Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement 37 J.L. & ECON. 
255, 261–62 (1993).  
168 Samuel Ferey, Histoire et méthodologie de l’analyse économique du droit 
contemporaine [History and Methodology of Economic Analysis of 
Contemporary Law], in ANALYSE ÉCONOMIQUE DU DROIT [ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW] 11, 18–20 (B. Deffains & E. Langlais, eds., 2009). 
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2014). 
169 See Michel van de Kerchove, Les fonctions de la sanction pénale. Entre 
droit et philosophie, 127(7) INFORMATIONS SOCIALES 22, 30 (2005) 
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Sanctioning has an expressive function (denunciation) because 
it underlines the importance that society and the public authorities give 
to the values and rights whose violation is sanctioned.170 This 
expressive function of punishment has been highlighted by sociologists 
such as Emile Durkheim.171 Society shows how precious a value is in 
two main ways. The law may provide for a particularly solemn 
procedure for the most serious crimes (special courts, intervention of 
popular juries, exceptional decorum, etc.).172 The other way of 
emphasizing the importance of the protected value is to provide that 
the infringement of this right will be severely punished, either through 
a feared type of penalty (death penalty, imprisonment, etc.) or through 
a high level of punishment (number of years in prison or amount of the 
fine).173 The expressive function of the sanction implies that if the 
society comes to recognize an important value in the protection of 
personal data and respect for the rights of the data subjects, then the 
sanctions incurred will logically be high.174 In fact, the sanctions 
provided by the GDPR are indeed among the highest financial 
sanctions that can be applied in Europe because of the way it is 
 
(explaining that the "socio-pedagogical" or "expressive" function of 
punishment may be understood as a symbolic expression of the attachment of 
the society to certain norms, the behaviour that conforms to them and the 
values that they protect). 
170 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in WHY PUNISH? 
HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT DESERVING 111, 114 (Michael 
Tonry, ed., 2011).   
171 EMILE DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 82 [THE DIVISION 
OF LABOR IN SOCIETY] (1893) (“Nous ne le réprouvons pas parce qu'il est un 
crime, mais il est un crime parce que nous le réprouvons”) [We do not 
condemn it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we condemn it].  
Thus, sanctions linked to the violations express the values and the collective 
consciousness of the society.).  
172 The most serious criminal offences are judged by special courts where 
particular solemnity is seen. See Garapon, supra note 124, at 54.   
173 Even in the case of international criminal law, where there are no guidelines 
or scale of penalties, penalties are apportioned according to the seriousness of 
the offenses. See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV.  415, 453 (2001) 
(“Tribunals have frequently stated the gravity of the offense is the most 
important consideration in devising a sentence”).  
174 Mira Burri & Rahel Schär, The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework: 
Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy, 
6 J. INFO. POL’Y 479, 481 (2016) (“It is important to stress at the outset that the 
right to privacy is a key concept in EU law and has been given significant 
weight that reflects deep cultural values and understandings”).  
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calculated.175 It should also be noted that the expressive function of the 
sanction does not necessarily imply that it will be actually applied. The 
threat of severe punishment could be enough to send a message to the 
public that this regulation is considered to be essential.176 However, the 
sociology of delinquency also emphasizes that the application of 
punishment is a way for society to remind the population of the value 
it attributes to protected rights.177 In this perspective, a frequent 
application of sanctions will tend to trivialize this set of rules and may 
harm the expressive function of the sanction. On the other hand, a 
punctual application of the sanction may be useful to affirm that society 
does not want to tolerate non-compliance with the law.178 Regulatory 
authorities are then inclined to impose exemplary sanctions. Rather 
than seeking to sanction many actors, a good policy for the expressive 
function of a sanction will be to sanction preferably emblematic 
actors.179 From this point of view, large companies that are well known 
to the public and the market, such as the U.S. Tech Giants, will be more 
exposed to the risk of sanctions than smaller and more banal 
companies.180 In addition, if an actor has committed a minor regulatory 
violation, the GDPR allows for a reprimand instead of an 
 
175  See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 3 (“The GDPR in its fining system is 
inspired by the system of fines in European Competition Law and uses its 
methodology in large part. In particular, the determination of fines in terms of 
a percentage of overall turnover and a cap of fines determined by a set 
percentage of turnover of the undertaking concerned”).  
176 However, the sanctions must be known to the people who incur them! See 
Robert Apel, Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal 
Deterrence, 29(1) J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 67, 71 (2013) (“deterrence is, 
fundamentally, a process of information transmission intended to discourage 
law violation”).  
177 Jack Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SOUTHWESTERN SOC. 
SCI. Q.  515, 517 (1968).  
178 Non-tolerance towards delinquency, even as far as the most minor 
infringements are concerned, is linked to the now famous theory of the broken 
window. See, generally, G. L. KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN 
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 
(1996).  
179 See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 1 (“Fines serve to discourage further 
infringements. Art. 83 GDPR serves both special prevention and general 
prevention, since high fines for misconduct are attracting widespread 
attention, especially in the case of controllers or processors known in the 
market and to the general public”).  
180 On the European Union's tendency to treat large digital companies more 
harshly, see, e.g., Javier Espinoza & San Fleming, EU Seeks New Powers to 
Penalise Tech Giants, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/7738fdd8-e0c3-4090-8cc9-7d4b53ff3afb.  
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administrative fine.181 With regard to the expressive function of 
sanctions, it is the sanctions incurred that count, even if the sanctions 
that are actually applied may be a useful reminder. The importance of 
the quantum of the penalty may enhance the effectiveness of the 
communication achieved through sanctions. As this message 
complements the regulation itself, decision-making practice must be as 
unambiguous as the regulation itself. This argues for a decision-making 
practice vis-à-vis the sanctions by the different DPAs as uniform as 
possible.182 
2. Normative Function 
Sanctions can also play a normative function.183 Sanctions not 
only help to say that a behavior is mandatory or prohibited, but also to 
say in useful detail what precisely is mandatory or prohibited. 
Sanctions decisions complement ex post the standards of behavior 
provided ex ante by regulation, as if there were a tacit delegation from 
the legislator or regulator to the judicial or regulatory authority.184 
Clarifications are all the more useful when interpreting and 
understanding a law based on abstract and sometimes new standards 
with uncertain implications.185 The possible or effective application of 
a sanction for having committed a criminal offense is an indirect way 
of saying that the conduct in question is prohibited and that people must 
therefore positively avoid such conduct.186 When sanctions are 
provided to ensure the effectiveness of a regulation, normative rules 
 
181 GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 148 (“In a case of minor infringement . . . a 
reprimand may be issued instead of a fine.”).  
182 The search for consistency in the implementation of the GDPR is an 
explicit goal of the EDPB. See Consistency Findings, EDPB, 
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/consistency-findings_en (last visited 
on Oct. 27, 2020).  
183 John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante 
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165–66 (2001) 
(“The code announces in advance what actions count as criminal; thus the 
citizenry can use the announcement to guide their actions to avoid criminal 
conduct.”).  
184 MARIA JOSE FALCON Y TELLA, CASELAW IN ROMAN, ANGLOSAXON AND 
CONTINENTAL LAW 112 (2011). 
185 See Wolff, supra note 76, at 11.  
186 See Durkheim, supra note 171, at 77 ("Le droit pénal, tout au contraire, 
n'édicte que des sanctions, mais il ne dit rien des obligations auxquelles elles 
se rapportent. Il ne commande pas de respecter la vie d'autrui, mais de frapper 
de mort l'assassin. Il ne dit pas tout d'abord, comme fait le droit civil: Voici le 
devoir, mais, tout de suite : Voici la peine. Sans doute, si l'action est punie, 
c'est qu'elle est contraire » à une règle obligatoire”).  
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are obviously included in this regulation. The principle of criminal 
legality normally even prevents the authority with the power to impose 
sanctions from punishing behavior that was not clearly and previously 
prohibited.187 As far as regulatory sanctions are concerned, the 
principle of criminal legality is not so strict.188  
In practice, some of the standards included in the regulations 
are sometimes relatively vague and case-law appears useful in 
clarifying the rules of behavior resulting from them. However, 
violations of regulations that may result in sanctions expose operators 
to a legal risk and a risk of sanctions that is high because the sanctions 
incurred are high.189 In view of this function, it seems important that 
sanction decisions are actually pronounced so that the normative details 
are given. The authorities can accentuate this function by echoing the 
sanction decisions that feed into case law. In this respect, decisions may 
be anonymous because what matters is not the identity of the person 
sanctioned.190 In contrast to the functions of sanctions that require 
severe penalties (such as deterrence), the amount of the sanctions is of 
little importance, since it is the reasoning of the decision that makes it 
possible to extract the information useful for the interpretation of the 
text. They may even be decisions concluding that the accused person 
has been exonerated because the explanation of the reasons why the 
accused was not sanctioned may very well be a source of information 
on the conduct that is authorized under the regulations.191 For this 
normative function of sanctions to play its role properly, it is important 
 
187 Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26(3) LAW & PHIL. 229, 
305 (2007) (“the rule that criminal statutes be construed narrow”).  
188 Case T-99/04, AC Treuhand AG v. Comm’n of the European 
Communities (July 8, 2008), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62004TJ0099&from=FR. 
189 It is not unusual that companies have to face legal and regulatory 
uncertainty. See P.H. Birnbaum, The Choice of Strategic Alternatives Under 
Increasing Regulation in High Technology Companies, 27(3) ACAD. MGMT. 
J. 489, 492–93 (1984).  
190 See Judges’ Technology Advisory Committee (Canadian), Use of Personal 
Information in Judgments and Recommended Protocol, March 2005, at no. 21, 
https://cjc-
ccm.ca/sites/default/files/documents/2019/news_pub_techissues_UseProtoco
l_2005_en.pdf. Luc Plamondon, Guy Lapalme & Frédéric Pelletier, 
Anonymisation de décisions de justice, Conference TALN 2004, at 2 
http://transsearch.iro.umontreal.ca/rali/sites/default/files/publis/0UdeM-taln-
04.pdf.  
191 On the merits of a dismissal decision, see, for example, the testimony of 
the president of a regulatory authority's sanction body: Daniel Labetoulle, La 
Commission des sanctions de l’Autorité des marchés financiers: un 
témoignage, 93 DROIT ET SOCIETE, 2016/2, 337, 352.  
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that the sanctions taken by the different DPAs are not contradictory and 
that they complement each other. Also, with regard to this function, the 
uniform application of sanctions must prevail in the European 
regulatory style.192 
D. Deterrence and Incapacitation 
In terms of regulatory sanctions, the function that often appears 
to be the most important is the deterrence function (Section 1). The 
sanction serves primarily to prevent individuals or companies from 
committing infringements in the future. The financial loss that the 
offender could suffer in case of sanction is anticipated and taken into 
account in his or her economic calculation, so that the violation appears 
to him or her to be economically inopportune. Then we will see that 
sanctions can also help to prevent the commission of offenses by 
impacting not only the anticipations of potential offenders but also on 
their means of committing the offenses. In classical criminal law, this 
refers to the function of incapacitation (Section 2).  
1. Deterrence 
From the deterrence perspective, the sanction must be 
sufficiently severe in order to play its disciplinary role.193 The right 
sanction is the one that is sufficiently dissuasive to encourage operators 
to comply strictly with the rules determining how to behave. 
Paradoxically, the effectiveness of the sanctions then lies in its ability 
not to be applied.194 The economic theory of crime developed from 
Gary Becker's seminal article,195 following the pioneering work of 
Jeremy Bentham,196 specifies the conditions under which a sanction 
can be deterrent. Assuming that the agents are rational, a sanction will 
be dissuasive if the anticipated sanction (taking into account the 
probability that the offense will be detected, prosecuted and effectively 
 
192 Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of 
European Regulatory Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 
430 (2011).  
193 See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 1.  
194 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary 
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985). 
195 Gary G. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POLITICAL ECON. 169 (1968).  
196 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATIONS, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (J. Bowring, ed., 
1838) (1789). 
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sanctioned)197 is greater than the anticipated benefit in the case of a 
violation of the norm belonging to the criminal law. The economic 
analysis of crime also underlines that the deterrent effectiveness of the 
sanction will vary according to the risk aversion of the agents. 
According to Becker, agents with high risk aversion are deterred more 
by severe penalties than by an increase in the probability of 
detection.198 Conversely, if they are less risk-adverse, the increase in 
the probability of detection will be more effective.199 According to 
Beccaria, the certainty and swiftness of the sentence is more important 
than its intrinsic severity.200  
The GDPR changes both parameters, however. On the one 
hand, the penalties incurred are significantly increased; on the other 
hand, thanks to the specialization of specific regulatory authorities in 
the field of personal data protection with a supervisory role for 
companies in this industry, and significant and harmonized 
investigation powers (the DPAs), the probability of detecting 
regulatory violations is increased.201 In addition, the fact that the rules 
and sanctions are common to all EU Member States and that the DPAs 
can jointly exercise the power of sanction reduces the likelihood that 
companies will escape them by exploiting the diversity of regulations 
and the lack of coordination between regulatory authorities.202  
 
197 In another field, see Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and 
Perceptions of the Risk of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 209 (1989) (stating that in another field, S. Klepper and D. Nagin 
emphasize the empirical importance of the perception of detection risk within 
a particular social group such as that of administrators on the deterrent effect 
of the sanction and on the fear of criminal prosecution).  
198 Bruno Deffains, Existe-t-il de bonnes sanctions d’un point de vue 
économiques? [Are There Good Sanctions from an Economic Point of View?], 
in LES SANCTIONS DES SOCIETES COTEES [SANCTIONS OF LISTED COMPANIES] 
53, 75 (Arnaud Reygrobellet & Nathalie Huet, eds.,  2012).  
199 See Mitchel A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Trade-Off Between 
the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880 (1979); 
see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions and 
Differences in Individuals’ Likelihood of Avoiding Detection, 13 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 217, 223 (1993); see also Nuno Garoupa, Optimal Magnitude and 
Probability of Fines, 45 EUR. ECON. REV. 1765, 1765 (2001); see also Jeffrey 
Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 297 
(1991).  
200 CESARE BECCARIA, DEI DELITTI E DELLE PENE [ON CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT] chs. 19 & 41 (1764).  
201 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58.  
202 Hugues Bouthinon-Dumas, Economic Analysis of the Interaction Between 
National Legal Systems: A Contribution to the Understanding of Legal 
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In the field of deterrence, it is the penalties incurred that count 
a priori more than the penalties actually imposed.203 Ideally, the mere 
potentiality of imposing sanctions is sufficient to persuade those who 
might be tempted by the transgression to give up this temptation. But 
if transgressions do occur, the fact that they are not sanctioned or not 
sanctioned severely enough destroys the credibility of the threat. If 
non-compliance, including serious non-compliance, can be observed, 
the proper functioning of deterrence requires that sanctions be 
effectively imposed and that they be sufficiently severe to update the 
deterrent effect, especially because the possibility of a sanction actually 
being applied tends to be underestimated by actors as it is a contingent 
future event.204 This attitude must be adopted by the different 
authorities, and it is therefore again recommended that there should be 
a uniform sanctions policy.  
2. Incapacitation 
Sanctions can also reduce the chances that violations of the law 
will occur by acting on the potential perpetrators and their means of 
action beyond their expectations.205 Regulators may also be tempted to 
impose the very high financial penalties at that may weaken or even 
exclude from the market an operator who has violated data protection 
regulation.206 This corresponds to the incapacitation function of the 
sanction, which is a means of protecting society and the market against 
 
Diversity and Legal Unity, 11 J. CIV. L. STUD. 320 (2018) (“Certain forms of 
harmonization such as the establishment of social and economic standards 
(e.g., minimal wages, maximum working time) are other ways of overseeing 
competition between national systems. In other words, regulatory competition 
should be mitigated and circumscribed through state cooperation”).  
203 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 6 (1992).  
204 Bottoms & Von Hirsch, supra note 105, at 106.  
205 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995); Bottoms & Von Hirsch, 
supra note 105, at 113 (“Whereas rehabilitation and special deterrence seek to 
affect offenders’ choices so they refrain from committing crimes, 
incapacitation requires no such change”).  
206 See, e.g., Curtis Poe, Is GDPR the New Way to Bankrupt Companies?, 
QUORA (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.quora.com/Is-GDPR-the-new-way-to-
bankrupt-companies (the author of this blog response, who identifies himself 
as the CTO of https://allaroundtheworld.fr/, states “the GDPR was created 
with the specific intention of levying incredibly punitive fines against 
companies for not taking this seriously. And yes, that means driving 
companies into bankruptcy for the worst violators of consumer rights”).  
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the risk that the sanctioned entity will repeat its harmful behavior.207 
The way in which the maximum financial penalties is determined, 
based on a high absolute value for small and medium-sized companies 
and even more so as a multiple of turnover, makes it possible to fine 
almost all companies very heavily.208 This method of calculation is 
potentially more severe than calculating sanctions on the basis of 
profits or benefits from a reprehensible practice. It makes it possible to 
fine companies that, in the cycle of their development, already have 
consequential economic activity but are not yet profitable and, 
therefore, do not yet generate a profit.  
Incapacitation is a traditional objective of criminal law 
enforcement. 209 It involves either removing the offender from society 
(by imprisonment) or from a particular activity (by banning him from 
practicing), or applying a specific sanction aimed at acting on the roots 
of his offending behavior. This concern is not necessarily unrelated to 
the policy of applying financial sanctions to entities that violate the 
GDPR. Admittedly, there are measures other than financial sanctions 
that are more directly relevant for ensuring that regulated entities are 
in compliance, such as injunctions relating to the obligation to set up 
an internal compliance program, as a form of probation for 
companies.210 But financial sanctions can indirectly play a role in this 
perspective. Indeed, a heavy financial penalty will often have the effect 
of bringing about a major change within the company—the company's 
strategy and internal organization may be radically reformed following 
the sanction, even if this transformation is not the subject of an explicit 
injunction from the regulator. It is also not infrequent for the company's 
top management to be removed and replaced by new executives to 
implement the reformed strategy and incorporate the compliance 
requirement lacking. This incentive for the company to reform will be 
stronger if the sanctions are more severe. The most severe financial 
 
207 W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. 
REV. 905 (2019).  
208 See infra Part II.C.1. (discussing “wealth-based punishment”).  
209 The main application of sentencing theory as a means of preventing crime 
(and not just deterring it) concerns pre-trial detention and long prison 
sentences or even life sentences, or even the death penalty. See, e.g., Thomas 
J. Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: 
Can the Twain Meet?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 122, 122–23 (2012) (“Another explanation is that prison 
serves an incapacitation function; that is, it allows the state to detain those 
offenders who are expected to commit further harmful acts if released.”).  
210 William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State 
Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 LAW. & SOC’Y 
REV. 741, 742 (1993).  
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sanctions may also result in the company being weakened to the point 
of bankruptcy or having to be absorbed by another company. In such 
cases, the most severe sanctions (in relation to the economic strength 
of the firm) will result in the market foreclosure of the non-compliant 
entity.211 The considerable amounts of penalties incurred in relation to 
personal data make it possible to imagine such a hypothesis. As the 
sanction has a very strong impact on competition, it is essential that the 
policy for the application of the GDPR is uniform, so as not to 
contribute to introducing distortions of competition between the 
sanctioned undertakings and those that might escape sanctions without 
this protection being deserved.212 This requirement is particularly  
based in EU law on the principle of equal treatment.213   
E. Conclusion on the Goals of Sanctions 
In view of the objective of preventing infringements of the 
GDPR, we note that regulatory sanctions should be imposed whenever 
justified, they should be as severe as necessary and they should be 
applied in a uniform manner regardless of the jurisdiction where the 
proceedings may be initiated.214  
 
211 The anticipation that a very high fine could lead to the weakening or even 
bankruptcy of a company is taken into account in competition law. In 
competition law, the disappearance of a competitor is rather analyzed as a 
perverse effect of a too severe sanction policy. Outside of competition law, 
the provoked disappearance of a delinquent firm does not pose the same 
problem. See Lianos, supra note 92, at 37 (“excessive fines may lead to the 
insolvency of the undertakings to which they have been imposed. This might 
not necessarily be a problem, as the risk of insolvency following the 
imposition of a fine may have potential deterrence effects. Yet, it may also 
lead to negative welfare effects, if it excludes one of the very few competitors 
in a market characterized by barriers to entry.”).  
212 Uniform application of the sanction policy with respect to companies 
operating in the same market is a condition of fairness among competitors. See 
Macrory, supra note 93, at 231 (“One of the prime goals of a sanctioning 
system should be to ensure that no financial gain or benefit is made from non-
compliance, and any economic gains recovered. This is only fair to 
competitors who comply with regulatory requirements.”).  
213 See Nemitz, supra note 58, at 6 (“The supervisory authorities must comply 
with the general principles of law of the European Union and the law of the 
Member States, in particular the principle of equal treatment. As a result, 
DPAs have a duty to develop an administrative practice for imposing fines in 
order to deal with similar cases in a similar way.”).  
214 See Yoram Shachar, Sentencing as Art, 25 ISR. L. REV. 638, 653 (1991) 
(for a discussion about the multiplicity of purposes and the need for effective 
sentences).  
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Finally, an analysis of the different goals assigned to the 
sanctions that DPAs are likely to impose leads to the conclusion that 
the predominant purpose of these sanctions is to make effective the 
legal and regulatory framework that DPAs are responsible for 
enforcing. In this respect, perhaps the most important sub-goal is 
deterrence in the broadest sense of the term, which consists in 
threatening regulated entities with sanctions that are sufficiently severe 
to convince them to not be tempted by non-compliance. We have 
observed, however, that the sub-goals that financial sanctions are likely 
to serve are more diverse. As may be deduced from the above, symbolic 
sanctions do not necessarily require heavy sanctions to be imposed, but 
they still require that sanctions are actually applied when there is a 
transgression to remind, clarify and update the message to market 
participants. As sanctions often have a material dimension, heavy 
sanctions appear to be necessary with regard to powerful players and 
to punish the most significant misconduct. Finally, uniform application 
is recommended so that most of the functions of sanctions can be 
fulfilled.215 Now, this study turns to the specific sanctions provided 
under the GDPR, both in the text of the law and in practice. 
II. GDPR SANCTIONS 
No sooner had the GDPR become applicable than the first 
actions under it were brought by digital rights groups in Europe: among 
them, those by NOYB.eu (None of Your Business, or NOYB), a group 
created by the Austrian activist Maximilian Schrems,216 and others by 
the French organization La Quadrature du Net (LQDN).217 However, 
 
215 See, e.g., Nemitz, supra note 58, at 5 (“With the entry into force of the 
Regulation, data protection authorities must be prepared to sanction 
infringements of the Regulation as consistently as possible under the 
Regulation, and in order to obtain a strong deterrent against non-
compliance.”).  
216 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data 
Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 427–29 (2019). See also Henry Farrell 
& Abraham Newman, Here's How Europe's Data Privacy Law Could Take 
Down Facebook, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018, 7:03 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/25/heres-
how-europes-gdpr-may-take-down-facebook/. 
217 See Nicholas Vinocur, ‘We Have a Huge Problem’: European Tech 
Regulator Despairs Over Lack of Enforcement,  POLITICO (Dec. 27, 2019, 
5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/27/europe-gdpr-
technology-regulation-089605 (“Another long-waiting party is La Quadrature 
du Net, a French digital rights group that filed no fewer than seven lawsuits 
against five big tech companies just a few days after GDPR came online.”). 
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sanctions were already provided for under the EU DP Directive.218 
What is new includes: additional obligations under the GDPR; 219 the 
extent of potential administrative sanctions;220 and the powers of the 
DPAs.221The GDPR provides for various legal actions for data 
protection violations and for sanctions.222  
This section begins with a discussion of sanctions and other 
actions under the EU DP Directive, then continues with an enumeration 
of the kinds of actions and sanctions possible under the GDPR.  
A. Sanctions and Other Actions Under the EU DP Directive 
The EU DP Directive provided that Member States should 
establish sanctions for infringement of its terms: “The Member States 
shall adopt suitable measures to ensure the full implementation of the 
provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay down the 
sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions 
adopted pursuant to this Directive.”223 It is thus clear that a crucial role 
of sanctions that regulatory authorities may impose is to ensure the 
effectiveness of a legal framework.224 However, as the EU DP 
Directive was a directive and not a regulation, Member States had 
significant discretion regarding the form and method of its 
implementation in national law.225 This extends to the establishment of 
sanctions and the setting of their amounts, as illustrated, for example, 
by the contrast between the UK law and that of France: the UK law was 
only amended to give its supervisory authority (data protection agency, 
or “DPA”) the power to issue sanctions in 2010,226 and then set the 
maximum penalty at £500,000,227 a figure that was higher than the 
€150,000 maximum established for the French DPA, which was 
 
218 EU DP Directive, supra note 4, art. 24. 
219 See Houser & Voss, supra note 15, at [71]–[95]. 
220 See id. at [57]. 
221 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58. 
222 Id. arts. 77–84. 
223 Id. 
224 See, e.g., Neil Gunningham, Enforcement and Compliance Strategies, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 120 (R. Baldwin et al., eds., 2010) 
(“Effective enforcement is vital to the successful implementation of social 
legislation, and legislation that is not enforced rarely fulfills its social 
objectives.”). 
225 See W. Gregory Voss, Looking at European Union Data Protection Law 
Reform Through a Different Prism: The Proposed EU General Data 
Protection Regulation Two Years Later, 17(9) J. INTERNET L. 1, 13 (Mar. 
2014).  
226 See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 288. 
227 Id. at 289. 
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empowered to issue sanctions by a 2004 amendment to its data 
protection act.228 Thus, under the EU DP sanctions were not uniform 
among the various Member States and their DPAs,229 whereas 
harmonized sanctioning practices is a condition for achieving the goals 
of sanctions.230  
DPAs were given investigative powers, powers of intervention 
(such as ordering a ban on processing, or ordering the erasure or 
destruction of data), and the power to engage in legal proceedings for 
violation of national implementing legislation.231 Furthermore, judicial 
remedies for data protection were afforded to persons for breaches of 
their rights,232 and they could seek compensation for damage resulting 
from unlawful processing or acts otherwise incompatible with data 
protection law.233 However, there was aa divergence among the 
Member State DPAs, with those of certain nations—for example, 
Germany and Spain—being tough regulators, while those of other 
Member States, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, were  seen as 
 
228 Loi n° 2004-801 du 6 août 2004 relative à la protection des personnes 
physiques à l'égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel et 
modifiant la loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, aux 
fichiers et aux libertés [Law No. 2004–801 of Aug. 6, 2004 Relating to the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
Amending Law No. 78–17 of Jan. 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data 
Files and Civil Liberties], J.O. du 6 aou. 2004, p. 14063.FRANCE 
229 See Jan Philipp Albrecht, How the GDPR Will Change the World, 2(3) 
EUR. DATA PROTECT. L. REV. 287, 288 (referring the situation before the 
GDPR as one “where 28 different legal systems as well as 28 different judicial 
and enforcement cultures define the regulatory environment”), 
https://edpl.lexxion.eu/data/article/10073/pdf/edpl_2016_03-005.pdf. See 
also Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection 
Regulation: What it is and What it Means, 28(1) INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 
93 (2019) (referring to the EU DP Directive, the authors state that “the 
Directive left fines and other remedies to individual member states. Some 
countries implemented the Directive with maximum fines of a couple of 
thousand euros – so low to be completely inconsequential to many 
businesses.”), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600834.2019.1573501.  
230 This is true, for example, regarding the incapacitation function of sanctions, 
so as not to distort competition between sanctioned undertakings. See supra 
Part I.D.2. This is also true with respect to the retributive and rehabilitative 
role of GDPR sanctions. See supra Part I.A.2. Furthermore, such 
harmonization of sanctions is desirable for the remedial function. See supra 
Part I.B.3. 
231 EU DP Directive, supra note 4, art. 28(3). 
232 Id. art. 22. 
233 Id. art. 23(1). 
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more accommodating to business.234 Enforcement powers of DPAs 
varied as well depending on applicable law and the individual DPA’s 
strategy; although, there was hope that in the European Union, at least, 
the GDPR would harmonize powers.235 Obligations were almost 
exclusively placed on the data controller,236 and this fact has been seen 
as a weakness under national implementing legislation.237 
In addition, the publicity created by certain DPAs with respect 
to fines issued may be seen as a deterrent in and of itself, perhaps being 
at least as important as the actual fines for multinational companies, as 
it could be potentially damaging for the company’s reputation in the 
eyes of its customers and the public, as we have noticed.238 Moreover, 
the amounts of the fines themselves may have been too low to deter 
such companies under the EU DP Directive.239 However, overall fines 
play a role in awareness-raising and in allowing for there to be a 
“business case” for data protection compliance.240 Thus, the 
denunciation function and the normative function could be performed 
by the fines under the Directive. 
B. Kinds of Actions and Sanctions Possible Under the GDPR 
Since the adoption of the GDPR much attention has centered 
on administrative sanctions issued by the Member State national data 
 
234 See, e.g., WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 
269 (2016) (“Germany and Spain are generally considered more stringent 
regulators than the UK or Ireland, for example.”). 
235 See David Wright, Enforcing Privacy, in ENFORCING PRIVACY: 
REGULATORY, LEGAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES 13, 23–24 (David 
Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2016). 
236 EU DP Directive, supra note 4, art. 2(d). Various articles provide for the 
controller to be responsible for compliance with data protection requirements. 
See, e.g., id. art. 6(2) (providing that controllers are to ensure compliance with 
data quality principle requirements); Id. arts. 10–11 (providing that in Member 
States, the controller or his representative shall provide the data subject with 
information regarding the collection of his data); Id. art. 17 (providing that 
Member States shall require the controller to implement measures to ensure 
the security of data, and be responsible for vetting, with respect to guarantees 
in respect of security, any processor who processes data on the controller’s 
behalf). 
237 See, e.g., GRAHAM J.H. SMITH, INTERNET LAW AND REGULATION (4th ed. 
2007) 716–17, (“The [Information] Commissioner may not serve enforcement 
notices on data processors and others: this is a weakness in the [Data 
Protection Act of 1998].”) (regarding the UK DPA and implementing 
legislation).  
238 See Grant & Crowther, supra note 8, at 299. 
239 Id. at 301. 
240 Id. at 304. 
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protection agencies for EU data protection law violations.241 However, 
that is only one of the tools of the data protection enforcement toolbox: 
individuals who are harmed may (1) lodge a complaint with a 
supervisory authority,242 (2) bring an action for effective judicial 
remedy against a supervisory authority before the courts of Member 
State where the supervisory authority is established,243 (3) individually 
seek to obtain a judicial remedy against a controller or a processor in 
an appropriate jurisdiction,244 or (4) mandate a non-profit public-
interest consumer or digital rights organization to lodge a complaint on 
his or her behalf, either with a supervisory authority or a court.245  Each 
of these options is discussed below. Note that, in addition to these 
options, Member States may specify additional penalties for 
infringements which are not subject to administrative fines;246 
although, those penalties, to the extent they exist, are beyond the scope 
of this study, which is focused on sanctions actually provided in the 
GDPR. 
1. Actions Before (or by) the Relevant Supervisory 
Authority and Its Possible Range of Sanctions 
 Data subjects have the right to file a complaint with a 
supervisory authority for an alleged infringement of data protection law 
involving their personal data.247 They may choose the supervisory 
authority of their habitual residence, workplace, or place of alleged 
 
241 See, e.g., Olivia Tambou, Lessons From the First Post-GDPR Fines of the 
CNIL Against Google LLC, 5 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 80 (2019) (discussing 
how the CNIL’s administrative sanction issued to Google “got a great deal of 
media attention as well as in the community of 'digital actors'.”). See also 
Houser & Voss, supra note 15, at [3] (highlighting the increased 
administrative sanctions under the GDPR, “potentially increasing maximum 
fines to over $1 billion for a company such as Facebook and over $3 billion 
for one such as Google.”); and see Hoofnagle et al., supra note 229, at 93 
(speaking to changes to EU data protection as a result of the adoption of the 
GDPR, the authors refer to administrative sanctions and state, “changes with 
respect to sanctions are the most spectacular."). 
242 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 77. 
243 Id. art. 78. 
244 Id. art. 79. 
245 Id. art. 80. 
246 Id. art. 84 (discussing that these penalties may be criminal penalties). See 
also GDPR, supra note 1, Recital 149 (“Member States should be able to lay 
down the rules on criminal penalties for infringements of this Regulation, 
including for infringements of national rules adopted pursuant to and within 
the limits of this Regulation.”). The references to criminal penalties in Part I 
of this study will be relevant for the reader interested in criminal penalties. 
247 Id. art. 77(1). 
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infringement.248  The relevant supervisory authority must inform the 
complainant about the possibility of a judicial remedy, and the progress 
and outcome of the complaint.249 
 With respect to controllers or processors, the Supervisory 
Authority has the power to: issue warnings where processing 
operations are likely to infringe the GDPR;250 issue reprimands where 
processing operations have infringed the GDPR;251 and order 
compliance with requests to exercise data subject rights;252 to order the 
bringing into compliance of processing operations with the GDPR 
(including within a specified manner or period, if appropriate).253 In 
addition, it may order a controller to make a data breach notification to 
a data subject.254 Furthermore, it may order a temporary or definitive 
 
248 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 77(1). 
249 Id. art. 77(2). 
250 Id. art. 58(2)(a); see European Data Protection Board (EDPB), Contribution 
of the EDPB to the evaluation of the GDPR under Article 97 (2020), 1, 32. 
(stating that the following fourteen countries used this power during the period 
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Malta and the United Kingdom) [hereinafter EDPB]. 
251 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(b); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 32 (stating 
that the following twenty-four countries used this power during the period 
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia and the United Kingdom).  
252 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(c); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 32 (stating 
that the following twenty-five countries used this power during the period 
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 
France, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia). 
253 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(d); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating 
that the following twenty-seven countries used this power during the period 
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, 
France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and 
Slovakia).   
254 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(e); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating 
that the following ten countries used this power during the period from May 
25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Malta, Poland and Latvia).   
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ban on processing,255 the correction or erasure of personal data,256 the 
withdrawal of a data protection certification,257 or the suspension of 
cross-border data flows.258 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly for 
the purposes of this study, a Supervisory Authority may impose 
administrative fines either in place of, or in addition to, other measures 
mentioned in this paragraph.259 The amount of these administrative 
fines is discussed in Section C.1. Administrative sanctions (other than 
administrative fines) help to deter market participants from breaking 
the rules and damaging the interests of data subjects. The deterrent 
power of these administrative measures, on the one hand, and 
administrative fines, on the other hand, is cumulative.260 The graduated 
response policy advocated by the GDPR is probably more relevant than 
a policy of sanctions, which would have at its disposal only the weapon 
of a formidable sanction.  
 
255 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(f); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating 
that the following thirteen countries used this power during the period from 
May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Germany, Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania 
and Slovenia). 
256 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(g); see EDPB supra note 250, at 33 (stating 
that the following seventeen countries used this power during the period from 
May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, 
Iceland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Portugal).   
257 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(h); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating 
that no country used this power during the period from May 25, 2018 to 
November 30, 2019).   
258 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(j); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating 
that no country used this power during the period from May 25, 2018 to 
November 30, 2019). 
259 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 58(2)(i); see EDPB, supra note 250, at 33 (stating 
that the following twenty-two countries used this power during the period 
from May 25, 2018 to November 30, 2019: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark (“the legal system of Denmark 
does not allow for administrative fines. Fines can only be imposed by the 
national courts, which means that the Danish SA reports infringements to the 
Police, which then takes the case to court”), Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Sweden and Slovakia).   
260 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2) (“Administrative fines shall, depending on 
the circumstances of each individual case, be imposed in addition to, or instead 
of, measures referred to in points (a) to (h) and (j) of Article 58(2).”). 
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2. Actions Against the Supervisory Authority 
Proceedings against supervisory authorities may be brought 
before EU Member State courts where such authorities are 
established,261 and they may concern the attempt to obtain an effective 
remedy: (i) against a legally-binding decision concerning the 
complainant,262 (ii) where the supervisory authority does not handle a 
complaint or inform the complainant within three months of the 
outcome or progress of it.263  The possibility for market participants to 
take legal action against supervisory authorities, and for courts to hear 
such cases, is required for an effective judicial remedy and is consistent 
with the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Convention 
108, and to the modernized version of that Convention.264 
In addition to having the possibility of lodging a complaint 
with a supervisory authority, a data subject may also seek effective 
relief against a controller or processor in the courts (the actions are 
without prejudice to one another).265  This would be the case where the 
data subject considers that his or her rights under the GDPR have been 
infringed by non-compliant processing of his or her personal data.266  
There are alternative possible jurisdictions for the case: the courts of 
the EU Member State, (i) where the controller or the processor, as the 
case may be, has an establishment, or (ii) of the data subject’s habitual 
residence, unless the defendant is “a public authority of a Member State 
acting in the exercise of its public powers.”267  If a competent court of 
an EU Member State knows of proceedings on the same matter 
involving data processing by the same controller or processor, as the 
case may be, it contacts the other court to confirm the existence of such 
proceedings,268 and any court other than the one where the case is first 
brought may suspend proceedings.269  In a similar manner, any court 
other than the one where the case is first brought may decline 
 
261 Id. art. 78(3). 
262 Id. art. 78(1). 
263 Id. art. 78(2). 
264 See Waltraut Kotschy, Article 78. Right to an Effective Judicial Remedy 
Against a Supervisory Authority, in THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION (GDPR): A COMMENTARY 1125, 1127–28 (Christopher Kuner 
et al., 2020). 
265 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 79(1). 
266 Id. 
267 Id. art. 79(2). 
268 Id. art. 81(1). 
269 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 81(2). 
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jurisdiction upon application of one of the parties, if the first court has 
jurisdiction and its law permits consolidation of the claims.270 
 The claimant, who may be the data subject or another injured 
party,271 has the right to compensation from the controller or the 
processor, as the case may be, if he or she has suffered damage 
(whether material or non-material) because of infringement of the 
GDPR.272  Such damage may be financial, physical or psychological.273 
Controllers are liable for damage caused by processing that infringes 
the GDPR, if they are involved in processing.  Processors, on the other 
hand, are only liable for damage related to non-compliance of 
obligations specifically addressed to processors in the GDPR, or where 
they have acted against the relevant controller’s lawful instructions.274  
In both cases, there may be an exemption from liability if the controller 
or processor, as the case may be, proves that “it is not in any way 
responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.”275 Where there are 
joint controllers or processors or both controller and processor are 
involved in the processing that causes the damage, each shall be held 
liable for the entire damage276 and the one who pays the full 
compensation is entitled to claim back a share (based on their relative 
parts of responsibility) from the other controller or processor involved 
in the proceeding.277 As a result of this potential for joint liability, 
processing agreements, whether in the context of joint controllers or 
the more traditional relationship between a controller and a processor, 
should clearly set out the responsibilities of each party, as indicated by 
Articles 26 and 28 of the GDPR, and this should include 
responsibilities for eventual claims.278 However, France, for one, has 
added the possibility of class action law suits for data protection 
 
270 Id. art. 81(3). 
271 See Heledd Lloyd-James & Peter Carey, The Rights of Individuals, in DATA 
PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO UK AND EU LAW 122, 152 (Peter Carey, 
ed., 5th ed., 2018) (“It is not necessary for the claimant to be the data subject 
in relation to the relevant processing.”). 
272 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82(1). 
273 See Lloyd-James & Carey, supra note 271, at 152 (“Claims for 
compensation may be brought for financial, physical, and psychological 
damage as well as for distress caused by an infringement of the GDPR.”). 
274 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82(2). 
275 Id. art. 82(3). 
276 Id. art. 82(4). 
277 Id. art. 82(5). 
278 See Lloyd-James & Carey, supra note 271, at 151–52. 
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violations,279 and the GDPR has included actions by non-profit 
organizations mandated by individuals, as this study will now discuss. 
In the case of the GDPR, such measure is intended to make easier and 
enhance the defense of data subject interests,280 thus facilitating 
reparation. This is useful since we noted that the reparation function 
was not directly fulfilled by administrative fines. 
3. Actions by Non-Profit Organizations Mandated 
by Individuals 
Procedural rules relating to private enforcement certainly have 
a potential effect on the effectiveness of regulation: the easier it is to 
initiate legal proceedings and the more open they are to a large number 
of potential claimants, including activist NGOs, the more likely it is 
that regulations and rights will be respected.281 Concern for effective 
regulation would be served not only by financial penalties as a deterrent 
to transgressing the applicable standards, but also by private 
enforcement actions. 
Under the GDPR, a data subject may mandate a non-for-profit 
body, organization or association, properly organized under the law of 
an EU Member State, whose purpose is in the public interest, and that 
is active in protection of data subject rights and freedoms regarding the 
processing of their personal data, to file a complaint, to apply to a court 
for relief against a supervisory authority, or to seek an effective remedy 
against a controller or processor on its behalf.282  Furthermore, EU 
Member States may grant to such bodies, organizations or associations 
to take such actions independent of any mandate, if it considers that 
data subject rights under the GDPR have been infringed.283 While the 
European Commission acknowledges that several actions were started 
by NGOs mandated by individuals, it commented that “recourse to 
representative actions would have been easier if more Member States 
had made use of the possibility provided for by the Regulation to allow 
non-governmental organisations to launch actions without a 
 
279 Loi 2016-1547 du 18 novembre 2016 de modernisation de la justice du 
XXIe siècle [Law No. 2016-1547 of Nov. 18, 2016 to Modernize XXIst 
Century Justice], J.O. du 19 nov. 2016, p. 269.  
280 See Gloria González Fuster, Article 80. Representation of Data Subjects, 
in THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR): A 
COMMENTARY 1142, 1143 (Christopher Kuner et al., 2020). 
281 See, e.g., Federica Casarosa, Transnational Collective Actions for Cross-
Border Data Protection Violations, 9(3) INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2020) 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/224938/1/1733852298.pdf. 
282 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 80(1). 
283 Id. art. 80(2). 
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mandate.”284 Since private enforcement techniques are available in 
different ways in the EU Member States, it appears that deterrence 
through administrative fines remains the minimum basic mechanism to 
ensure effective regulation. Private enforcement appears to be a 
complementary, and not a generalized mechanism. 
However, the Commission has proposed a new Directive on 
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of 
consumers,285 which is intended to apply to data protection, among 
other areas.286 This proposed Directive is in the legislative process and, 
on March 26, 2019, an amended version of the proposed Directive was 
approved by the Parliament on first reading, but, as of July 30, 2020, 
the legislative text still awaits the Council’s first reading position.287 
The proposed Directive, if adopted in the form proposed by the 
Commission, would enable “qualified entities to seek representative 
actions aimed at the protection of consumers, while ensuring 
appropriate safeguards to avoid abusive litigation.”288 It would also 
allow for redress measures, including those for compensation,289 and 
EU Member States would be able to provide, alternatively, for courts 
or administrative authorities to issue declaratory decisions with respect 
to listed EU legislation “regarding the liability of the trader toward the 
consumers harmed by an infringement . . . in duly justified cases where, 
due to the characteristics of individual harm to the consumers 
concerned the quantification of individual redress is complex,”290 with 
 
284 Communication from Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Data Protection Rules as a Trust-Enabler in the EU and Beyond – 
Taking Stock, at 7, COM (2019) 374 final (July 24, 2019).  
285 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of 
Consumers, and Repealing Directive, COM (2018) 184 final (Apr. 11, 2018). 
286 Id. recital (6) at 19; see Annexes to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Representative Actions for the 
Protection of the Collective Interest of Consumers, and Repealing Directive 
2009/22/EC, at 5, COM (2018) 184 final (Apr. 11, 2018), (illustrating the 
GDPR figures on the list of EU legislation to be covered by the proposed 
Directive).  
287 See Representative Actions for the Protection of the Collective Interests of 
Consumers, PARL. EUR. DOC. (COD 0089) (2018), 
https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?referen
ce=2018/0089(COD)&l=en (last visited on July 30, 2020).   
288 Proposal for a Directive, supra note 285, art. 1(1) at 26. 
289 Id. art. 6(1) at 28. 
290 Id. art. 6(2) at 28; see Internet, New Technologies, and Value, supra note 
14, at 482–84 (explaining that the quantification of redress for personal data 
is famously complex, as there is a lack of transparency on the part of the U.S. 
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certain exceptions.291 Importantly, the proposed Directive provides for 
cross-border representative actions:  
Member States shall ensure that where the 
infringement affects or is likely to affect consumers 
from different Member States the representative action 
may be brought to the competent court or 
administrative authority of a Member State by several 
qualified entities from different Member States, acting 
jointly or represented by a single qualified entity, for 
the protection of the collective interest of consumers 
from different Member States.292 
This move toward collective redress (CR) is part of an evolution of EU 
law from a focus on institutions or individuals taking action to 
collective action, which has specifically been called for in the areas of 
“consumer protection, competition, environment protection, protection 
of personal data, financial services legislation and investor 
protection.”293 
Having presented the sanctions other than the administrative 
fines, it appears that the competition between types of sanctions or legal 
actions does not undermine the specific effectiveness of administrative 
sanctions in terms of the objectives we have listed. On the contrary, the 
different types of sanctions complement each other, either because 
administrative fines do not achieve certain goals (e.g., reparation for 
victims) or because other sanctions actually increase the effectiveness 
of administrative fines (e.g., the regulator's injunctions which both 
precede and are secured by the fines).  
C. The Quantum of Administrative Sanctions 
The quantum of administrative sanctions imposed on violators 
of data protection law is the subject of this Section, as well as the 
subject of many commentators on the GDPR. This study will start this 
 
Tech. Giants regarding their value, and there is also a “collective effect of 
cumulated data,” making them more valuable collectively than cumulatively. 
This all argues for collective redress).  
291 Proposal for a Directive, supra note 285, art. 6(3) at 28–29. 
292 Id. art. 16(2) at 32. 
293 Sara Benedi Lahuerta, Enforcing EU Equality Law Through Collective 
Redress: Lagging Behind?, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 783, 792 (2018) (“EU 
law has, therefore, evolved from its initial focus on institutional and individual 
vigilance to recognize, more recently, that collective vigilance, particularly 
CR and broader standing rules, are necessary to make the enforcement toolkit 
more comprehensive and effective.”) (citation omitted).  
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subject by detailing the relevant text of the GDPR and its development 
(Section 1), then will explain the “one-stop-shop” mechanism (Section 
2), before comparing sanctions prior to the GDPR to those after its 
application date (Section 2).   
1. The Text of the GDPR and Its Development 
The text of the GDPR was developed over a period that began 
well before the eventual application of the legislation in May 2018. In 
the European Commission’s initial proposal of the GDPR, which was 
released on January 25, 2012, a proposed Article 79 aimed to empower 
DPAs to impose administrative sanctions that were to be “in each 
individual case effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”294 This 
language regarding sanctions was retained in the final version of the 
GDPR.295 The goal was to be achieved in the context of what was to be 
strong enforcement of the data protection rules.296 Implementation was 
expected to lead to, in the Commission’s analysis, “consistency of data 
protection enforcement in the Union, the effective possibility of 
individuals to exercise their data protection rights to the protection of 
personal data within the EU and the efficiency of data protection 
supervision and enforcement.”297  
The initial Commission proposal for the GDPR gave DPAs the 
power to sanction administrative offenses,298 and provided that 
administrative sanctions should go on a sliding scale, from mere 
warnings, to a first level of €250,000 or 0.5% of annual worldwide 
turnover for an “enterprise,” to a second level of €500,000 or 1% of 
annual worldwide turnover, and to a third, highest level of €1 million 
or 2% of annual worldwide turnover, in the most serious cases.299 The 
position of the European Union Parliament in first reading in 2014, 
provided, in addition to the range of sanctions mentioned above, the 
 
294 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), art. 79, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012). 
295 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(1). 
296 Proposal for a Regulation, supra note 294, at 2 (“[I]t is time to build a 
stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU, backed by 
strong enforcement that will allow the digital economy to develop across the 
internal market, put individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal 
and practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities.”) 
(emphasis added). 
297 Id. at 5. 
298 Id. art. 53(4). 
299 Id. art. 79. 
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possibility of requiring “regular periodic data protection audits.”300 
Furthermore, the Parliament rejected the sliding scale approach and 
increased the maximum level of administrative fines up to €100 million 
or 5% of annual worldwide turnover in the case of an enterprise.301 This 
relatively radical change in fines must be seen in the context of the 
Edward Snowden revelations about the cooperation of U.S. Tech 
Giants in NSA mass surveillance programs, which were brought to the 
attention of the general public through the press less than one year 
earlier.302 Following the trialogue negotiations among the Council, the 
Commission and the Parliament, the GDPR provision was modified 
and a two-level set of fines was adopted. 
As finally provided in the GDPR, the level of administrative 
sanctions may vary on a case-to-case basis, depending on the 
circumstances, including compliance measures taken.303 Furthermore, 
sanctions will differ depending on whether the controller or processor, 
as applicable, is an undertaking or not. An “undertaking” is a term used 
throughout the GDPR, but without definition.304  It should be read to 
be an enterprise involved in economic activity and will often act as a 
legal person (or corporate entity).305  A company (or corporation) 
involved in economic activity would be an undertaking.  The term 
“enterprise” is defined as “a natural or legal person engaged in an 
economic activity, irrespective of its legal form, including partnerships 
or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity.”306 
Infringements of different categories of obligations may lead 
to different levels of sanctions, from up to €10 million or €20 million, 
in the case that the controller or processor is not an undertaking, and 
 
300 Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
(COM(2012)0011 – C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)) (Ordinary legislative 
procedure: first reading), art. 79(2a)(b). 
301 Id. art. 79(2a)(c). 
302 For a discussion of the impact of the NSA revelations on the GDPR 
legislative process, see W. Gregory Voss, Looking at European Union Data 
Protection Law Reform Through a Different Prism: The Proposed EU 
General Data Protection Regulation Two Years Later, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1, 
19–21 (2014). 
303 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2). 
304 However, the term “group of undertakings” is defined and means: “a 
controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings.” Id. art. 4(19).  
Obviously, this does not help us with the definition of “undertaking.” 
305 In recital 14 we learn that undertakings may be established as legal persons.  
Id. recital 14. More importantly, in recital 110 we see that “group of 
undertakings” may be synonymous with “group of enterprises engaged in a 
joint economic activity.” Id. recital 110.   
306 Id. art. 4(18). 
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up to the greater of whichever of such sums is applicable to its category 
and 2% or 4% of total worldwide annual turnover for preceding 
financial year, depending on the category, in the case of an undertaking. 
The two categories of provisions set out in Article 83 of the GDPR may 
be broken down into those the infringement of which is less serious, 
and those the infringement of which are more serious. The less serious 
include infringement of provisions centered around compliance-
ensuring obligations, including specific security obligations.307 The 
more serious include infringement of provisions centered around basic 
obligations to process data, and data subjects’ rights.308 
Perhaps what is most notable about this, in addition to the 
potential quantum of the fines, is that the GDPR embraces what has 
been described as “wealth-based punishment,” which Professors 
Rustad and Koenig claim is a U.S. innovation,309 not traditionally 
levied in the European Union.310 Rustad and Koenig do, however, 
recognize the large amounts of wealth-based fines imposed by the 
European Commission for EU competition law violations.311 In cases 
of an illegal cartel or abuse of a dominant position, fines may go up to 
a maximum of ten percent of total turnover of the undertaking or the 
association of undertakings in the preceding business year,312 or up to 
two and one-half times the maximum amount under the GDPR. 
Through their mutual adoption of wealth-based punishment, the 
GDPR’s tie to one area of economic law—competition law—is 
recognized. 
The sanctioning power conferred on DPAs is part of the more 
general trend of European law to strengthen sanctions serving a more 
effective market regulation.313 A set of common rules at European level 
 
307 Id. art. 83(4). 
308 Id. art. 83(5). 
309 See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data 
Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 369, 431 (2019) (where the authors 
claim that the GDPR’s fines are “[s]imilar to U.S. punitive damages,” in that 
they are imposed “based upon the wrongdoer’s annual turnover.”) Id. at 431. 
310 Id. at 429. 
311 Id. at 429–31 (citing the July 2018, $5.1 billion fine against Google, the 
May 2009, €1.06 billion fine against Intel, and the September 2017, €2.2 
billion fine against Google).  
312 Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 17. 
313 One note focuses on “an observable intersection of data protection and 
competition law to create a more efficient regulatory environment with the 
goal of offering consumers the best protection for their personal data at the 
least cost for the companies storing and processing that data,” which should 
be the goal of such trend. See Olivia Altmayer, The Tipping Point – 
 
60 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
on sanctions is gradually being developed. The standard of "effective, 
dissuasive and proportionate" sanctions is present in different 
regulations and its understanding in the field of data protection law can 
therefore be inspired by its application in other areas, such as 
competition law or market abuse law. The power of sanctions in data 
protection law has been presented as a revolution, but it may also 
appear as the effect of a convergence between the different European 
regulations on sanctions.  
2. The One-Stop Shop Mechanism 
A “one-stop shop” (OSS) mechanism has been provided in the 
GDPR, whereby, when a data controller has more than one 
establishment in the European Union (actually the EEA), and there is 
cross-border processing of personal data, the DPA of the main 
establishment has the competence to act as “lead supervisory authority” 
for such cross-border processing.314 The term “main establishment” is 
defined as follows: 
(a) as regards a controller with establishments in more 
than one Member State, the place of its central 
administration in the Union, unless the decisions on 
the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data are taken in another establishment of the 
controller in the Union and the latter establishment has 
the power to have such decisions implemented, in 
which case the establishment having taken such 
decision is to be considered to be the main 
establishment; 
(b) as regards a processor with establishments in more 
than one Member State, the place of its central 
administration in the Union, or, if the processor has no 
central administration in the Union, the establishment 
of the processor in the Union where the main 
processing activities in the context of the activities of 
an establishment of the processor take place to the 
 
Reevaluating the ASNEF-EQUIFAX Separation of Competition of Data 
Privacy Law in the Wake of the 2017 Equifax Data Breach, 39 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 37, 40 (2018). 
314 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 56(1) (“Without prejudice to Article 55, the 
supervisory authority of the main establishment or of the single establishment 
of the controller or processor shall be competent to act as lead supervisory 
authority for the cross-border processing carried out by that controller or 
processor in accordance with the procedure provided in Article 60.”). 
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extent that the processor is subject to specific 
obligations under this Regulation[.]315 
The term “place of its central administration” is not defined in the 
GDPR but may be seen as the place out of which the company is 
actually run, where the main decisions are made, usually corresponding 
to the operational headquarters.316 Yet, cases may exist “where an 
establishment other than the place of central administration makes 
autonomous decisions concerning the purposes and means of a specific 
processing activity” where there could be more than one lead DPA.317  
In this context, “cross-border processing” means either 
“processing of personal data which takes place in the context of the 
activities of the establishment in more than one Member State of a 
controller or processor in the Union where the controller or processor 
is established in more than one Member State”318 or “processing of 
personal data which takes place in the context of the activities of a 
single establishment of a controller or processor in the Union but which 
substantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in 
more than one Member State.”319 In other words, there is an element of 
internationality either through the places where processing takes place 
in the context of a controller’s or processor’s establishments’ activities, 
or where there is a single establishment but their processing affects data 
subjects in different EU Member States. Additionally, the DPA, who 
has the lead role, may change if there is the relocation of a company’s 
main establishment to another EEA Member State, and if there is an 
ongoing procedure involving that company. This would “deprive the 
first authority of its original competence at the moment such a change 
becomes effective, but not to retrospectively deprive the operations 
 
315 Id. art. 4(16). 
316 See Luca Tosoni, Article 4(16). Main establishment, in THE EU GENERAL 
DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR): A COMMENTARY 225, 230 
(Christopher Kuner et al. eds., 2020). 
317 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines for identifying a 
controller or processor’s lead supervisory authority, WP 244 rev.01, adopted 
on Dec. 13, 2016, as last revised and adopted on Apr. 5, 2017 [hereinafter WP 
244] (this would be the case, “where a multinational company decides to have 
separate decision making centres, in different countries, for different 
processing activities.”). These Guidelines were endorsed by the EDPB when 
it came into existence and replaced the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party on May 25, 2018. European Data Protection Board, Endorsement 
1/2018, at 2 (May 25, 2018).   
318 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4(23)(a). 
319 Id. art. 4(23)(b). 
62 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
already carried out by the initial authority of a legal basis.”320 Thus, the 
DPA of the new Member State where the main establishment is located 
would become the lead DPA. 
However, despite this competence of the lead DPA, each DPA 
may handle complaints brought to it or possible GDPR violations if 
related only to the establishment in its Member State or where it 
substantially only affects data subjects there,321 after having informed 
the lead supervisory authority,322 where the lead supervisory authority 
does not decide to handle the case, subject to procedures of mutual 
assistance and joint operations between the DPAs.323 Where the lead 
supervisory authority decides to handle the case, the procedure for 
cooperation between itself and the other “supervisory authorities 
concerned” shall apply.324 In any case, the lead DPA is “the sole 
interlocutor of the controller or processor for the cross-border 
processing carried out by that controller or processor,”325 although it 
has been suggested that this does not mean that the lead DPA must be 
their sole contact point.326 Furthermore, there is a consistency 
mechanism set up under the GDPR,327 in which the EDPB takes a key 
 
320 European Data Protection Board, Opinion 8/2019, at 8 (July 9, 2019) (On 
the competence of a supervisory authority in case of a change in circumstances 
relating to the main or single establishment). 
321 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 56(2) (“By derogation from paragraph 1, each 
supervisory authority shall be competent to handle a complaint lodged with it 
or a possible infringement of this Regulation, if the subject matter relates only 
to an establishment in its Member State or substantially affects data subjects 
only in its Member State.”). 
322 Id. art. 56(3). 
323 Id. art. 56(5). 
324 Id. art. 56(4) (the cooperation procedure is set out in Article 60 of the 
GDPR). “Supervisory authority concerned” is defined as “a supervisory 
authority which is concerned by the processing of personal data because: (a) 
the controller or processor is established on the territory of the Member State 
of that supervisory authority; (b) data subjects residing in the Member State 
of that supervisory authority are substantially affected or likely to be 
substantially affected by the processing; or (c) a complaint has been lodged 
with that supervisory authority.” Id. art. 4(22). 
325 Id. art. 56(6). 
326 HIELKE HIJMANS, Article Commentary, Art. 56 Competence of the Lead 
Supervisory Authority, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
(GDPR): A COMMENTARY 913, 924 (Christopher Kuner et al. eds., 2020) 
(“This does not mean that the lead DPA must always operate as the sole 
contact point of the local DPA. In view of the strong position of the local DPA 
on substance, as described, it would be illogical to preclude the local DPA 
from interacting with the controller or processor.”). 
327 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 63. 
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role through, for example, issuing opinions328 or adopting binding 
decisions to resolve disputes.329 
As a result of this OSS mechanism, the sanctioning power of 
the supervisory authorities is exercised on a national (or Member State) 
level, through Member State DPAs,330 whether they be lead 
supervisory authorities or supervisory authorities concerned, albeit 
with a coherency mechanism headed up by the EDPB. This may be 
seen to go against the trend for enforcement more generally in the 
European Union, which is a move of enforcement powers from the 
Member States to the European Union.331 This trend is illustrated, for 
example, by changes in the supervisory competence of large financial 
institutions. In the past, credit institutions in the Member States were 
regulated by national supervisory authorities, irrespective of their size. 
Today, the main European banking groups are mainly placed under the 
supervision of the European Central Bank, which has, inter alia, the 
power to impose administrative sanctions (up to 10 % of the total 
annual turnover).332 It may be argued that the fact that administrative 
sanctions under the GDPR are handled at the Member State level, 
through national DPAs, especially when the position of Ireland is 
considered, is the root of difficulties for the enforcement of the GDPR, 
as discussed in Section 3 below. 
3. Comparison with Sanctions Prior to the 
Application of the GDPR 
Immediately prior to the application of the GDPR, maximum 
fines under Member State national law implementing the EU DP 
Directive did not generally exceed hundreds of thousands of euros. For 
example, in Germany the maximum was €300,000; in the United 
Kingdom, it was £500,000 or roughly €580,000; in Sweden, one 
million crowns or roughly €105,000; in Ireland €100,000; in Italy, 
 
328 Id. art. 64. 
329 Id. art. 65. 
330 See Commission Decision of June 27, 2017, supra note 51 (Provides a 
definition of “supervisory authority.” This study uses the abbreviation DPA 
for “supervisory authority” as well). 
331 See Scholten et al., supra note 66, at 6 (“[ . . . ] a clear trend has emerged 
where enforcement powers that were once in the hands of the MS have been 
transferred to the EU”). 
332 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions, art. 18 (2013). 
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€300,000; in the Netherlands, €820,000 or 10% of turnover; in 
Romania €22,000 or 2% of turnover; and in France €3,000,000.333 
 After the application of the GDPR, on March 14, 2019, the 
Dutch DPA—Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens—published a fining 
structure for GDPR violations and those of the Netherland’s 
implementing act for the GDPR, introducing four fine categories with 
fine ranges extending from €0-€200,000 to €450,000-€1 million and 
default fine rates ranging from €100,000 to €725,000.334 Although 
these rates differ from the GDPR rates (and indeed are much lower than 
those in the GDPR335), the Dutch DPA may vary its fines from the 
default rates based on mitigating or aggravating factors and may still 
fine up to the maximum fine rates set out in the GDPR.336 This 
highlights the principle that fines must at the same time dissuade, be 
effective and not be disproportionate, so that the circumstances of each 
case must be evaluated before establishing the fine, but it also may be 
sending a clear message that “fines are coming!”337 If the EDPB were 
to decide to publication guidelines for the calculation of GDPR fines, 
however, the Dutch DPA might withdraw its guidelines.338 
While the first six months to one year following the first date 
of application of the GDPR seemed to be a relative “cease-fire,” this 
changed with a first multimillion euro fine by the French DPA against 
 
333 See BART CUSTERS ET AL., EU PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 228 (2019). Note that, in France’s case, maximum fines had 
been €150,000 for first offenses until adoption of the GDPR, but during the 
period between the GDPR’s adoption and its application this was changed by 
the Loi pour une République numérique (Digital Republic Act) of October 7, 
2016, which increased maximum fines to €3,000,000, thus anticipating higher 
fines under the GDPR. See CNIL, Ce que change la loi pour une République 
numérique pour la protection des données personnelles [What the Digital 
Republic Act Changes for the Protection of Personal Data] (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://www.cnil.fr/fr/ce-que-change-la-loi-pour-une-republique-numerique-
pour-la-protection-des-donnees-personnelles.   
334 Steenbruggen et al., Dutch Regulator Publishes Guidelines for the 
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336 Id.  
337 Id. (the authors suggest that if the EDPB decides to publish guidelines for 
the calculation of GDPR fines, the Dutch DPA might withdraw its guidelines). 
338 Id. 
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Google in January 2019.339 While only amounting to 0.05 % of revenue 
for Google’s parent, Alphabet, for the year 2017,340 such fine for 
violations of the obligations of transparency and information, and for 
lack of a legal basis for ads personalization data processing is, as of 
October 31, 2020, the largest fine issued under the GDPR. However, 
more spectacularly, in July 2019, the United Kingdom’s DPA—the 
ICO—announced intentions to fine British Airways £183.39 million341 
and Marriott International more than £99 million,342 both in connection 
with data breaches. However, the British Airways fine was eventually 
lowered to £20 million,343 and the Marriott International figure was 
finally reduced to £18.4 million.344 As of October 31, 2020, fourteen 
fines of over €1 million have been assessed by an EU or EEA DPA 
since the GDPR has applied: (i) Google LLC (France), €50,000,000; 
(ii) Hennes & Mauritz Online Shop A.B. & Co. KG (Germany), 
€35,258,708; (iii) TIM (Italy), €27,800,000; (iv) British Airways 
(United Kindgom), €22,046,000; (v) Marriot International, 
€20,450,000; (vi) Austrian Post (Austria), €18,000,000; (vii) Wind Tre 
S.p.A. (Italy), €16,700,000; (viii) Deutsche Wohnen SE (Germany), 
 
339 The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 
Million Euros Against GOOGLE LLC, CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty-
50-million-euros-against-google-llc (the fine amounted to €50 million and 
was appealed, unsuccessfully, by Google).  
340 The CNIL converted the 2017 revenue of Alphabet—$109.7 billion—into 
the figure of roughly €96 billion. See Commission Nationale de 




Dividing the amount of the fine by this revenue figure yields roughly 0.05%. 
Note that the sanction was upheld on appeal by the Council of State (CE 19 
June 2019, req. n° 430810), https://www.conseil-
etat.fr/fr/arianeweb/CE/decision/2020-06-19/430810.   
341 Intention to Fine British Airways £183.39m Under GDPR for Data Breach, 
ICO (July 8, 2019), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-
and-blogs/2019/07/ico-announces-intention-to-fine-british-airways/.  
342 Intention to Fine Marriott International, Inc More than £99 Million Under 
GDPR for Data Breach, ICO (July 9, 2019), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-
ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/intention-to-fine-marriott-
international-inc-more-than-99-million-under-gdpr-for-data-breach/.   
343 British Airways, ICO (Oct. 16, 2020), https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-
taken/enforcement/british-airways/.  
344 Marriott International Inc, ICO (Oct. 30, 2020), https://ico.org.uk/action-
weve-taken/enforcement/marriott-international-inc/. 
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€14,500,000; (ix) 1&1 Telecom GmbH (Germany), €9,550,000; (x) 
Eni Gas e Luce (Italy), €8,500,000; (xi) €3,000,000; (xii) Google LLC 
(Sweden), €7,000,000; (xiii) National Revenue Agency (Bulgaria), 
€2,600,000; and (xiv) Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse (Germany), 
€1,240,000.345 Other than the CNIL Google fine and the Data 
Protection Authority of Sweden Google fine, the only four other fines 
of a U.S. Tech Giant are a Data Protection Authority of Hamburg fine 
assessed on Facebook Germany GmbH in the amount of €51,000,346 far 
below the maximum fine that could have been assessed,347 a more 
recent Belgian DPA (Autorité de protection des données (APD)) fine 
imposed on Google Belgium SA, in the amount of €600,000;348 and a 
Hungarian DPA fine of Google Ireland Ltd. in the amount of €58.349 
Thus, while a few multimillion euro fines have been assessed, there has 
not been a fine of a U.S. Tech Giant in the hundreds of millions of 
euros, much less in the billions. However, the larger fines do benefit 
from the increased maximum levels allowed by the GDPR, as do even 
the intermediate fines. This analysis is important, although not enough, 
as indicated by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (known as the LIBE Committee) of the European Parliament, 
which called for the following: 
 
345 See GDPR Enforcement Tracker, CMS, https://enforcementtracker.com 
(last visited on July 8, 2020) (this listing of GDPR fines is compiled by global 
law firm CMS, through its German member CMS Hasche Sigle Partnerschaft 
von Rechtsanwälten und Steuerberatern mbB).  
346 Id. 
347 See Facebook Germany GmbH, DUN & BRADSTREET (last visited on July 
13, 2020), https://www.dnb.com/business-directory/company-
profiles.facebook_germany_gmbh.84c0ca792f206051f23fa9d29059a699.ht
ml (In 2017, Facebook Germany GmbH revenue was $42.05 million). Based 
only on the revenue of the German subsidiary, the maximum fine for a first 
offense by a company would be either $10 million or $20 million, depending 
on the category of the violation. If assessed on Google segment revenue of 
Alphabet Inc., the figure increases dramatically, as the 2019 revenue was 
$160.74 billion. Annual revenue of Google from 2002 to 2019, STATISTA 
(last visited on Oct. 21, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266206/googles-annual-global-revenue/. 
348 Autorité de protection des données, 600,000 euros d’amende: l’APD 
sanctionne Google Belgium pour non-respect du droit à l’oubli [600,000 
Euros Fine: APD Sanctions Google Belgium for Non-Compliance with the 
Right to be Forgotten] (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/news/600000-euros-d-amende-l-
apd-sanctionne-google-belgium-pour-non-respect-du-droit-a-l-oubli.  
349 See id. 
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Regarding the level of enforcement and 
specifically the sanctions foreseen under the GDPR, 
an evaluation of the appropriateness and the 
effectiveness of the fines issued in relation to the 
violations of the GDPR should be conducted. For this 
purpose, the sanctions issued for infringements of the 
GDPR should be broken down by category, by 
industry and by size of business. Any calculation 
mechanism used by DPAs would show the 
enforcement practice and could allow to give an 
indication of the proportion of sanctions/fines issued 
in relation to reported breaches. Furthermore, since 
several DPAs have started imposing fines on data 
controllers, it would be relevant to assess the impact 
of fines issued in relation to the violations of the 
GDPR and whether the fines have led to subsequent 
compliance.350  
Nonetheless, the DPA of one very important jurisdiction, Ireland, 
where many U.S. Tech Giants have their EU headquarters, in July 
2019, was reported to have eleven investigations underway for 
Facebook violations of the GDPR, with at least two rulings likely in 
the then-coming months.351 The Irish Commissioner for Data 
Protection—Helen Dixon—underscored both the Irish DPA’s role in 
public enforcement of the GDPR and in providing guidance to 
companies so that they may comply with the law. Speaking about the 
second year of the GDPR’s application, the Irish DPA stated that the 
conclusion of ongoing investigations will “showcase how the 
corrective and fining powers afforded to data protection authorities can 
be utilized.”352 Of the nineteen ongoing “statutory inquiries” in Ireland, 
most concern the U.S. Tech Giants and their subsidiaries: Facebook 
counts for a total of eleven (eight for the parent, two for WhatsApp, 
 
350 Annex to the Letter of the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament 
of 21 February 2020 to Commissioner Reynders, Ref: IPOL-COM-LIBE D 
(2020)6525 at 4, https://www.politico.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/SKM_C45820030616021.pdf. 
351 See Adam Satariano, Facebook Dodged a Bullet from the F.T.C. It Faces 
Many More., N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://nyti.ms/30xFwm0 (the Irish 
DPA is also reported to have been investigating Google). Note that, as of June 
30, 2020, those two rulings had not yet been issued. 
352 Press Release, Data Protection Commission, Data Protection Commission 
Reflects on the First Year of the GDPR (May 24, 2019), 
https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/data-protection-
commission-reflects-first-year-gdpr.   
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and one for Instagram); Apple for two; Google for one; and Microsoft 
subsidiary LinkedIn for one. Of the remaining cases, Twitter accounts 
for three and Quantcast for one.353   
The Irish DPA itself reported that it had received 6,624 
complaints in the GDPR’s first year,354 and that it would conclude 
investigations within the GDPR’s second year, including those 
involving certain internet platforms.355 In addition to Google, Apple 
and Twitter were named.356 However, as of June 30, 2020, the Irish 
DPA had assessed only two fines, each on Tusla Child and Family 
Agency, in the amounts of €75,000 and €40,000, respectively, and both 
assessed in the second quarter of 2020.357 As of that date, no data 
protection fine under the GDPR had been imposed by Ireland on a U.S. 
Tech Giant. 
D. EU Institutional Reactions to GDPR Enforcement and 
GDPR Cooperation and Consistency Mechanisms 
The European Commission described the “lack of blockbuster 
fines” during the GDPR’s first year as nothing to be concerned 
about.358 It qualified national data protection authorities’ actions as a 
“balanced approach to enforcement powers,” adding that “[t]hey have 
focused on dialogue rather than sanctions, in particular for the smallest 
operators which do not process personal data as a core activity.”359 The 
Commission indicated that some of the delay in action was due to 
 
353 See Simon Carswell, GDPR One Year On: No Fines But Considerable 
Amounts of Dread, IRISH TIMES (May 25, 2019), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/gdpr-one-year-on-no-fines-
but-considerable-amounts-of-dread-1.3903169. 
354 See id. As a point of comparison, the French regulator (CNIL) indicated 
in its activity report for 2019 that it had received 14,000 complaints during 
the year, an increase of more than 27% compared with the previous year, of 
which 20% were cross-border complaints. See Rapport d’activité 2019, 
CNIL, (June 2020) https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil-
40e_rapport_annuel_2019.pdf.  
355 See Press Release, Data Protection Commission, supra note 352. 
356 See Carswell, supra note 353. 
357 See GDPR Enforcement Tracker, supra note 345. 
358 See Mehreen Khan, Brussels Defends Lack of Blockbuster Fines for Big 
Tech Groups, FIN. TIMES (July 23, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/3629b0fc-ad73-11e9-8030-530adfa879c2. This 
view has been echoed more recently: see Catherine Stupp, EU Privacy 
Regulators Found to Lack Staff, Funds to Enforce GDPR, WSJ PRO 
CYBERSECURITY (June 29, 2020, 5:30 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-privacy-regulators-found-to-lack-staff-
funds-to-enforce-gdpr-11593423000.  
359 See Data Protection Rules as a Trust-Enabler, supra note 284, at 4.  
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DPAs wanting to ensure that they have cases that respect procedure, 
and it also focused on the change in culture and behavior of relevant 
actors as a sign of success.360 Furthermore, concern was expressed 
about whether the DPAs have the necessary resources to bring the big 
cases.361 The preference given to educational action during the 
implementation phase of the new regulation with dissuasive sanctions 
is quite typical of a regulatory approach to sanctions.362 Nevertheless, 
certain hypotheses (lack of resources, reluctance to initiate 
proceedings, etc.) put forward by the Commission suggest that the 
practice of national regulators' supervisory and sanctioning powers 
does not allow sanctions to play their full role.363 
The GDPR itself calls for a report by the Commission on an 
evaluation and review of that regulation, particularly covering cross-
border personal data transfers and cooperation and consistency 
mechanisms involving the DPAs and the EDPB by May 25, 2020, and 
every four years thereafter.364 On January 21, 2020, the Council 
adopted365 its position and findings on the application of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (Council Position),366 meant to contribute 
to the Commission’s 2020 review. In the Council considered that 
cooperation be strengthened between Member State Supervisory 
Authorities, “as it is particularly relevant for the supervision of cross-
border processing involving risks or for the processing concerning 
many Member States, for instance as regards so-called big tech 
companies.”367 However, the Council found that it was too early to 
assess the functioning of GDPR’s cooperation and consistency 
mechanisms.368 
The EDPB also contributed to the discussion around the 
Commission’s GDPR evaluation and review in a document adopted on 
 
360 Id. at 5. 
361 See Khan, supra note 358. 
362 See Arnaud Lecourt, RGPD: nouvelles contraintes, nouvelles stratégies 
pour les entreprises, 2019 DALLOZ IP/IT 205 (Apr. 9, 2019) (commenting on 
the pedagogical role of the CNIL from the start). 
363 See Nemitz, supra note 58, at 2. 
364 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 97(1)–(2). 
365 Council of the European Union Brussels Press release 5332/20, Outcome 
of the Council Meeting, 3743rd Council Meeting, Economic and Financial 
Affairs (Jan. 21, 2020). 
366 Council of the European Union Brussels ‘A’ Item Note, Council Position 
and Findings on the Application of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), 14994/2/19 REV 2 (Jan. 15, 2020). 
367 Id. at 5. 
368 Id. at 10. 
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February 18, 2020.369 It noted that the divergence of national 
procedures and practices negatively impacted the cooperation and 
consistency mechanisms, and that Supervisory Authority resources 
were insufficient.370 Furthermore, consistent interpretation of GDPR 
terms is needed, among other concerns.371 However, it is clear that the 
cooperation and consistency mechanisms are still in a breaking-in 
period and, for example, the joint operation procedure under Article 62 
of the GDPR has not yet been triggered by the Supervisory 
Authorities,372 and the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Article 
65 of the GDPR has not led to the adoption of a binding decision as, 
“so far the involved SAs have been able to reach consensus on cross-
border cases in the cooperation mechanism.”373  
During the period from May 25, 2018 to December 31, 2019, 
1346 procedures were initiated to identify the Lead Supervisory 
Authority (and also the Concerned Supervisory Authorities) for the 
OSS, and cases with a cross-border element were registered in the 
central Internal Market Information (IMI) Case register database.374 
During the same period, 807 cases were registered in the IMI database, 
for which the following countries were the six countries serving as 
Lead Supervisory Authority for the largest amount of cases: Ireland 
(127 cases), Germany (92 cases), Luxembourg (87 cases), France (64 
cases), the United Kingdom (56 cases), and the Netherlands (45 
cases).375 As noted by the Commission, the “ranking reflects notably 
the specific situation of Ireland and Luxembourg, who host several big 
multinational tech companies,”376 notably those this study refers to as 
the U.S. Big Tech Companies. 
A further contribution to the Commission’s evaluation was 
made by an expert group that it set up, including business associations, 
civil society associations, and individual professional or academic 
 
369 EDPB, supra note 250. 
370 Id. at 3. 
371 Id. at 12. 
372 Id. at 14. 
373 Id. at 17. 
374 Id. at 7. 
375 EDPB, supra note 250, at 8. 
376 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document 
Accompanying the Document Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, Data Protection as a Pillar of Citizens’ 
Empowerment Citizens’ Empowerment and the EU’s Approach to the Digital 
Transition – Two Years Digital Transition – Two Years of Application of the 
General Data Protection Regulation, at 7, SWD(2020) 115 final (June 24, 
2020). 
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members (Multistakeholder Expert Group).377 In its report, the 
Multistakeholder Expert Group highlighted the need to prevent 
fragmentation in application of the GDPR rules,378 and its civil society 
members called for “stronger and more coordinated enforcement of the 
data protection rules by DPAs.”379 Several comments were made about 
enforcement actions: although not consistent in all sectors, an increase 
in complaints to DPAs was noted; however there was no significant 
increase in court actions caused by the GDPR.380  
Several uses of representative actions under Article 80 of the 
GDPR were remarked in the report, where civil society and consumer 
organizations acted, generally under a mandate from individuals: (i) 
NOYB and LQDN complaints filed on the first day of application of 
the GDPR with several DPAs against U.S. Tech Giants Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft;381 (ii) a coordinated action 
by consumer organizations against Google launched in November 
 
377 Contribution from the Multistakeholder Expert Group to the Commission 
2020 Evaluation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
Multistakeholder Expert Group to support the application of Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679, Report, at 3–4 (June 17, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.group
MeetingDoc&docid=41708, [hereinafter Expert Group Report].  
378 Id. at 5. 
379 Id.  
380 Id. at 13 (“Several members reported complaints related to transparency 
obligations, consent, request for identification by the controller before 
responding to a data subject’s request, and the exercise of data subjects’ rights 
in particular the right of access… Most business members indicate that there 
was either no court action or no significant increase in the number of court 
actions against their members’ organisations caused by the GDPR”). 
381 Id. at 14 (these complaints were centered on the issue of consent). A couple 
of these complaints resulted in the CNIL’s largest administrative fine so far, 
in the Google LLC case discussed in Part III.A.2.b. One law firm commented 
that, “This indicates that if a well-known not-for-profit organization lodges a 
basic but sufficiently argued claim, it might be sufficient for a data protection 
authority to launch an investigation. Also, the success of the collective 
complaint of this case may encourage data subjects to utilize a collective 
complaint and/or redress mechanism provided for under Article 80 GDPR.” 
Romain Perray, Euro Fifty Million GDPR Fine on Google by French Data 
Protection Authority, LEXOLOGY (July 9, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=67739262-9e11-4664-ac72-
1576414b9e48 (the author also mentioned that the case was carried out 
entirely online, without on-site inspect, leading him to conclude that, “A data 
protection authority may now easily investigate digital businesses even if their 
offices are located outside its geographical jurisdiction,” increasing risk of 
investigations for global digital business). 
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2018, involved the filing of complaints regarding the processing of 
location data with the DPAs of Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Greece, the Czech Republic and Poland;382 (iii) Privacy 
International filed complaints in November 2018, as a civil society 
organization, without mandates of individuals, against seven data 
brokers and credit reference agencies for profiling without a legal basis, 
and for failure to comply with certain data protection principles, with 
DPAs in France, Ireland and the United Kingdom;383 (iv) Open Rights 
Group, Panoptykon Foundation and their partners in December 2018, 
and January 2019, filed complaints regarding online behavioral 
advertising processing;384 and (v) Norwegian consumer association 
Forbrukerrådet filed complaints in January 2020, in Norway regarding 
ad-tech processing.385 Nonetheless, “many Member States have not 
made use of Article 80(2) of the GDPR, which would allow NGOs to 
bring forward collective complaints without having to be directly 
mandated by individuals,”386 however, civil society and consumer 
organizations are contemplating bringing actions before courts in order 
to obtain compensation for data subjects.387 Finally, response by DPAs 
to actions brought so far has been slow, with decisions on important 
cross-border cases not yet rendered.388 
In its June 2020 communication, the Commission committed 
to pursuing exchanges with EU Member States regarding national DPA 
resources, called on the EDPB to increase cooperation among DPAs, 
including through joint investigations,389 supported reflection within 
the EDPB on improving cooperation among the DPAs on cross-border 
cases, and stated that “Member States shall allocate resources to data 
protection authorities that are sufficient for them to perform their 
tasks.”390 
 
382 Expert Group Report, supra note 377, at 14 (this was reported by BEUC). 
383 Id. 
384 Id. (this was reported by Access Now). 
385 Id. 
386 Id. at 15. 
387 Id. 
388 Expert Group Report, supra note 377, at 15–16. 
389 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, Data Protection as a Pillar of Citizens’ Empowerment and the 
EU’s Approach to the Digital Transition – Two Years Digital Transition – 
Two Years of Application of the General Data Protection Regulation, at 15, 
COM(2020) 264 final (June 24, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/1_en_act_part1_v6_1.pdf.  
390 Id. at 16. 
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E. Conclusion on GDPR Sanctions 
In this study’s Introduction, the question was asked, does the 
reality of supervisory authority action support the theoretical goals for 
GDPR sanctions? In Part I this study discussed the goals of sanctions 
to include the main objective of acting as a deterrent, providing an 
incentive for companies to comply with the regulations. However, 
other functions for sanctions exist: the incapacitation effect; the 
budgetary effect; the normative and symbolic effect; the consolidation 
of the market by weakening an artificially dominant actor effect, and 
so on. However, this study has shown that the deterrence effect is 
perhaps the most important sub-goal of sanctions in the context of 
GDPR sanctions, with the symbolic function also playing an important 
role. 
From today’s viewpoint, given the failure of Ireland and 
Luxembourg to issue substantial fines on the U.S. Tech Giants, and 
given the relatively moderate level of fines indicated in Section C.3., 
the answer has to be that the reality of GDPR sanctions has not yet 
supported the theoretical goals of GDPR sanctions—especially the 
deterrence and symbolic sub-goals—which to a fairly large extent 
require effective and substantial sanctions. Furthermore, although the 
combination of action on the competition, data protection and 
consumer protection fronts has provided the strongest challenge to U.S. 
Tech Giants so far, doubts have been expressed about the ability of 
“mere fines” to help bring them into rein.391 However, the enforcement 
toolbox has expanded considerably, and collective action provides 
possibilities for individuals to more easily bring complaints. In this 
context, this study now investigates strategic aspects and risks. 
III. STRATEGIC ASPECTS AND RISKS: LACK OF UNDERSTANDING  
  OF THE GDPR, NON-COMPLIANCE AND NON-ENFORCEMENT 
As part of its investigation of the impact of sanctions, this study 
will analyze strategic aspects and risks, first from the standpoint of 
companies,392 which may react in an incorrect way, either through a 
lack of understanding of the GDPR, or through a conscious decision to 
 
391 See Julia Powles, The EU is Right to Take on Facebook, But Mere Fines 
Don’t Protect Us from Tech Giants, Guardian (May 27, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/may/20/eu-right-to-take-
on-facebook-fines-dont-protect-us-from-tech-giants (stating, in this opinion 
piece, that “[i]If we are really to change the dynamics of the modern data 
economy, it is going to take more than just targeted arrows and small-fry fines. 
The true response to Facebook is to see it as a company that ruthlessly 
monetizes every aspect of our everyday lives.”).  
392 Lecourt, supra note 362.  
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try to game the system or to fail to comply (Section A), before looking 
at the risks of non-enforcement by DPAs and the effect this may have 
on companies (Section B). 
A. Risks Involved with Lack of Understanding of the GDPR 
and Non-Compliance 
Firms faced with decisions regarding the processing of 
personal data might, for lack of understanding of the provisions of the 
GDPR, prove too zealous or even fail to comply with the legislation. 
Furthermore, companies may be tempted, given the GDPR 
enforcement record of the European DPAs to data, to assume greater 
risks with respect to non-compliance, or to try to arbitrage based on the 
position of the various DPAs to date. However, this study argues that 
such reactions would be poor corporate strategy. In order to analyze 
these risks and strategic aspects, focusing on the action of companies, 
this study engages the legal strategy and compliance literature. This 
Part begins with a short discussion of legal strategy and competitive 
advantage (Section 1), then analyzes certain aspects of understanding 
the GDPR (Section 2), prior to discussing compliance, non-
compliance, and sanctions (Section 3). 
1. Legal Strategy and Competitive Advantage 
Strategy theory informs us that, at least in emerging industries 
outside of “a traditionally regulated sphere” regulation may be imposed 
abruptly, slowing the industry’s progress.393 The U.S. Tech Giants, 
based in a culture where entrepreneurs live by the mantra, “Move fast 
and break things,” attributed to Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg,394 have 
developed in a legal culture where there has been meager protection of 
data privacy.395 Arguably, this has given them a competitive advantage 
over companies from jurisdictions such as the European Union, where 
certain actions are prohibited or restrained by data protection law. In 
the legal strategy literature, while the baseline discussion relates to 
what behavior is illegal, mere compliance is considered a limiting 
position, compared to the use of law proactively, to create and capture 
 
393 MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR 
ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS, 224 (1st ed. 1980). 
394 Hemant Taneja, The Era of “Move Fast and Break Things” Is Over, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-era-of-move-fast-and-
break-things-is-over.  
395 See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 
642 (2014). See also W. Gregory Voss, Cross-Border Data Flows, the GDPR, 
and Data Governance, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 485, 491–92 (2020). 
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value and obtain competitive advantage.396 Seidel and Haapio discuss 
the diminishment of legal comparative advantage as a result of 
convergence of substantive and procedural law globally.397 While 
Seidel and Haapio cite several fields of law for which this is the case 
(contract, product liability, environmental law, securities regulation, 
and sexual harassment),398 data protection or data privacy law does not 
figure on their list. Data privacy law has not been harmonized 
internationally, especially not between the United States and the 
European Union.399 However, one of the arguably subsidiary aims of 
the GDPR400 has been to eliminate what has been seen as an element 
of competitive advantage of U.S. Tech Giants by levelling the playing 
field between European companies and non-European ones such as the 
U.S. Tech Giants401 in the area of data privacy. The GDPR, with its 
extraterritorial effect, may be considered the abrupt imposition of 
regulation on the U.S. Tech Giants (unless they scrupulously renounce 
 
396 See Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do with It?: Integrating Law 
and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 587–88 (2010). 
397 George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive 
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 645 (2010). 
398 Id. at 645–46. 
399 See W. Gregory Voss, Obstacles to Transatlantic Harmonization of Data 
Privacy Law in Context, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 405, 408–12 (2019). 
400 The GDPR’s stated objectives are twofold: 
2. This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms 
of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of 
personal data. 
3. The free movement of personal data within the Union shall 
be neither restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected with the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data. 
GDPR, supra note 1, art. 1(2)–(3). 
401 See, e.g., Questions and Answers – General Data Protection Regulation, 
EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_387 
(“The same rules for all companies – regardless of where they are 
established: Today European companies have to adhere to stricter standards 
than companies established outside the EU but also doing business in our 
Single Market. With the reform, companies based outside of Europe will 
have to apply the same rules when they offer goods or services on the EU 
market. This creates a level playing field.”) (emphasis omitted). See also 
Manuel Klar, Binding Effects of the European General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) on U.S. Companies, 11 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 101, 
124 (2020) (“In Europe, the aspect of the new approach that received the 
most praise was the equality of competition between companies in and 
outside of the European Union.”) (citation omitted). 
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the European market that is not realistic) of which the strategy theory 
spoke. 
2. Understanding the GDPR: Management 
Understanding of the Law 
Seidel has set out an action plan for achieving competitive 
advantage, called the “Manager’s Legal Plan,” the first of four steps of 
which is “management understanding of the law.”402 A manager must 
have an understanding of the law in order to implement further steps in 
order to obtain competitive advantage.403 This is important with respect 
to an American company faced with GDPR compliance because of 
major differences between the EU and U.S. law,404 including even 
differences in terminology and concepts.405 This Section illustrates the 
importance of management understanding the law through two cases: 
first, this study discusses the understanding of the law and risks of over-
compliance (Section a), before discussing management understanding 
of the OSS mechanism (and the concept of “main establishment”) and 
efforts to forum shop (Section b). 
a. Over-Compliance 
Bagley informs us that lawyers may be incentivized to 
“overstate legal risk,” and be overly conservative, such as when faced 
 
402 See Siedel & Haapio, supra note 397, at 651–52 (discussing Siedel’s 
Manager’s Legal Plan); see Siedel, Using the Law for Competitive Advantage, 
20–25 (2002). 
403 See Siedel & Haapio, supra note 397, at 651. 
404  See, e.g., Voss, supra note 399, at 417–27 (discussing the lack of 
harmonization between EU and U.S. “data privacy” law). 
405 See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal 
Information in the United States and European Union, 102 CAL. L. REV. 877 
(2014) (examples regarding the differences between the concepts and terms of 
“personal data” in the European Union, and “personal information” or 
“personally-identifiable information (PII)” in the United States); see also 
Nancy J. King & V.T. Raja, What Do They Really Know About Me in the 
Cloud?: A Comparative Law Perspective on Protecting Privacy and Security 
of Sensitive Consumer Data, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 413, 422–32 (2013) (regarding 
the differences in the concept of “sensitive data” or “sensitive information” 
between the European Union—which actually refers to “special categories of 
data”—and the United States); see also Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 310, 
321 (on a U.S. view of sensitive data and on sensitive data in the European 
Union); and see Voss, supra note 399, at 408–09 (on the difference in 
terminology among the terms “privacy,” “data privacy,” and “data 
protection.”). 
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with “high ambiguity,”406 which may be the case in the early years of 
the GDPR’s application. Top management familiarity with the GDPR 
and DPA guidance may help them be what Bagley describes as “legally 
astute,”407 allowing them to treat the GDPR as a business issue with a 
business solution. Bird and Park discuss using corporate compliance to 
obtain competitive advantage, acknowledging that different firms have 
different profiles where compliance is concerned, and arguing that 
firms may tend to over-comply with regulation out of a 
“disproportionate fear of sanction.”408 This may be the case with data 
protection breach reporting under the GDPR, which does not require a 
notification to the DPA if the “data breach is unlikely to result in a risk 
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons,”409 for example, where 
data have been properly encrypted so that unauthorized parties are 
unable to read them.410 As stated by the ICO’s Deputy Commissioner 
(Operations) in 2018,  
Some controllers are “over-reporting”: 
reporting a breach just to be transparent, because they 
want to manage their perceived risk or because they 
think that everything needs to be reported. We 
understand this will be an issue in the early months of 
a new system but we will be working with 
 
406 Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378, 382 (2008). 
407 Id. 
408 Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance Into 
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 310 (2017) (citation 
omitted). 
409 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 33(1). 
410 Cédric Burton, Article 33. Notification of a Personal Data Personal Data 
Breach to the Supervisory Authority, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION (GDPR): A COMMENTARY 640, 647 (Christopher Kuner et al., 
2020) (“The WP29 has also given examples of situations where the rights and 
freedoms of natural persons are not at issue, such as where the personal data 
are already publicly available and their disclosure does not present a likely 
risk to the individuals concerned, and when data have been properly encrypted 
so that they have been made unintelligible to unauthorised parties and a copy 
or a backup exists”) (citing Article 29 Data Protection. Working Party, 
Guidelines on Personal Data Breach Notification under Regulation 2016/679, 
WP 250rev.01, as last revised and adopted on Feb. 6, 2018, at 18–19), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612052.  
Those Guidelines were endorsed by the GDPR. See Personal Data Breach 
Notifications, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION BOARD (May 25, 2018), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/guideline/personal-
data-breach-notifications_en (GDPR endorsing those guidelines).  
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organisations to try and discourage this in future once 
we are all more familiar with the new threshold.411 
A greater understanding of the GDPR’s data breach notification 
requirements could help alleviate this issue, for example, and the ICO 
has published self-assessment tools to help achieve this.412 DPA 
guidance is an effective source of material that may help management 
to better understand compliance issues. With regard to the expressive 
function of sanctions, we have noted that some DPAs may be tempted 
to impose sanctions more particularly against emblematic companies 
such as U.S. tech giants. Then the problem of over-compliance should 
be considered by companies in relation to their risk of being subject to 
exemplary sanctions because of their notoriety. Larger companies may 
need to be more cautious than smaller or less well-known companies. 
It can be hypothesized that the risk of sanction related to the expressive 
function of sanctions is not completely independent of the way public 
opinion views a company. Although DPAs are supposed to be 
"independent" according to the GDPR,413 this independence is 
understood more as an independence from governments and market 
players than from citizens in general, since the objective of the GDPR 
is to protect them in particular.414  From this point of view, there could 
be an influence of public opinion and a propensity of DPAs to consider 
exemplary sanctions against a company. In other words, the occurrence 
of a scandal or circumstances affecting trust in the company (such as a 
major case of lack of data security, illegitimate exploitation of data for 
political purposes for example) could lead some DPAs to impose heavy 
sanctions on liable companies.  
b. The OSS Mechanism and “Forum 
Shopping” 
 Another area where management could be well served by a full 
understanding of data protection law is with respect to the OSS 
mechanism. While the GDPR, through its extraterritorial scope, was 
intended to avoid forum shopping in the sense that had the legislation’s 
 
411  ICO Deputy Commissioner (Operations) James Dipple-Johnstone – speech 
to the CBI Cyber Security: Business Insight Conference, INFORMATION 
COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE (Sept. 12, 2018), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-
ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2018/09/cbi-cyber-security-business-
insight-conference/.  
412 Self-Assessment for Data Breaches, INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S 
OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/personal-data-
breach-assessment/ (last visited on July 18, 2020). 
413 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 52.  
414 Id. art. 51(1).  
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jurisdiction been based solely in the place of the registered office of a 
data controller, a company might have been able to avoid the 
application of EU law (and thus avoid requirements for compliance) by 
setting up its registered office outside of the European Union,415 it may 
still seem to provide a basis for forum shopping through the OSS 
mechanism.416 This relates to the concept that, based on enforcement 
records of the GDPR to-date by the various EU Member States, U.S. 
and other non-EU companies may engage in legal arbitrage, choosing 
their forum for potential discussions of administrative sanctions using 
the OSS mechanism. This is arguably what the U.S. Tech Giants have 
already done through their choices for a jurisdiction in which to locate 
their EU headquarters,417 maybe because of the perception that Ireland, 
given its size and the resources its DPA has available for 
enforcement,418 might be a jurisdiction unlikely to be zealous in 
 
415 See Klar, supra note 401, at 124 (commenting that a “marketplace rule” for 
jurisdiction was chosen over this “origin rule approach”). 
416 See supra Part II.C.2 (OSS Mechanism, noting that the term “forum 
shopping” may not be the perfect word choice to reflect these “forum 
choices”); see also Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum 
Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.  579, 582 (2017) (Bookman comments 
that “the practice of global forum shopping is deplored but poorly defined,” 
with critics using it as a derogatory term to refer to forum choices, instead. 
This study has retained the controversial term, not only because it is used in 
this context in the literature, but also because the forum choice determines (in 
many cases) the choice of lead DPA.). 
417  See Vinocur, supra note 217 (The “two nations most directly responsible 
for policing the tech sector” as a result of having the main tech companies 
having their EU headquarters there are Ireland and Luxembourg, with Ireland 
overseeing Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Twitter.); see also Adam 
Satariano, New Privacy Rules Could Make This Woman One of Tech’s Most 
Important Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018) [hereinafter Satariano, 
New Privacy], https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/technology/gdpr-helen-
dixon.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/technology/gdpr-helen-
dixon.html (Airbnb and Apple likewise have their EU headquarters in 
Ireland); see Adam Satariano, Europe’s Privacy Law Hasn’t Shown Its Teeth, 
Frustrating Advocates, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2020 [hereinafter Satariano, 
Europe’s Privacy], last updated Apr. 28, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2S79ZW8 
(Luxembourg’s DPA has the responsibility for regulating Amazon). 
418  See Satariano, Europe’s Privacy, supra note 417 (Although Ireland has 
an “outsize influence” in GDPR enforcement, because of the U.S. Tech 
Giants that it regulates, its DPA’s budget is only sixth among EU DPAs, and 
it has only been able to obtain a third of the budget increase it sought. 
However, it has increased staff from 27 in 2017 to 140); see also Will 
Goodbody, Data Protection Commissioner Defends Speed of Investigations 
into Tech Firms, RTE (Jul. 14, 2020, 16:53), 
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enforcing the GDPR, although assuredly other factors such as low 
corporate income tax rates, an English speaking population and a 
business-friendly and common law-based environment have played a 
role in the decision.419 However, it may be argued that data subjects 
benefit from the possibility of forum shopping, as well, as they may 
choose to file a complaint against a private sector entity with the DPA 
of either the EU Member State of their “habitual place of residence, 
place of work, or place of the infringement.”420 The OSS mechanism 
may not apply in such a case if there is no cross-border processing.421 
 
https://www.rte.ie/news/technology/2020/0714/1153293-data-protection-
commission/ (The head of Ireland’s DPA, when asked “whether her office 
has sufficient resources to regulate tech companies as lead regulator in the 
EU, she said it depends on how quickly people anticipate outputs will be 
generated,” and elaborate that the authority has, “enough resources and the 
right resources to conclude, but we can’t do it all simultaneously and 
immediately.”); but see John Naughton, Data Protection Laws are Great. 
Shame They are not Being Enforced, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2020) (In this 
opinion piece, the author refers to an investigation by the developers of the 
Brave browser, and comments that the “most worrying deficit” of technical 
experts “is in the Irish DPA, which, according to the Brave report, has only 
21 tech-enforcement roles. The fact that most of the tech giants have their 
European HQs in Dublin means that the Irish authority has the heaviest 
enforcement workload; it’s currently the lead authority for 127 cases and yet 
its budget is being squeezed by the Irish government.”).  
419 See Vinocur, supra note 217 (Ireland is reported to have a “history of law 
oversight of the technology industry.”); see also Satariano, New Privacy, 
supra note 417. 
420 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 77(1); see e.g., Joshua Blume, A Contextual 
Extraterritoriality Analysis of the DPIA and DPO Provisions in the GDPR, 49 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1425, 1444 (2018) (“Connected with the “‘one stop shop’” 
provision . . . this will essentially provide data subjects the opportunity to 
forum shop, finding the DPA with the most bandwidth, availability, and 
aggressive stance.”). 
421 See Case C-230/14, Weltimmo s. r. o. v. Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és 
Információszabadság Hatóság, 2015 E.C.L. I-639(Oct. 1, 2015) (In the same 
vein, but under the EU DP Directive, Weltimmo is instructive in that, 
“Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as permitting the 
application of the law on the protection of personal data of a Member State 
other than the Member State in which the controller with respect to the 
processing of those data is registered, in so far as that controller exercises, 
through stable arrangements in the territory of that Member State, a real and 
effective activity — even a minimal one — in the context of which that 
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One case deserves special attention here: Google LLC. In it, 
the French DPA—the CNIL–received complaints by NOYB and 
LQDN against Google LLC. On January 21, 2019, the CNIL issued its 
highest administrative fine ever—for €50 million—against Google 
LLC in the case for failure to comply with GDPR obligations of 
transparency and information, and for lack of a legitimate basis for 
advertising personalization processing.422 Regarding the OSS 
mechanism, the CNIL stated the following: 
In this case, the discussions with the other 
authorities, in particular with the Irish DPA, where 
GOOGLE’s European headquarters are situated, did 
not allow to consider that GOOGLE had a main 
establishment in the European Union. Indeed, when 
the CNIL initiated proceedings, the Irish establishment 
did not have a decision-making power on the 
processing operations carried out in the context of the 
operating system Android and the services provided 
by GOOGLE LLC, in relation to the creation of an 
account during the configuration of a mobile phone. 
As the “one-stop-shop mechanism” was not 
applicable, the CNIL was competent to take any 
decision regarding processing operations carried out 
by GOOGLE LLC, as were the other DPA.423 
The CNIL’s analysis refers to the concept of “main establishment” 
discussed in Part II.C.2. Google LLC argued that the CNIL did not have 
competence to deal with the complaints, as it considered that Google 
Ireland Limited, its Irish subsidiary, “must be considered its main 
 
4; see also Waltraut Kotschy, Article 77 Right to Lodge a Complaint with a 
Supervisory Authority, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION 
(GDPR): A COMMENTARY 1117, 1122–23 (Christopher Kuner et al., 2020) 
(providing a short discussion of the Weltimmo case: a Slovakia registered 
company targeted exclusively clients in Hungary for its processing activities, 
and the CJEU considered that the Hungarian DPA could hear claims against 
the Slovakian company, brought by Hungarian data subjects). When 
juxtaposed to here, there was no cross-border processing, in the sense of the 
term’s definition set out in Part II.C.2, as only Hungary was concerned by 
the processing. 
422 The CNIL’s Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 
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establishment within the European Union for some of the cross-border 
processing that it carried out, and particularly that subject of the 
complaints received by the CNIL.”424 The CNIL considered that in 
order to be considered the main establishment, Google Ireland Limited 
would have to “have decision-making power with regard to the 
processing of the personal data in question.”425  
The CNIL found that the Irish subsidiary was not mentioned in 
the relevant privacy policy, and that in any event, when the proceedings 
were initiated there was no proof that Google Ireland Limited 
possessed decision-making power regarding the relevant processing 
and that Google LLC was the only developer of the Android operating 
system involved.426 Furthermore, Google LLC wrote in a letter to the 
CNIL “that the “transfer of responsibility” from Google LLC to Google 
Ireland Limited for certain personal data processing operations relating 
to European citizens would be complete on January 31, 2019,” and the 
relevant privacy policy would come into effect on January 22, 2019—
a day after the CNIL’s sanction was issued.427 As a result, the CNIL 
considered that Google Ireland Limited was not the main establishment 
for the processing in question, which allowed the CNIL to act against 
Google LLC,428 as the Irish DPA was not then lead DPA. On appeal by 
Google to France’s highest administrative court, the Council of State 
(Conseil d’Etat) agreed with the CNIL that at the time of the decision 
Google Ireland Limited did not fulfil the criteria to be considered the 
main establishment for the relevant processing, and thus that there was 
not then a lead DPA,429 and rejected Google LLC’s petition for the 
quashing of the sanction.430  
This case highlights the importance of understanding the law, 
including all important definitions (such as that of “main 
establishment”), in assessing the compliance environment, thus 
looping back to the discussion in Section 2 above. However, it also 
underscores the ways in which the GDPR helps avoid the use of forum 
shopping, and focuses on the facts to determine the reality of the data 
 
424 See Deliberation No. SAN-2019-001 of the Restricted Committee of the 
CNIL, supra note 114, at 4 (¶ 23). 
425 Id. at 5 (¶ 30). 
426 Id. at 6 (¶¶ 36–38). 
427 Id. at 6 (¶ 39). 
428 Id. at 6 (¶ 40–41). 
429 CE, June 19, 2020 (Société Google LLC No. 430810), at 5 (¶ 6), 
https://www.conseil-etat.fr/ressources/decisions-contentieuses/dernieres-
decisions-importantes/conseil-d-etat-19-juin-2020-sanction-infligee-a-
google-par-la-cnil (page and paragraph numbers refer to the PDF form of this 
decision, downloadable at this address).  
430 Id. at 12 (¶ 28). 
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processing situation on which to base procedural requirements (such as 
the OSS) intended to help ensure enforcement and, as a result, 
compliance.  This is crystal clear from the text of the Article 29 
Working Party Guidelines: 
The GDPR does not permit ‘forum shopping’. 
If a company claims to have its main establishment in 
one Member State, but no effective and real exercise 
of management activity or decision making over the 
processing of personal data takes place there, the 
relevant supervisory authorities (or ultimately EDPB) 
will decide which supervisory authority is the ‘lead’, 
using objective criteria and looking at the evidence.431  
Thus, in terms of legal strategy, it would seem that efforts at complying 
with the law, instead of those attempting to avoid compliance through 
forum shopping, would be more productively spent. 
3. Compliance, Non-Compliance and Sanctions 
Bagley remarks that in order to realize benefits from corporate 
resources, legal measures must be implemented by firms; the failure to 
do so can have “very negative monetary return,”432 which might be the 
case if large administrative fines were imposed under the GDPR. 
Furthermore, shareholder value may be destroyed as a result of 
violations,433 and in the area of data privacy, this might be the case if 
violations lead to loss of customer trust.434 In contrast, Voss and Houser 
 
431 WP 244, supra note 317, at 8. 
432 See Bagley, supra note 396, at 607–08. 
433 Id. at 608. 
434 See Rafi Goldberg, Lack of Trust in Internet Privacy and Security May 
Deter Economic and Other Online Activities, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. 
ADMIN. (May 13, 2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/lack-trust-
internet-privacy-and-security-may-deter-economic-and-other-online-
activities. The U.S. Department of Commerce has indicated that the lack of 
trust in Internet privacy in the U.S. is hampering economic activity. Id. These 
privacy concerns continued in a more recent version of the survey. See Rafi 
Goldberg, Most AMS. Continue to Have Privacy and Security Concerns, NTIA 
Survey Finds, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2018/most-americans-continue-have-privacy-
and-security-concerns-ntia-survey-finds. Voss and Houser point to a decline 
of Facebook’s social media market share as a result of concern regarding loss 
of privacy and potential security issues, following the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal. See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 337. That boils down to a loss 
of trust, which could cause users to be reluctant to share their personal data. 
Id. at 338. 
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argue that U.S. Tech Giants can use their GDPR compliance to garner 
trust from their customers.435 Indeed, the Commission has echoed this 
view, citing consumer demand for privacy: 
A growing number of companies have 
responded to this demand for privacy notably by 
voluntarily extending some of the rights and 
safeguards provided for in the GDPR to their non-EU 
based customers. Many businesses also promote 
respect for personal data as a competitive 
differentiator and a selling point on the global 
marketplace, by offering innovative products and 
services with novel privacy or data security 
solutions.436 
Bradford  relates that, as companies have failed in lobbying efforts to 
stop the European Union from regulating through the GDPR, their 
response may be the “if you cannot beat them, join them” type, 
lobbying home governments for “EU-equivalent regulation at 
home.”437 Embracing the GDPR through company compliance efforts 
may be a way to prepare for any such eventuality, such as GDPR-
inspired U.S. State-level legislation.438 
The GDPR provides incentives for compliance, in the form of 
factors to be taken into account by DPAs in issuing administrative 
 
435 See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 338.  
436 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, Data Protection as a Pillar of Citizen’s Empowerment and the 
EU’s Approach to the Digital Transition – Two Years of Application of the 
General Data Protection Regulation, at 3, COM (2020) 264 final (June 24, 
2020). 
437 ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION 
RULES THE WORLD 256 (2020) (Bradford ties this position to the levelling-
the-playing-field argument discussed in Section 1 above: “Given that these 
firms already have to bear the costs of complying with EU rules, they now 
have the incentive to advocate further externalization of the single market to 
their home markets: a strategy that allows them to level the playing field with 
respect to their domestic, non-export-oriented competitors which, absent 
domestic regulation, remain unaffected by EU regulations.” Id.). 
438 See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 340–41 (For example, this action 
might be true with respect to the California Consumer Privacy Act, as it may 
also help create efficiencies within firms by applying a high data protection 
standard worldwide); see Voss, supra note 395, at 500–01 (Washington State, 
among other jurisdictions, has also proposed legislation inspired by the 
GDPR). 
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fines, somewhat reminiscent of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.439 
Supervisory authorities are to weigh various factors in deciding 
whether to impose administrative fines or not, and at which level.440 
These factors include the “nature, gravity and duration of the 
infringement,”441 “the intentional or negligent character of the 
infringement,”442 whether the controller or processor had previous 
infringements,443 and the categories of data infringed,444 among others. 
However, other factors allow for the controller or processor to take 
action in order to improve its position when potential administrative 
fines are considered or their amount set: for example, action taken by 
it to mitigate data subject damage,445 cooperation with the DPAs to 
remedy the infringement or to mitigate,446 the fact that the controller or 
processor notifies the infringement to the DPA itself,447 or adherence 
to an approved code of conduct or certification mechanism.448 Thus, 
through its understanding of the GDPR, and through adapting its 
organization and processes to take such measures, a company may 
seize the opportunity to improve its situation in the unfortunate case of 
an infringement. 
Certain companies may see compliance choices through the 
prism of risk.449 They may model this risk based on various factors, 
such as “formal penalties, reputational impacts on customers, 
organizational morale costs, relations with regulators, and perceptions 
of society.”450 In the context of the GDPR, given its short period of 
application to date, there is a chance that any such model would be 
skewed, given the implementation time that has been needed prior to 
jurisdictions such as Ireland being ready to assess major administrative 
fines. That is, the “formal penalties” factor would potentially be 
understated and reduce the modelized consequences of non-
compliance. If we imagine that firms engage in a tradeoff between 
 
439 See Voss, supra note 16, at 818–19. 
440 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2). 
441 Id. art. 83(2)(a). 
442 Id. art. 83(2)(b). 
443 Id. art. 83(2)(e). 
444 Id. art. 83(2)(g). 
445 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83(2)(c). 
446 Id. art. 83(2)(f). 
447 Id. art. 83(2)(h). 
448 Id. art. 83(2)(j). 
449 See Bird & Park, supra note 408, at 297. 
450 Id. at 299. 
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expending resources for compliance or, alternatively, accepting to pay 
sanctions,451 their analysis would potentially be erroneous. 
Indeed, there have been signs that companies—and first among 
them, the U.S. Tech Giants—should expect significant administrative 
sanctions in the future. First, the head of the Irish DPA—Helen Dixon, 
the Data Protection Commissioner—has sounded the alarm that 
concluding major investigations into what are surely the U.S. Tech 
Giants, is the Irish DPA’s top priority.452 Earlier in the year, she is 
reported to have said that “rulings involving Twitter, Facebook and 
others were coming.”453 In 2019, she commented that fines will be 
“substantial.”454 Just before the application date for the GDPR, Dixon 
said, in answer to a question on whether she had a message for 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and other tech executives, “they 
should expect her to use her new powers to “to the fullest.”455  
Dixon put the risk of sanctions in terms that a compliance 
officer can understand, referring at the start to the one-off fine that FTC 
had previously announced against Facebook:  
“While big figures have been bandied about in 
terms of a one-off settlement, the GDPR is going to be 
with us probably for another 20 years,” said Dixon. 
“And in each of the investigations, fines can be applied 
in each separate case.” 
“As new issues keep arising, we’ll keep 
investigating and pursuing,” she said. “So in a very 
theoretical sense, if we’re forced based on a risk-based 
 
451 Id. at 301 (“The choice to either invest in compliance or pay the cost of 
non-compliance implies imperfect substitutes. Firms can switch between 
compliance and sanction, but the tradeoff is not identical.”). 
452 See Goodbody, supra note 418 (“The Data Protection Commissioner has 
said concluding investigations that are underway into large multinational tech 
firms is the number one priority for her office,” and has previously mentioned 
investigations into Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and Twitter). 
453 Privacy Advocates’ Complaints Overwhelm Data Protection Office, IRISH 
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020, 16:49), 
https://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/privacy-advocates-
complaints-overwhelm-data-protection-office-1.4240175.  
454 Angelique Carson, Dixon at Senate Hearing: Fines are Coming; They Will 
be ‘Substantial’, IAPP (May 2, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/dixon-at-
senate-hearing-fines-are-coming-they-will-be-substantial/. 
455 Satariano, New Privacy, supra note 417. 
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analysis to keep opening investigations, the fines are 
going to mount up over time.”456 
Furthermore, mounting pressure is being placed on Ireland to act457 
from many sources, such as EU government leaders,458 privacy 
advocates459 and other DPAs.460 Nonetheless, the Irish DPA is reported 
to have provided a draft decision on an investigation of Twitter to other 
EU DPAs under the OSS mechanism.461 Moreover, given the results of 
 
456 Nancy Scola, Irish Data Official Defends Tech Investigation Record: 
‘They’re not Overnight’, POLITICO (May 4, 2019, 9:57 AM CET, updated May 
6, 2019, 3:13 PM CET), https://www.politico.eu/article/helen-dixon-irish-
data-official-defends-tech-investigation-record-theyre-not-overnight/.  
457 See, e.g., Mark Scott, EU Privacy Enforcer Hits Make-or-Break Moment, 
POLITICO (May 21, 2020, 6:00 AM CET), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/21/europe-data-protection-agency-
ireland-272889 (“With the two-year anniversary of Europe's privacy 
standards coming next Monday, Dixon is under mounting pressure to show 
that her agency can act.”). 
458 See Satariano, Europe’s Privacy, supra note 417 (“The inaction is creating 
tensions within European governments, as some leaders call for speedier 
enforcement and broader changes.”). 
459 See Open Letter: EDRi Urges Enforcement and Actions for the 2 Year 
Anniversary of the GDPR, EDRI (May 25, 2020), https://edri.org/open-letter-
edri-urges-enforcement-and-actions-for-the-2-year-anniversary-of-the-gdpr/ 
(the user digital rights organization, without naming Ireland specifically, 
wrote to the Commission to “urge action to tackle the GDPR’s vast 
enforcement gap.”); see also NOYB - European Center for Digital Rights, 
NOYB Letter to the European Data Protection Authorities, the European 
Data Protection Board, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament (May 25, 2020), https://noyb.eu/sites/default/files/2020-
05/Open%20Letter_noyb_GDPR.pdf (“The GDPR is only as strong as its 
weakest DPA: In practice, this is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the 
Irish DPC has so far not issued a single fine under the GDPR against a 
private actor, despite reporting 7,215 complaints in 2019 and staff of more 
than 130. It comes as no surprise that Google immediately tried to switch to 
the jurisdiction of the Irish DPC right after the French CNIL issued its fine in 
the parallel procedure cited above.”). 
460 See Scott, supra note 457 (describing some EU regulators as considering 
that Ireland is “dragging its feet.” “‘You don’t hear anything about cases 
transferred to Ireland,’ says Johannes Caspar, head of Hamburg’s data 
protection regulator, whose agency is the first port of call for privacy 
complaints about almost all U.S. tech firms in Germany. ‘What goes on, what 
types of information was exchanged, we don’t get any of that. We’re here just 
standing and waiting.’”). 
461 Natasha Lomas, First Major GDPR Decisions Looming on Twitter and 
Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (May 22, 2020, 9:30 PM CEST), 
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the Commission’s two-year GDPR evaluation detailed in part II.D., 
greater cooperation between DPAs and additional funding for DPAs 
such as the Irish DPA should be forthcoming, which should help further 
enforcement and lead to larger fines of the U.S. Tech Giants that violate 
the GDPR, as provided for in the GDPR, unless they categorically 
abandon the European market, which is unrealistic. In this context, the 
GDPR’s cooperation and consistency mechanism should be of great 
use. 
B. Risks Involved with GDPR Non-Enforcement 
As Wojciech Rafał Wiewiórowski—the European Data 
Protection Supervisor—recently stated, “Effective enforcement is an 
important element of any data protection framework.”462 An evaluation 
of the effectiveness of GDPR enforcement to-date is relevant to this 
study, and the institutional evaluation of the GDPR has been detailed 
in Part II.D.  
DPA communications are important as indicating what action 
the regulator intends to take, thus providing companies with 
information that will help shape their compliance programs. 
Interestingly, DPAs have tended to minimize the role of sanctions or, 
alternatively, to highlight the policy goals for their use, while many 
companies have been focused on the issue. For example, the ICO 
addressed the issue of GDPR sanctions early on in a “myth-busting” 
blog post.463 Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denham said that 
the GDPR “is not about fines,” adding that it is “about putting the 
consumer and the citizen first.”464 She emphasized the educational role 
played by the DPA, and the importance of other enforcement tools 
which have an impact on reputation: 
… it’s scaremongering to suggest that we’ll be 




462 European Data Protection Supervisor, The EDPS Strategy 2020 – 2024: 
Shaping a Safer Digital Future (2020), 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/20-06-
30_edps_shaping_safer_digital_future_en.pdf.  
463 Elizabeth Denham, GDPR – Sorting the Fact from the Fiction, ICO BLOG 
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-
blogs/2017/08/blog-gdpr-sorting-the-fact-from-the-fiction/ (“Myth #1: The 
biggest threat to organisations from the GDPR is massive fines.”). 
464 Id. 
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infringements or that maximum fines will become the 
norm. 
The ICO’s commitment to guiding, advising 
and educating organisations about how to comply with 
the law will not change under the GDPR. We have 
always preferred the carrot to the stick. 
… we have yet to invoke our maximum 
powers. 
Predictions of massive fines under the GDPR 
that simply scale up penalties we’ve issued under the 
Data Protection Act are nonsense. 
Don’t get me wrong, the UK fought for 
increased powers when the GDPR was being drawn 
up. Heavy fines for serious breaches reflect just how 
important personal data is in a 21st century world. 
But we intend to use those powers 
proportionately and judiciously. 
And while fines may be sledgehammer in our 
toolbox, we have access to other tools that are well-
suited to the task at hand and just as effective. 
Like the DPA, the GDPR gives us a suite of 
sanctions to help organisations comply – warnings, 
reprimands, corrective orders. While these will not hit 
organisations in the pocket – their reputations will 
suffer a significant blow. 
And you can’t insure against that.465 
These comments are very interesting and illustrate the philosophy that 
some regulators may develop, namely that the administrative sanctions 
provided for in the GDPR mainly have an expressive function. From 
this perspective, the symbolic function does not require effective 
impositions of sanctions.466 
Moreover, a discourse like that of the UK DPA emphasizes that 
the attitude of DPAs towards sanctions is definitely that of a regulator, 
and not that of a criminal judge whose job it is basically to pronounce 
sentences if offenses are proven, as soon as the repressive rule is 
 
465 Id. 
466 See supra Part I. C.  
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operative.467 In the case of regulators, it appears clearly that sanctions 
are merely a means of fulfilling their role and enforcing the legal 
framework set up by the lawmaker.468 In the initial phase, when the 
GDPR had to be applied by businesses, the regulators' discourse was 
that priority was given to education and support for actors to help them 
to put in place solutions to comply with the new regulation.469 Without 
affirming that sanctions would not be imposed, the message was that 
companies, especially SMEs, should not be overly afraid of sanctions 
and that they should instead engage in a cooperative approach with the 
regulator. Thus, there was a kind of two-fold caveat about sanctions: 
(i) sanctions would not be the first response to difficulties in 
immediately applying the new regulations; and (ii) the regulation 
would differentiate between large firms and smaller firms with less 
expertise to implement the GDPR. The interpretation to be given to the 
position of regulators should therefore take into account that the initial, 
"educational" phase may be over and that these reassuring words about 
the risk of sanctions may not apply to tech giants. A third points should 
be mentioned: Information Commissioner Denham’s 
words express the opinion of a person responsible for a particular DPA, 
especially one from a country that is no longer a member of the 
European Union, with the end of the Brexit transition period soon 
 
467 Daniel Ohana, Regulatory Offenses and Administrative Sanctions: Between 
Criminal and Administrative Law, The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, 
(M. D. Dubber & T. Hörnle, 2014).  
468 Achour M. Taibi Achour, La justification du pouvoir de sanction des AAI 
de régulation est-elle toujours pertinente? [Is the Justification for the 
Sanctioning Power of Regulatory IAAs Still Relevant?], 84 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL 463, 463 (2013). 
469 See Catherine Stupp, Falque-Pierrotin Leaves Top EU Post Before Dawn 
of ‘New Era’ for Privacy, EURACTIV (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/data-protection/interview/falque-pierrotin-
leaves-top-eu-post-before-dawn-of-new-era-for-privacy/ (quoting Isabelle 
Falque-Pierrotin, then outgoing head of the Article 29 Data Protection 
Working and head of the CNIL about then-forthcoming application of the 
GDPR, “It means the national authorities have to invest also in regulatory 
dialogue with the actors to provide them with a compliance tool that is very 
flexible, deciding the provision of the regulation in a more operational way. 
We’ve started this sectoral conversation with the actors in France and I believe 
in most of the countries we’re going to have this type of demand from 
stakeholders. Because of course they want to avoid fines, it’s normal. It’s our 
job as regulators to help them comply. Our job is not to have fines at any 
price.”).  
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ahead on December 31, 2020.470 It cannot be excluded that divergences 
between the policies pursued by the different national DPAs will 
increase during the current period. The DPAs might have different 
ideas on whether the initial pedagogical phase is over and whether it is 
not appropriate to have strong expectations vis-à-vis the tech giants.471 
These advanced or dissenting assessments could lead some DPAs to 
consider applying sanctions against tech giants, as the French CNIL 
has started to do against Google, or even to consider applying severe 
sanctions, as it is not yet the case. 
While such measures may have many goals, including perhaps 
some political ones, they should be modelled in a way that does not 
undercut the theoretical goals of the GDPR’s sanctions, including 
notably the deterrence function discussed in Part I.D. Furthermore, the 
lack of heavy sanctions and of effective enforcement by the Irish DPA 
to date poses a difficulty in light of the theory of sanctions. Particularly, 
to date sanctions have not been significantly large so as to sufficiently 
encourage the U.S. Tech Giants to comply with the GDPR. 
Furthermore, effective sanctioning is needed for the symbolic function, 
to send a message to market participants. This has been lacking in 
Ireland up to present. Finally, as this study discussed in Section III.A., 
companies do analyze past sanctions through modeling to evaluate risk 
of non-compliance. Thus, there is a danger that a lack of large, effective 
sanctions, may be giving a signal that the U.S. Tech Giants may 
continue to consider the risk of GDPR sanctions as a mere cost of doing 
business. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two and one-half years after Axelle Lemaire made her 
comment about sanctions, and two months after the GDPR entered into 
application, Facebook’s shares lost about from twenty percent to a 
quarter of their value, attributed in part to expected costs of the privacy-
enhancing requirements of the GDPR and also to loss of users due to 
scandals such as the Cambridge Analytica case involving misuse of 
 
470 UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson is reported to have indicated that the UK 
would diverge from the European Union on data protection law when the blocs 
split. There is also no guarantee that the UK will receive an adequacy decision 
for cross-border data transfers. See Jorge Valero & Samuel Stolton, LEAK: 
Commission Pushes UK for ‘High Degree of Convergence’ in GDPR Review, 
EURACTIV (June 23, 2020, updated June 24, 2020), 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/leak-commission-pushes-uk-
for-high-degree-of-convergence-in-gdpr-review/ (If no agreement is reached 
on an adequacy decision, controllers will not be able to export personal data 
from the European Union to the UK without additional safeguards.). 
471 See Golla, supra note 67, at 72–73. 
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personal data.472  In the market value ranking of the U.S. Tech Giants, 
the two companies arguably the most dependent on the use of personal 
data for advertising—Google and Facebook—both slipped between 
2017 and 2019. Alphabet (Google) went from second to fourth place 
and Facebook from fourth to fifth.473 This article argues that Lemaire’s 
comment and the news are related—that the fact of having higher 
sanctions—if effectively applied—should give Facebook (and other 
data-consuming companies) the incentive it needs to comply with EU 
data protection law, and that, although compliance may involve costs, 
it in turn may result in benefits to firms (such as the avoidance  of 
sanctions and related legal costs and staff time, or eventually increased 
trust in the eyes of the consumer and thus advanced compliance with 
personal data law may ultimately appear to be a competitive advantage 
in the market compared to other less scrupulous companies.)474 and 
further, that previously the lack of adequate sanctions gave companies 
such as Facebook no effective incentive originating in law to truly 
guarantee user data protection. Effective and substantial fines should 
result in the deterrence effect, which perhaps does not yet exist because 
of the failure to date of the Irish DPA to bring to completion 
enforcement action against the U.S. Tech Giants.  
Also, DPAs must pay more attention to the message that they 
communicate. While DPAs such as the United Kingdom’s ICO might 
be eager to reassure stakeholders that “Predictions of massive fines . . 
. are nonsense,” as Commissioner Denham was quoted as saying in Part 
III.B., they should consider the impact that this has on the deterrent 
effect of those same sanctions, especially on the U.S. Tech Giants and 
similar companies in China, India, and elsewhere. While such 
measures may have many goals, including perhaps some political ones, 
they should be modelled in a way that does not undercut the theoretical 
 
472 See Vengattil Munsif & Dave Paresh, Facebook's Grim Forecast: Privacy 
Push Will Erode Profits for Years, REUTERS (July 25, 2018, 10:11 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-results/facebooks-grim-
forecast-privacy-push-will-erode-profits-for-years-idUSKBN1KF2U5. See 
also, Hannah Kuchler, Facebook Shares Take a Hit After Poor Results, FIN. 
TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c0097b18-9028-11e8-
bb8f-a6a2f7bca546.   
473 See Kenneth Kiesnoski, The Top 10 US Companies by Market 
Capitalization, CNBC (Mar. 8, 2017, 7:53 AM EST, updated Oct. 24, 2017, 
2:22 PM EDT), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/08/the-top-10-us-companies-
by-market-capitalization.html (For the ranking as of October 24, 2017). 
474 See Voss & Houser, supra note 22, at 334–40 (Arguing that compliance 
with provisions of the GDPR, even beyond what is necessary, for example by 
extending GDPR-like protections to consumers worldwide, may constitute an 
element of legal strategy).  
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goals of the GDPR’s sanctions, including notably the deterrence 
function discussed in Part I.D. The other conclusion that can be drawn 
from the preceding remarks is that it would be important that the 
different policies of the DPAs regarding the use of sanctions be 
harmonized, both for the legal certainty in favor of businesses and for 
the credibility of the regulatory policy.  
Nonetheless, as a result of this potential for greatly reinforced 
enforcement measures and sanctions in the near future, companies 
(especially the U.S. Tech Giants) must ensure that their risk assessment 
tools are not too grounded in the past, and adequately take count of 
probable future changes. They should consider that big sanctions—
those that deter violations and demand compliance—are presumably 
on their way in Ireland and perhaps elsewhere.  
In their discussion of GDPR compliance,475 Voss and Houser 
refer to a legal strategy theoretical framework of compliance pathways 
developed by Bird.476 Five stages are detailed in that framework: 
avoidance, compliance, prevention, advantage, and transformation, 
ordered with respect to the degree of business transformation, with the 
highest degree at the end (transformation).477 Indeed, compliance with 
regulation not only may reward companies with trust but may bring 
other benefits, which argues in favor of companies’ embracing 
compliance. As an example, by making efforts to comply with the 
GDPR, companies will be preparing themselves for future changes to 
laws of countries that will be impacted by the GDPR, through 
negotiations between them and the European Union leading to 
adequacy decisions. Thus, embracing the GDPR now will prepare them 
for the future in other jurisdictions, including U.S. states whose 
legislation is inspired by the GDPR.478 Furthermore, even new 
economic actors may pop up, seizing an opportunity, such as those of 
the privacy tech sector.479 
Looking forward, the reader could imagine an extreme case of 
the risk of sanctions (for example the maximum incurred) applied to 
one of the U.S. Tech Giants, motivated by an anti-U.S. Tech Giants us-
versus-them spirit. A national DPA such as the CNIL could react 
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vigorously against a clear or even scandalous violation of the rights of 
Internet users (think of the Cambridge Analytica affair) and seek to 
"mark the spirits" by imposing an exemplary sanction. The impact 
would not only be financial for the sanctioned company; it would also 
be competitive. The digital services offered by the tech giants are partly 
specific and partly common to the different companies. For example, 
Google is dominant on the market for search engines,480 Facebook is 
dominant on the market for social networks, and so on.481 However, the 
various giants are in competition with each other in part of their 
business, particularly in the advertising exploitation of site traffic from 
the platforms that these companies offer.482 Each company, therefore, 
runs the risk of being threatened by a regulatory decision that would 
weaken it and affect user confidence vis-à-vis it. If one of the dominant 
companies in the digital economy commits serious violations of the 
GDPR and is therefore heavily sanctioned (through a heavy fine and a 
compliance order), then that company risks being seriously harmed. 
The exploitation of personal data is at the heart of their business model. 
If it is the way it collects, processes, and trades data that is considered 
to be contrary to the GDPR, then its business model needs to be 
thoroughly revised.483 Such a challenge would certainly be costly and 
time-consuming to implement. In the meantime, there is a risk that 
competing firms may gain a lead that the sanctioned firm may have 
difficulty catching up to. The history of the digital economy, and of 
technology firms more generally, has shown that apparent dominance 
at one point in time does not prevent rapid relegation.484 Thus, the 
challenge for each tech giants is not only to be sufficiently compliant 
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with the GDPR in order not to be exposed to sanctions, but also not to 
be less compliant than other major market players so as not to risk that 
a possible sanction becomes a serious competitive disadvantage. While 
this scenario remains hypothetical, it is a possibility that leads us to 
recommend taking the risk of sanctions by the DPAs seriously.  
CONCLUSION 
Prior to the application of the GDPR, on May 25, 2018, one of 
the results of the relatively-low-level of legislatively permitted data 
protection violation administrative fines was, arguably, a lack of 
compliance by U.S. Tech Giants, among others. At least on paper, this 
changed under the GDPR. This study has approached the issue of 
GDPR sanctions, not through the lens of a future catastrophe, but 
through, first developing the theoretical grounds for sanctions, prior to 
viewing the practical side of them. In doing so, it has been somewhat 
unique and has added to the GDPR literature. Furthermore, it has 
engaged the legal strategy and compliance literature to bring its results 
home to inform companies as to the risks involved and to provide 
strategic recommendations. 
 Of the several sub-goals of sanctions, this study has 
determined that the most relevant for an analysis of GDPR sanctions—
which are administrative, regulatory, and financial sanctions, in large 
part—is the deterrence function, beyond the symbolic functions. This 
demands effective and substantial administrative fines. While these are 
not the only sanctions available under the GDPR—this study has also 
set out a range of possible sanctions, such as judicial compensation and 
orders to halt data processing—they are perhaps the most characteristic 
of data protection enforcement. However, through what is referred to 
as the OSS mechanism, the Irish DPA is the lead authority for most of 
the U.S. Tech Giants, and it has failed to act against them up to now, 
resulting in a potential lack of deterrence. 
This study argues that companies should not take this recent 
past as a sign of the future, and should assume that bigger fines are 
coming, including those that should be issued by Ireland’s DPA. This 
is because Ireland has been hampered by problems of limited resources 
but should be on the verge of a decision on Twitter, and the finalizing 
of investigations against other U.S. Tech Giants. Pressure coming from 
various sources (public opinion, peer DPAs, etc.) is being put on the 
Irish DPA to do exactly this, and the OSS and cooperation and 
consistency mechanisms under the GDPR should help. Furthermore, 
the Commission is pushing Member States to provide greater resources 
to DPAs, and the EDPB to work on greater cooperation among DPAs. 
Thus, companies should seize the reputational and other benefits of 
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GDPR compliance, and not base compliance risk modeling on the 
sanctions that have been issued during what has turned out to be the 
GDPR’s breaking-in period. 
At the same time, DPAs (and the EDPB) must be aware of the 
importance of enforcement action. Truly dissuasive administrative 
fines must be issued in order for the sanctions to have their necessary 
deterrence effect. Furthermore, as has been shown, companies watch 
the past to predict the future, so it is important to signal to them that 
compliance is being taken very seriously. 
 
